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An analysis of the law. hased on a study commissioned 
hy Amnesty International 
hy Douwe Korff 
The following analysis of the non-jury (" Diplock") couns in Northern Ireland was 
prepared in 1982 by Dutch lawyer, Douwe Korff, as a commissioned study for 
Amnesty International. 
The text reproduced here has been shortened slightly (for reasons of economy). 
Amnesty International submitted the full text of the study in 19M3 to an official re-
view, then in progress, of the legislation and procedures governing such courts, as 
background to a recommendation that the organization's concerns he taken into ac-
count. 
SIM is grateful to Amnesty International for making the text available for independ-
ent publication. All rights for further reproduction are vested in Amnesty Interna-
tional. 
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Preface 
Since I Y73. special. non-Jury courts have been m operaiHm m Northern Ire-
land to try persons suspected of tcrronst oftenn·s; the so-called .. Diplock .. 
courts. named after the JUdge who headed the ( 'omm1ssion which. in I Y72 
recommt·ndcd that such courts he set up. 
In I YX2. Amnesty International (AI) had the law and prot·cdurl~S attend-
ing trials in the .. Diplock" courts analysed by a Dutch lawyer. Douwe Korff*. 
The orgamzation submitted this analysis to the UK government in Decem-
her I YX2 and to a government-appointed in4uiry in August I YIU. The anal-
ysis is hne made public in full for the first time. 
SIM has added to the study a brief Background Note concerning the 
emergency in Northern Ireland generally. and also providing information on 
certain developments since the writing oft he analysis. An external AI Circu-
lar of February I YX4, setting out the organization's continuing wncerns re-
garding the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland. is attached as an ap-
pendix. 
The AI analysis describes the impact of "emergency legislation" on the 
administr.1tion of justice in Northern Ireland in respect of terrorist suspects. 
having regard to both pre-trial proceedings and the trial stage. lt does so by 
comparing the special provisions introduced by this •· emergency legislation" 
and their practice with the ordinary rules and practice concerning criminal 
proceedings. Its author gives a detailed description of both systems, based 
upon legislation, case-law and legal opinion. Special attention is paid to tht• 
broad powers of arrest and detention by the police and the army; the rules 
pertaining to the 4uestioning of suspects; pre-trial investigation of com-
plaints; the trial itself in the "Diplock courts" as compared with ordinary (ju-
ry-) proceedings; the admissibility and weighing of evidence; and the relia-
bility of confessions. 
On the basis of this analysis the assessment is made that the effect of the 
"emergency legislation" on the administration of criminal justict~ in Nor-
thern Ireland means in many respects a departure from certain minimum re-
4uiremcnts of the English system of criminal justice as identified, inter alia, 
by the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, and in some respects a de-
parture from international standards for a fair trial; the latter especially 
where the practice of the prc-trial investigations and the impact thereof on 
the attitude of the judges is concerned, as well as the freedom from self-incri-
mination and the presumption of innocence. 
Dissemination ofthe analysis and its conclusions may be of great use, both 
to those who arc, in one way or another, involved in the administration of cri-
minal justice in Northern Ireland, and to all those who share our concern for 
a fair administration of justice all over the world. 
Professor P. van Dijk 
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Background note 
N.H. This note ts provttit'd ny SIM for the convemenee oft he general reader. 
at whom the analysts prepared for Amnesty International was not aimed. It 
is not part of that analysts, nor can 11 ne regarded as reflecting that organiza-
• • • !ton S VIeWs. 
Emergency legislation has neen a permanent feature of the law in Nor-
thern Ireland from lis foundation; it was agatn invoked ny the Northern Irish 
government to introduce internment in 1971. The Hritish government, hav-
ing suspemkd the Northern Irish government m March 1972, to replace it 
with "direct rule" from London, retained internment. 
However. in September 197 2 it appointed a commission, chat red by Lord 
Diplock, to consider 
"what arrangements for the administration of Justice in Northern Ireland could he 
made in order to deal more effectively with terrorist organizations hy hringing to 
hook, otherwise than hy internment hy the Executive, individuals involved tn terror-
ist activitie:; ... " ( Diplock Report, para I) 
The Diplock Commission treated its task as urgent. Having met for the 
first time on 20 October 1972, its report could already be presented to Par-
liament in December of that year. Yet it dealt with a vast topic, covering all 
aspects of the criminal justice process from arrest, through detention and in-
terrogation; bail; the mode and conduct of the trial; the rules of evidence; to 
special measures to deal with young offenders. Based on the recommend-
ations of the commission, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 
1973 (consolidated, with some amendments, in the present 1978 version of 
the Act) created a, de facto, parallel system of criminal justice applicable to 
terrorism-related offences. Persons suspected of involvement in terrorism 
can be arrested on less clear suspicion than can persons suspected of ordi-
nary crimes; they can be detained longer and subjected to much more force-
ful questioning; they are less likely to be granted bail; have less opportunity 
to challenge the prosecution case in the pre-trial stage; and, most important, 
are denied their right to a jury trial and tried instead in special courts before a 
single judge, with different rules of evidence, in particular as regards confes-
sions obtained as a result of "oppressive" questioning. At the same time, le-
gal safeguards in the system are reduced, as are judicial supervision and con-
trol over the manner in which the security forces use their new, or extended, 
powers. These are the matters addressed in the attached analysis. 
Lord Diplock, in making his recommendations had envisaged the non-ju-
ry courts to operate auxilliary to internment, and this was the initial situation. 
(see the Summery of Conclusions in the Diplock Report, para 7, under a-e). 
After the "Diplock" courts had been operating for just over a year, in 1974, 
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the ( iardmer ( 'ommlttee rL·vil'wed "in the context of civtlliherties and hu-
man fl!(ht<' the antl-terron..,t measure.., m Northern Ireland. The committee 
~:on eluded that detentton without trial (as internment had heen re-named) 
could not remain a.., a long-term poli~.:y; although the ~.:ommittee did not feel 
ahlc to recommend the immediate abolition of detention without trial. as a 
result of Its t:onstderation. detention without trial was phased out 111 thl' 
cour'ic of I (}7'5 and has not been used since. 
The ~.:ommtttee also reviewed the operation of the ·'Diplock" ~:our!\ dur-
ln!! thi-. ftrst year of thctr existence. remarking: 
"Hut for tht• fact that thcrl' I' no Jury. the non-Jury court' arc ordmary cour". 'illtn!! 
m public w1th variatiom tn the law of ev1dcncc and procedure wh1ch. on the whole. 
are not maJor ones". ( ( iardmer Report. par a 24 ). 
The committee discussed the changed ruk' of evidence which allowed 
conviction~ in the "Diplock" courts to he hased on ''involuntary" confes-
sions, and noted that the judges in the "Diplock" courts had retained a dis-
cretion to exclude confessions, even when legally admissihle, if not to ex-
clude them "would operate unfairly against the accused". The committee 
ohserved: 
"We have been told that [the change in the law of evidence regarding confessions [ 
has proved proccdurally convenient and satisfactory; we have heard nothing to in-
dicate that it has caused any miscarriage of justice; and, so long as the judicial discre-
tion remains, we think the chances of [this change in the law J producing an unjust tri-
al or an unjust verdict arc remote." ( Gardiner Report, para 50). 
The committee therefore merely recommended that the existence of the 
judicial discretion to exclude evidence he confirmed hy statute. 
There were indeed few complaints ahout the outcome of trials in the 
"Diplock" courts at the time. However, two factors affected the situation 
shortly after. 
First of all, while the committee was completing its report on the emerg-
ency legislation, the British Parliament passed the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act, granting police powers of arrest and detention for interrogation lasting 
up to a week. Although the committee stated that it had reviewed its findings 
in the light of the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the effect of 
prolonged interrogation on the reliability of confessions- which subsequent-
ly became the crucial issue in the "Diplock" courts- was not considered. 
Secondly, and probahly even more important, the committee did not con-
sider the effect of the abolition of detention without trial on the operation of 
the courts. For detention without trial to be ordered by the Executive, evid-
ence had sufficed which could not stand up in a court of law: anonymous 
evidence by witnesses who were too afraid of reprisals hy paramilitary or-
ganizations to testify in open court; intelligence evidence which, if disclosed, 
would compromise the source; hearsay evidence; or evidence by paid infor-
mers who could he discredited in cross-examination even if they had been 
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willing to testify in court. After detention without trial ended. people against 
whom the security forces had ohtained such evidence, hut no evidence which 
could he produced in court, could not, in the words of Lord Diplock 's com-
mission, he "hrought to hook"- unless they confessed during interrogation. 
Thus, the ending of detention without trial, much though it was to he wel-
comed in itself, hrought ahout a situation in which the ohtaining of confes-
sions is of crucial importance to the security forces in their efforts to "hring to 
hook" suspected terrorists. This remams the case to this day; and it is with 
this context in mind that Al's analysis should he read. 
In I 97() and 1977 the rules, regulations and safeguards surrounding inter-
rogation proved ineffective to prevent the ill-treatment of suspects in police 
custody. Amnesty International, in its Report of a Mission eo Northern Ire-
land ( 2H March-() Decem her 1977 ), published in I97H, concluded that such 
ill-treatment was sufficiently wide-spread to warrant a puhlic inquiry to he 
held. The committee of inquiry into police interrogation procedures, 
chaired hy Ben nett J., which was suhsequently appointed hy the British gov-
ernment, confirmed that there were cases "in which injuries, whatever their 
precise cause, were not self-inflicted and were sustained in police custody". 
( Bennett Report, para I ll3 ). 
In its 197H report, AI had already raised the question of the admissihtlity 
in evidence of statements hy persons suhjected to interrogation in police 
stations in Northern Ireland, stating: 
"The reduction of procedural safeguards regarding the admissibility of statements, 
the extention of the discretion of the single judge and the absence of a jury enhance 
the danger that statements obtained by maltreatment of suspects will be used as evid-
ence in court". (p. 67) 
However, the terms of the announcement of the appointment of the Ben-
nett Committee specifically excluded from the scope of its inquiry another 
examination ofthe change in the law of evidence regarding confessions. or of 
the emergency legislation generally. 
Apart from the Diplock-, Gardiner-, and Benne!!- reports, AI's analysis 
also draws on the Shackleton- report, which reviewed the operation of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act; and on the report hy the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Procedure and its Research Studies; as well as on reports of acad-
emic research into the "Diplock" courts, carried out at Queens's University 
Belfast; and on other publications. 
Finally, the AI analysis concerns mainly the risk of convicting people ac-
cused of serious (terrorist) crimes on the sole basis of uncorrohorated con-
fessions (allegedly) made during police interrogation, hut contested by the 
accused in court as either never having been made or as false and having 
been ohtamed under duress. Although the practice of convicting accused on 
the basis of such confessions (which accounted for the overwhelming major-
ity of contested cases at the time of writing of the analysis) continues to be wi-
despread, a new feature of prosecution practice has arisen since. Apart from 
prosecutions based on (alleged) confessions. a large number of people have 
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heen charged since early 1983 on the sole basis of testimony of former ac-
complices of the accused, so-called "supergrasses" (from the English slang 
word for informer. "grass"). 
Amnesty International's concerns in this respect are set out in a circular 
of 17 Feoruary 1984. attached as an appendix. Suffice it to say here that the 
issue of "supergrass" evidence in so far shows parallels to the issue of confes-
sion evidence as ooth regard the inherent lack of reliability of statements 
which are not made "voluntarily": confessions used in the "Diplock" courts 
are obtained as a result of strong psychological pressure during interroga-
tion; "supergrass" testimony as a result of promises (of freedom from prose-
cution, or low sentences even for killings, and/ or of money and a new ident-
ity). Without discussing the matter further here (for details, see Supergrass. 
The Use of Accomplices Evidence in Northern Ireland, Cobden Trust, Lon-
don, 1984) it may be noted that the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal has 
recently ruled that with regard to "supergrass" testimony. corroboration of a 
"clear and compelling kind" is required before a conviction may be based on 
it. (ruling in the McCormick-case, Guardian 13 January 1984 ). This would 
appear to underline the conclusion reached in At's analysis with regard to 
confession evidence: that confessions obtained as a result of oppressive 
questioning are prima facie unreliable and should not be a basis for convic-
tion without corroboration. 
No such conclusions are drawn, however, in the report by Sir George 
Baker, made public in April 1984. The English High Court judge, who was 
appointed by the British government to review the Northern Irish (Emerg-
ency Provision) Act on which the "Diplock" court system is based, and to 
whom Amnesty International submitted its analysis, said that a concrete 
case of wrongful conviction at trial had nowhere been presented to him. He 
therefore recommended only a few, relatively insignificant changes in 
"Diplock" court proceedings, mainly: that certain minor or non-terrorist of-
fences be tried in the ordinary courts; that the number of defendants in joint 
"supergrass" cases be reduced; that police powers of arrest be (further) sim-
plified and detention on the sole authority of the police be reduced from 72 
to 48 hours (while retaining the possibility of prolonged detention of up to 
seven days on the authority of the Secretary of State); and that delays in 
oringing people to trial be reduced. 
Sir George rejected arguments for a return to trial by jury or for trials in 
the "Diplock" courts to be presided over by a plurality of judges, recom-
mending in stead that the present system be retained of such trials to be con-
ducted by a single judge acting also as jury. He defended the use of "super-
grasses". 
Although the use of tape-recorders in police offices should, in Sir 
George's view, be considered, he made no firm recommendations in this re-
spect. Nor are the rules on "admissibility" of confessions to be altered, or the 
rule that confessions may form the sole basis for a conviction without any 
further corroborative evidence. 
Again without going into detail, it should be noted that Sir George's in-
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yuiry appears to have failed to address the crucial issue concerning the fair-
ness of proceedings linked with the "Diplock" courts: the reliahility of con-
fessions ohtamcd as a result of "forceful", "decisive" and "persistent" inter-
rogation. The yuestion that should he asked in this regard is not whether any 
people convicted in the "Diplock" courts can he shown to have he wrongly 
convicted and innocent. hut whether it can he confidently said that the pres-
ent rules and proceedings assure that people are only convicted if their guilt 
of the crimes of which they arc accused is cstahlishcd hevond reasonahlc 
• 
douht. The fact that Sir Georgc relics on the ahsence of proven wrongful 
convictions as an argument against change lends support to the conclusion 
reached in Amnesty International's analysis, that there arc douots ahout the 
adherence in the" Diplock" court system to the presumption of innocence in 
all cases. 
Amnesty International's analysis therefore remains as relevant today as it 
was when it was written in 1982. 
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Introduction 
This study contams an analysis of the law relating to trials in the non-jury 
.. Diplock .. courts in Northern Ireland -the courts set up in ( >ctohcr 197 3 on 
the hasis of recommendations made hy Lord Diplock. The courts have juris-
diction in cases of "scheduled offences". i.e. offences listed 111 a schedule 
( ~chcdulc 4) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act. which es-
tahlishcd the courts. In the words of Lord Diplock. "scheduled offences" arc 
"those crimes whtch arc commonly committed at the present time hy mcm-
hcrs of terrorist orgamzations".: 
Lord Gardiner. in his review of the anti-terrorist measures in Northern 
Ireland in 1974. said that. 
"Hut for the fact that there i~ no Jury. the non-Jury court~ arc ordinary courts, slll-
mg m puhhc with vanalions m the law ol eVIdence and procedure whtch. on the 
whole. are not maJor ones" ( (iardtner Report. para ~4). 
lt will he shown. however. that the emergency legislation has affected all 
stages of the criminal justice process. and some of these stages seriously. De-
fendants in the .. Diplock" courts who contest their case may he convicted on 
the hasis of confessions which could not form the has is of a conviction under 
ordinary rules. Often specific changes in legal provisions have an effect far 
heyond the immediate part oft he law in which they arc contained. This anal-
ysis therefore attempts to put such provisions, with their changes, in the con-
text of the whole criminal justice system, to show these effects. lt does so with 
reference to the ordinary criminal justice process as it applies in Northern 
Ireland. This system is hroadly the same as the system in England. from 
which it is taken and on which. in many respects, it relics. Reference ts there-
fore often made to English judicial precedents which apply fully to the Nor-
thern Irish system. 
The English I Northern Irish system of criminal justice is an accusatorial, 
common-law system. The emphasis in the prc-trial stage is on cstahlishing 
whether there is a case against the accused. rather than on examining all 
aspects of the case (as in inquisitorial systems).The powers of the police to 
detain suspects for questioning, which in ordinary circumstances arc relat-
ively limited. must he seen in this light, and in the light of the historical deve-
lopment of questioning hy the police in English law: the police, who arc rc-
sponsihlc hoth for the investigation of crime and for the preparation of the 
prosecution. arc independent from the executive as well as from the courts, 
and arc not 'iuhject to independent, contemporaneous supervision. The im-
pact of changes in the law on prc-trial procedures, mduding extended police 
powers, arc discussed in Part I of the analysis. 
The emphasis in the English criminal justice system as a whole is on the tri-
al. in which proscl'ution and dcfcnl'L' arc mcticulou\ly ensured "equality of 
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arms" in presenting their case to the tribunal of fact. The setting by the judge 
of the legal framework for the "weighing" of evidence by the tribunal of fact 
is a crucial clement in attaimng fairness in English criminal proceedings. The 
effects of emergency legislation on the trial arc discussed in Part 11 of the 
analysis. Part 11 also contains brief discussions of the possibilities, nature, 
and scope of appellate review of judgments in the" Diplock" courts, and of 
the complaints machinery. 
In Part Jll the crucial issue in the" Diplock" cout1s, as it has emerged in the 
earlier parts, is singled out and discussed: the reliability of confessions ob-
tained as a result of "forceful", "persistent" and "decisive" interrogation as 
the sole basis for convictions. The practice of the "Diplock" courts is con-
trasted with considerations brought up in the most recent authoritative, offi-
cial rcvtcw of English criminal procedure, carried out by the Royal Commis-
sion on Criminal Procedure on behalf ofthc British Government. The Royal 
Commission, in formulating its proposals for ensuring the reliability of con-
fessions, and for evidentiary rules linked with the question of reliability, had 
before it the results of a study oft he psychological effects of interrogation, to 
which reference is also made in this part of the analysis. Finally, the proceed-
ings in the "Dip lock" courts arc assessed under international norms which 
set minimum standards for the fairness of trials. 
lH 
PART I 
dings 
The pre-trial inquiries and procee-
The detcnmnation of guilt or innocence of an accused on a criminal charge 
in a court of law cannot he seen separately from the mquirics and proceed-
ings pnor to the trial, since I hey both affect the fairness of the trial and the re-
liability of its outcome. No court of law can fairly assess the case against an 
accused unless in the prc-trial stage there arc safeguards concerning the 
manner in which evidence is obtained against him. More than to any other 
part of the proceedings, this applies to the manner in which statements hy the 
accused, in particular self-incriminating statements and confessions, arc ob-
tained in custody. 
International attention on methods of interrogatiOn by the security forces 
in Northern Ireland in the past decade has focusscd on methods of interroga-
tion amounting to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, used by 
the army in 1971, and on physical maltreatment in the course of police ques-
tioning, widespread in 1976 and 1977. 
The fairness and reliability of convictions in criminal trials (and \\-lth it the 
integrity of the entire criminal justice system) is not, however, ensured hy the 
mere absence of physical maltreatment in the course of questioning. A high-
er not m is set both hy basic requirements of the English system of criminal 
justice (which applies also in Northern Ireland) and hy international instru-
ments. These norms are further discussed in Part Ill of this analysis; in the 
meantime, this analysis of the law concerns, not only the extent to which the 
law and other, subordinate, rules guarantee the absence of physical mal-
treatment of persons detained for questioning, hut beyond that, the extent to 
which these rules seek to ensure the reliability of evidence (confessions) ob-
tained as a result of such questioning. Chapter I analyses the legal basis for 
arrest and detention for questioning under the emergency legislation, as 
compared with the ordinary law. It gives particular attention to the legal con-
straints on, and the extent of judicial control over. the exercise of emergency 
powers of arrest and detention, since the absence of safeguards against the 
arbitrary use of these powers in itself can lead to abuses affecting the criminal 
justice process as a whole. Chapter 2 analyses the framework for and rules 
relating to interrogation; and the manner in which the implementation of the 
rules is supervised. Chapter 3 deals with a number of other changes in the law 
regarding the pre-trial stage of the "Diplock" court system. The law regard-
ing the trial in those courts itself is discussed in the second part of this analy-
SIS. 
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Chapter 1 The leJlHI basis for arrest and detention for ques· 
• • tJORinJl 
(i) Ordinary Powers of Arrest 
(ii) Common Law Euentials for a Valid Arrest 
( iii) Detention for Questioning 
(iv) Special Powers of Arrest and Detention 
( v) Legal Constraints and Judicial Control On re Martin Lynch I 
(vi) Special Powers of Arrest and Detention by the Army 
f vii) Conclusions 
( i) Ordinary Powers of Arrest 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure observed: 
"There is a lack of clarity and an uneasy and confused mtxture of common law and 
statutory powers of arrest, the latter having grown piecemeal and without any con-
sistent rationale" ( RCCP Report, para 3.o!\ ). But although "(I) he law ahout the cir-
cumstances in which someone can he arrested ... is complicated ... in general only 
someone who has heen seen to commit an offence or who can reasonahly he suspect-
ed of committing an offence can he arrested" (Ibid., para 3. 70). 
Briefly, the common law confers powers of arrest for dealing with 
breaches ofthe peace. Otherwise. arrests must he hy virtue of a warrant issu-
ed by a magistrate, or without warrant on the basis of a specific statutory pro-
vision. The most commonly used statutory provisions for Northern Ireland 
are contained in section 2 of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 196 7 
(the Northern Irish equivalent of the Criminal Law Act 1967, concerning 
England and Wales). These provisions confirm the above general statement 
about the law. In the words of Bennett J.: 
"The two points to be noted about these provisions are, first, that the power of ar-
rest arises only in respect of a specific offence either committed or suspected to have 
heen committed or about to he committed, and, second. that the re-iteration of the 
requirement of 'reasonahle cause· provides an objective element and pre-condition 
to the exercise of the power of arrest." Benne// Report, para o5 ). 
It is therefore a fundamental principle of English law that people not su-
spected of a specific offence cannot he forced hy means of arrest to assist the 
police, even if this would be helpful to the inquiries; they have a social and 
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moral duty to assist the police. hut not a legal one. This principle is directly 
linked to the traditional view that the police should and ts policmg hy consent 
( RCCP Report. para .l!JO). 
(ii) Common Law Essentials for a Valid Arrest 
Where an arre~;t is made on a warrant. the law rcqmres that the warrant 
should state the charge on which the arrest is made. The courts have deve-
loped a similar safeguard against arbitrary arrests without warrant: even 
when lawfully possthlc. for an arrest without warrant to he valid. certain 
'common-law essentials' have to he met. These have been developed in the 
case of Christie and another I' Leachinskv( I IJ4 7) I All ER 5o 7. and reqmre 
that a person who is being arrested he told. at the time of the arrest. that he is 
being arrested and the factuatbasis for the suspicion on which the arrest is 
hased. Lord Simons. delivering the judgement. said: 
"First, I would say that it is the right of every cillzen to he free from arrest unless 
there is in \ome other cttllen. whether a constahle or not, the right to arrest him. I 
would say next that it i' the corollary of the right of every cititen to he thus free from 
arrest that he should he entitled to resist arrest unless that arrest is lawful. How can 
these rights he reconciled with the proposition that he may he arrested without 
knowmg why he is arrested'! It ts to he rememhered that the nght of the constahle in 
or out of uniform ts. except for a circumstance irrelevant to the present discussion, 
the same as that of every other citizen. Is citizen A hound to suhmit unresistingly to 
arre~t hy citizen Bin ignorance of the charge made against him? I think. my Lords. 
that ,·an not he the law of England. Blind unquestioning ohedience is the law of tyr-
ants and of slaves. It does not yet flounsh on English soil. I would. therefore. suhmit 
the general proposition that it is a condition of lawful arrest that the man arrested 
should he entitled to know whv he is arrested. and then. since the affairs of life sel-
• 
dom admit an ahsolute standard or an unqualified proposition. see whether any 
qualification ts of necessity imposed on it. It is not an essential condition oflawful ar-
rest that the constahle should at the time of arrest formulate any charge at all. much 
less the charge which may ultimately he found in the indictment, hut this. and this on-
ly. is the qualification which I would impose on the general proposition. It h:aves un-
touched the principle. which lies at the heart of the matter. that the arrested man is 
entitled to he told what is the act for which he is arrested .... This is, I think, the fund-
amental principle, that a man is entitled to know what, in the apt words of Law· 
rence I. J are 'the facts alleged to constitute crime on his part"' (emphasis added). 
(iii) Detention for Questioning 
Many of the legal principles and rules governing the criminal justice process 
stem from an earlier period (before the middle ofthe 19th century) when the 
law did not envisage questioning of suspects by the police. Arrests used to 
he: "the first step in a criminal proceeding against a suspected person on a 
charge which was supposed to he judicially investigated"(Scott, L.J. in 
Christie v Leachinsky; emphasis added). 
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In time. however, the investigative functions of the magistrates (other 
than at committal proceedings) disappeared. With the emergence of a mod-
em police force. questioning hy the police of arrested suspects developed in 
the course of this century within what might he called the legal vacuum he-
tween the moment when the minimum requirement for a lawful arrest (rea-
sonahle suspicion of involvement in a specific offence) exists, and the emerg-
ence (possihly as a result of questioning) of "enough evidence to prefer a 
charge" against the suspect. when the latter must he charged "without delay" 
and after which, as a rule. no further questioning is allowed (Principle (d) 
prefaced to, and Rule Ill (b) of the Judges' Rules, discussed he low). On this 
rather narrow legal hasis, the courts sanctioned questioning of suspects in 
detention hy the police in order to dispel or confirm such reasonable suspi-
cion as gave rise to the arrest (cf. Lord Devlin's opinion in the case of Shaa-
ban Bin Hussein v Chong Fook Kam( 1969) 3 All ER 1626). The practice of 
police questioning has been further extended by means of the legal fiction 
that many people taken ("invited") to the police station are voluntarily 
"helping the police in their inquiries"; they are supposeq not to he arrested 
even if they may be under the (often not unreasonable) impression that they 
are not free to leave. 
In England and Wales, the ambiguous situation is further compounded by 
the uncertainty and lack of clarity of the law on the permitted period for 
which a suspect may be kept in police custody after arrest without being 
charged or brought before a court. In that jurisdiction persons arrested on 
suspicion of a ·•serious" offence must be brought before a magistrate's court 
"as soon as practicable"; those suspected of any other offence, within 24 
hours (unless released earlier). The words "serious" and "as soon as practic-
able" have not been clearly defined (in practice). In the view of the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure this "gives flexibility but produces un-
certainty both for the police and the suspect" (para 3.98).1n Northern Ire-
land, the requirement generally is that arrested persons must be brought be-
fore a magistrate within 48 hours. 
(iv) Special Powers of Arrest and Detention 
Special powers of arrest and detention are conferred upon the Northern Ire-
land police (the Royal Ulster Constabulary, RUC) by virtue oftwo statutes, 
the current versions of which are the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provi-
sions) Act 1978 and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) 
Act 1976. The Emergency Provisions Act also confers powers of arrest on 
members of the security forces; this will be discussed separately below. The 
police powers of arrest and detention under these two Acts are usually dis-
cussed together, but in view of their rather different origin, it is useful to con-
sider them separately. 
The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) A et 197 3 (consolidated in 
the current 1978 Act) was based on the Diplock Report, which recom-
mended the setting up of special courts (the "Diplock Courts", discussed be-
low) to try those against whom evidence could be produced in a court of law 
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of their involvement in "those crimes which are commonly committed at the 
present time by members of terrorist organizations" ( Diplock Report, para 
6 ). Trial of suspected terrorists on charges of involvement in such "sche-
duled offences" was specifically seen as auxilliary to detention without trial 
(internment) and the powers granted by the Act must he viewed in that con-
text. 
Section ll ( l) ofthe current I 97K version oft he Act provides that "I a [ny 
constable may arrest without warrant any person whom he suspects of being 
a terrorist". 2 A person so arrested may he detained for up to 72 hours. 
The Bennett Report comments: 
.... .it is clear that these powers of arrest were designed to he used a~ the start of a 
procedure leading to questioning, followed by detention without judicial trial (for· 
merly referred to as internment)" (para 66). 
Section 13( I) of the current 1978 version of the Act provides that" [ a[ny 
constable may arrest without warrant any person whom he suspects of com-
mitting, having committed or being about to commit a scheduled offence or 
an offence under this Act which is not a scheduled offence." Again, to quote 
the Bennett Report: 
.. It is to he noted that the power of arrest under section 13 arises in respect of a spe-
cific offence, but that the section does not grant any extension of the power to keep in 
custody following an arrest under this section, lleyond the ordinary provision in Nor-
them Ireland of 48 hours" (para 67). 
Thus, the wider power of arrest and detention, based on a general suspi-
cion, was linked with an extra-judicial process with a view to possible deten-
tion without trial, whereas arrests made on suspicion of involvement in spe-
cific offences, that is, in the prospect of criminal prosecution, were supposed 
to he subject to the ordinary time limit on police detention in Northern Ire-
land. It would appear to follow that in the absence of detention without trial 
the wider power should not be used. In fact, as the Bennett Report observes: 
" ... the powers of detention without trial under the consolidated Act have never 
been used, and comparable powers under earlier Acts have not been used since 
1975. But the powers of arrest under section 11 continue to be used as the start of a 
procedure leading to questioning, and, possibly, the charging of the prisoner with a 
specific criminal offence for which he will be tried in a court of law" (para 66 ). 
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) A et 1 976( consoli-
dating the origina\197 4 version of the Act) provides in section 12 that a con-
stable may arrest without warrant anyone whom he reasonably suspects to 
be "a person who is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism", or whom he reasonably suspects to be guilty 
of certain offences created by the Act, related to terrorism. 
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The Act prov1tlcs the police throughout the United Kingdom wnh powers 
to hold persons arrested under th1s section for qut•stioning for up to 4X hours 
on their own authority, and. for a further five days, with the formal consent 
• 
of the Home Secretary (in England and Wales) or of the Secretary of State 
for North cm Ireland (for that junsdict1on ). · 
The (original) Prevention of Terrorism Act lll74 was passed hy the Umt-
cd Kingdom Parliament wnh unprecedented haste following the homhing 
hy the Provisional Irish Republican Anny of two public houses m Birming-
ham on 21 Novcmhcr IIJ74, which resulted in the deaths of 21 people. with 
injuncs to over I XO others ( Shackleton Report. para I ff). 
The scope of this report heing restricted to Northern Ireland, it is, non-
etheless, 1mportantto note that the Prevention ofTerronsm Act was passed 
to meet the threat of political v1olence in Northern Ireland spreading to 
(ireat Britain. lt is clear from parliamentary debates that the Act was intro-
duced and contmucd in operation with the situation in (ire at Britain 111 
mind. In particular, 11 appears that no consideration was given to the cfft·ch 
of the extended powers of arrest, detention, and questionmg on the opera-
tion of the rules of procedure and evidence in trials in the Diplock courts. 
The report on the rcv1ew of the operation of the Act, carried out hy Lord 
Shacklcton in IIJ7X, states, in the general chapter dealing with powers of ar-
rest and detention: "The Judges' Rules and the related Admmistrativc DI-
rections on interrogation and the taking of statements apply to a pt·rson de-
tained under the Act as they do to any person arrested under other powers" 
(Para X7 ). 
However, the chapter of that report dealing with the application of the 
Act in Northern Ireland makes no mention of the fact that the rules of evid-
ence in the Diplock ( ·ourts have hccn altered to nullify the sanction on wh1ch 
the Judges' Rules rest (see hclow. Chapter 2). 
lt can he concluded that prolonged detention for questioning in Northern 
Ireland heyond the ordinary time limit of 4X hours is hascd on two provi-
sions, neither of which was introduced with the Diplock court system 111 
mind: the relevant provision in the Emergency Provision Act, when intro-
duced, envisaged proceedings leading to detention without trial, and the 
provision in the Prevention of Terrorism Act was passed in considcrahle 
haste with the situation in Great Britain in mind. Nor did anv of the reviews 
" 
of relevant legislation ( Gardincr, Shack let on, Ben nett) consider the effects 
of these provisions on the Diplock courts system. 
( v) Legal Comtraints and Judicial Control (in re Martin Lynch) 
lt would appear from this summary that there arc a numhcr of legal con-
straints upon the exercise hy the police of the emergency power-, of arrest 
and detention. Firstly, when an arrest must he hascd on "rcasonahlc suspi-
cion" ,this ought to provide, m Ben nett J. \words, "an objective clement and 
pre-condition lo the exercise of the power of arrest ... This applies to arrests 
hy the police under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (section 12)and under 
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the Emergency Provisions Act (~ection 13 ). 
Secondly. 11 would appear that when there 1s a reasonahlc suspicu>n of 
someone's involvement in a specific (terrorist) offence, he/she ought to he 
arrested under section 13 of the Emergency ProvisiOns Act; and where there 
1s only a general suspicion of someone's involvement m terrorism, hut there 
1s no suspicion of any specific crime, the wide powers can he used. 
Thirdly, it would appear that when there is a reasonahle suspicion of in-
volvement m a specific offence. thc common-law essentmls for a valid arrcst 
apply. 
Finally, and most important. 11 was thought until recently that succcssivc 
arrests on the samc suspicion wcrc unlawful (m that scnsc, scc Report of an 
A mnestv International Minion to Northern Ireland ( 2N Nm·emher- () l>e-
cemher /<iTi ), p. hX ). 
Thc ruling, on a haheas corpus application hrought in June IIJXO in re 
Martin Henry Lynch makcs cl car that in fact none of these constramts apply. 
Thc case dealt with the fact that, although suspected of involvement m a spe-
cific offence, Lynch was not arrested under section 13 of the Emergcncy 
Provisions Act: that he was consequently not told of which offence he was 
suspected, nor given the factual has1s for suspicion; with the fact that Lynch 
was repeatedly arrested, in quick successiOn, on the same suspicion: and 
with demal of access to a solicitor or doctor. 
The Lord Chief Justice for Northern Ireland cstahlishcd in that case the 
following points of law on the ahovc points. Firstly, that the court nccd not 
prohe the suspicion of the arresting officer heyond heing informed, in that 
officer's affidavit, that his suspiwm was hascd on his "existing knowledge 
and the m formation given to him" at the hriefing he received heforc making 
the arrest (cited on p.4 of the ruling). In the Judge's view, "it would he per-
verse. on the affidavit evidence which is availahlc,to deny the reasonahlencss 
• 
of the arresting constahle 's suspicion" (p. 10 of the ruling- original empha-
sis). No "ohjccllve element" can ht• discerned in the test applied hy the Lord 
Chief .Justice. 
Secondly, it1s clear from the ruling that arrests under the w1dc powers arc 
lawful also in cases whcrc the arrested pt•rson is in fact suspected of a specific 
offence. 
Indeed. thirdly, the Lord Ch1ef Just1cc held that hecause "no specific 
cnme need he suspected in order to ground a proper arrest under section 12 
( I) (h)". persons arrested under th1s section, hut who arc suspected of a spe-
Cific crime, also need not he informed of the specific acts of which they arc 
suspected (pp. X-IJ of this ruling). The common law safeguards developed in 
Christie v Leachinsky therefore do not in practice apply to arrests made un-
der the wide emergency powers- even as regards arrests hascd on suspicion 
of a specific offence. 
The Lynch ruling thus validated the RUC policy, noted hy Bennell J ., "to 
arrest e~cry suspect, even if caught in the act of committing a spec1fic off-
ence, under their powers either under section I I of the IIJ7X Act or section 
12 of the IIJ7h Act" (Para 70). 
The lack of safeguards against the arbitrary use of police powers of arrest 
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and detention arc the more disturhmg m the light of the JUdge's ruling (on the 
central is~ue) that successive arrcsh on the same suspicion were not unlaw-
ful: 
'"IW]ecanfindnothingmsecllon 11 ofthc 197HActorscction 12ofthc I'176Act 
to place a fetter on the ri~tht to arrest first under one Act and then under the other. or 
indeed tw1ce m quick succes'lon under the same provisum .. ."" 
The JUdge wa~ "also reminded of' the ( ·ar/tonacase ( 1943) 2 All ER 560, 
in which it was held that the requisitioning of property in the second world 
war was not subject to JUdicial control (in the ab~cnce of proven bad faith). 
lhe Lord Chief Justict~ quoted this case as follows: 
··11 has heen decided as clearly as anything can he decided that, where a regulation 
of this kmd commits to an executive authority the decision of what is ncces'l!ry or 
cxped1cnt and that authonty makes the decision. it is not competent to the couw.to 
mvestigatc the grounds or the reasonableness of tht: decision in the absence of an 
allegation of bad faith. If it were not so. it would mean that the courts would be made 
responsible for carrying on the executive government of this country on these im-
portant matters. Parliament. which authorises this regulation. commits to the execu-
tive the discretion to decide and with that discretion, if bona fide exercised. no court 
can interfere. All that the court can do is to see that the power which it is claimed to 
ellercise, is one which falls within the four corners of the powers given by the legisla-
ture and to see that those powers are exercised in good faith. Apart from that, the 
courts have no power at all to inquire into the reasonableness, the policy. the sem.e. 
or any other aspect of the transact10n'" (pp. 14-15 of the ruling). 
According to the Lord Chief Justice: 
"lhis observation underlines the argument for the Crown that an unacceptable 
but ostensibly lawful exercise of the powers of arrest conferred by the 1976 and 197H 
Acts would call for an ellecutivc rather than a judicial remedy" (p. 15 of the ruling). 
Although in the Judge's opinion: 
"In reality no such exercise could be alleged in the present case'" ( p. 15 of the rul-
ing). 
The ruling by the Lord Chief Justice also made clear that habeas corpus 
proceedings do not constitute a remedy against improper or even unlawful 
behaviour by the police during questioning. The relevant passage reads: 
" [Defence counsel's J last point (ground 3) was that the applicant's detention, 
even if lawful to start with, became unlawful befause of its conditions in that he con-
tinued to be detained in custody without being granted access to his solicitor or doc-
tor. There is no authority to support this submission. lt to us that the treat-
ment and conditions of detention accorded to a person lawfully detained do not 
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touch on the lawfulness of that detention and do not therefore J!i"e rise to the rem-
t'dy of habt'as corpus. There is old authority for this which !prosecution counst•l! 
brought to our notice and which we would respectfully follow. 
Style 432 (I 654) H2 F.R H3H reports a case as follows: 
The Court was moved for a habeas corpus to remove a pri~oner in Northampton 
Ciao!. that was convicted of felony. and het~n burnt on the hand. upon an affidavit 
that the ~taokr used him hardly. Aut Roll. Chief Justice answered, that it could not 
he, but they might either emhct the gaoler, or bring an action against him." 
And in ex parte William Cobhett (I H4H) 5 CA 41 H: 136 ER 940. the Court re-
fused to grant a haheas corpus to a prisoner in custody on the ground that the keeper 
of the prison had improperly removed him to a part of the prison provided for pris-
oners of a particular class. Wilde.C.J .. delivering judgment, said: 
This court has no power to interfere in the matter. The prisoner is in custody un-
der process issuing out of the Court of Chancery. If the keeper of the Queen's prison 
is acting Improperly m placing him in the particular part of the prison of which he 
complains, the ordinary means of redress for the wrong are open to him"" ( /. ynch-
ruling. pp. 15-16, emphasis added). 
The specific point at issue in the Lynch case regarded denial of access to a 
solicitor and a doctor in the course of incommunicado detention. The Lord 
Chief Justice's statement of the law (emphasized in this quote) is not how-
ever in any way qualified and extends to all aspects of detention: no matter 
how badly a prisoner is treated, an no matter even if that treatment is as such 
unlawful, the remedy of habeas corpus is not available as long as the initial ar-
rest was lawful and as long as the detention did not exceed the time limits laid 
down by the law. By accepting the 17th century case as legal precedent, the 
Lord Chief Justice makes clear that even ill-treatment of a prisoner does not 
give rise to habeas corpus. 
In the absence of institutional judicial involvement in police questioning 
(below, Chapter 2( i) ), and of other means of contemporaneous judicial re-
view of police behaviour in the course of interrogation, the ruling that the 
treatment of prisoners does not affect the legality of their detention effect-
ively absolves the courts from providing any form of immediate relief against 
abuse of prisoners' rights and indeed against attacks on their physical or 
mental integrity. 
All other, ex post facto, remedies suffer from the obvious defect that they 
can no longer prevent or terminate wrongful arrests and detentions. But they 
are also ineffective in practice in that, other than in habeas corpusproceed-
ings, they place the onus on the complainant to prove, at least on the balance 
of probability, that the challenged arrest or detention was unlawful 1 ; for ex-
ample that there was no "reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorism". 
Given the vagueness ofthese terms, and the possibility ofthe police to claim 
that their suspicion was based on information which cannot be disclosed, this 
is virtually impossible in practice. 
So long as the courts accept such a claim by the police without probing it, it 
will also be virtually impossible to prove bad faith on the part of the police -
the final test which the courts have reserved for themselves. Although the ac-
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ccptancc of such a claim hy the courts must of course he seen m the light ot 
the very real dan!(er to witnesses who give evidence to the police. this should 
not leave unnoticed that hy not probing the alle!(Cd factual hasts for an arrest 
and detcntum this final test too no longer constitutes effective JUdtctal con-
trol over the excrrtse of police powers of arrest and dctentton. 
(l'i! .\pectall'owers o/Arre.H and Detentwn hv the Armv 
. . 
In ordmary nrcumstances. the army plays no role m the enforcement of the 
law vis-a-vts ctvillans. But in the emergency cxistmg in Northern Ireland it 
has hccn ass1gned such a role. even if at present it is government policy that 
the IH !('is again pnmanly responsible in this respect, with the army acting 
under the acgts of the police, in particular asststing them in effecting arrests 
under the special powers, described above. Following Lord Dtplock's re-
commendations, however. there is also a special provtsion for arrest and det-
ention hy the army. actmg mdcpcndently of the police. 
When the army was first assigned a role m law enforcement, the Northern 
lnsh courts applied to arrests hy soldiers the ordinary legal criteria for a valid 
arrest, requiring that the arrested person he informed, at the time of his ar-
rest, of the fact that he i' arrested and of the grounds for arrest, including the 
power under which the arrest is made. Lord Diplock considered: 
"We are satisfied that this is a serious handicap to the security forces in perfonning 
the1r difficult and dangerous duty of prott•cttng the life and property of innocent cit-
llens in Northern Ireland. Reluctant though we arc to propose any curtailment. 
however slight. of the liherty of any tnnocent man. we think it is Justifiable to take the 
risk that occasionally a person who takes no part in terrorist activity and has no spe-
cial knowkdge ahout terrorist organizations should he detained for such short time 
as is needed to establish his identity, rather than that dangerous and guilty men 
should escape Justice because of technical rules about arrest to which it is impractic-
ahle to conform m existing circumstances. 
We accordingly recommend that steps should be taken by lcgislation 
( I ) to confer upon members of the armed serviccs: 
(a) Power to arrest without warrant and to remove to any police station or to any 
premises occupied hy the armed forces any pcr,on suspected of having committed or 
being about to commit any offence, or having information about any offence com-
mitted or about to be committcd hy any other person; and 
(b) Power to detain any such person in custody for a period of not more than four 
hours for the purpose of establishing his identity. 
( 2) lt should be an offence to refuse to answer or to give a false or misleading 
answer to any question reasonably put for that purpose by a member of the armed 
forces or a police officer. 
( 3) Arrest and detention for up to four hours under the above powers should not 
be unlawful hy rcason of the fact that no reason was given or a wrong reason given for 
the arrest. 
( 4) A person arrested or detained under the above powers should be deemed to 
be in lawful custody, so as to make it an offence to resist arrest or to escape from cus-
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tody or to md or abet any pt,rson attcmptmg to re'l'l or to e'cape. 
Nothmg that Wt' propose to "mphfy the formalities of arrest by memncrs of the 
armed serv1ces should he under,tood as countenancing any relaxation of the1r com-
mon-la" obhgat1on to u~e no more than that amount of force that is reasonably ne-
cessary m all the nrcumstanccs to effect the arre't and hold the arrested person m 
custody. We contemplate that when the arresttod person\ 1dcnt1ty has been esta-
bh.,hed satisfactorily. he should he released unless wanted by thl' police e1ther on su-
'Pit'lon of havmg h1mself committed an offence or for Interrogation a' a person su .. 
'ipectt•d of having knowlcdgt• ol any terrorist organwttion or activities. If 1t I' m-
tcndcd to keep h1m 1n custody on c1thcr ground. he should be rcarrcsted either hv thc 
m1htary police or hy a police officer and m formed of the ground;, for h1' further det-
ention in custPdy. Our proposal does not in\'ol\'e that questionin~ prior to re·ar-
re;,t should be directed to any other purpoSl' than establishin~ the identity of thl' 
per"'" arrested." (paras 4H- 511. cmphasi' added). 
The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act IY7S providcs.m sec-
lion 14 (section 12 in the IY7 3 version of the Act): 
"14. Powers of arrest of member~ of Her MaJesty's force'> 
(I) A memncr of Her MaJesty's forces on duty may arrest without warrant. and 
detain for not more than four hours. a person whom he suspects of committing, hav-
ing commttted or being about to commit any offence. 
( 2) A person cffectmg an arrest under thi~ section complies with any rule of law 
requiring him to state the ground of arrest 1f he states that he 1seffcctmg the arrest as a 
member of Her MaJesty's forces. 
(3 ) ..... 
The law is therefore silent as regards the purpose for which the army may 
exercise its powers of arrest; in practice, such arrests do not appear to be res-
tricted to establishing someone's identity. On the other hand, although sub-
section ( 2) explicitly abrogates, for arrests made by the armed forces, the 
common-law essentials for a valid arrest developed in Christie v Leachins-
ky, an arrest not made on suspicion of a specific offence would appear to be 
unlawful. 
However. the use in section 14 of the words" a person whom he suspects", 
rather than "a person reasonably suspected", in the English legal context. 
tends to remove from the test of the lawfulness of the arrest any objective cle-
ment. 
The auny furthermore can claim that their suspicion was based on infor-
mation which cannot be disclosed. ln the Lynch· ruling, discussed above, the 
Lord Chief Justice accepted the reasonableness of a police officer's sus pi-
cion without probing the factual basis for that suspicion. In view of that rul-
ing, it is clear that the courts would also not probe the factual basis of such a 
claim by the auny beyond establishing the mere existence of a soldier's suspi-
cion, which need not be reasonable or even based on fact. In view of the 
Lynch-ruling, it is furtheunore clear that repeated arrests and detentions in 
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quick succession of the same person by the army under their emergency 
powers would not be held unlawful, unless bad faith could be proved by the 
complainant - something which, given the above consideration, is virtually 
impossible. 
In practice, therefore, arrests and detentions by the auny under the 
emergency powers must be regarded as unchallengeable, whether in habeas 
corpus or in ex post facto proceedings. 
(vii) Conclusions 
Prolonged detention for questioning in Northern Ireland beyond the ordi-
nary time limit of 48 hours is based on two provisions, both introduced with-
out consideration of their effect on the special "Diplock" court system: the 
relevant provision in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 
when introduced, was envisaged for use in proceedings leading to detention 
without trial (internment); and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act, containing the other provision, was passed in considerable 
haste with the situation in Great Britain in mind, where the "Diplock" courts 
do not operate. Yet these two provisions form the basis on which virtually all 
police questioning of persons suspected of involvement in terrorism takes 
place. 
The exercise by the police of these emergency powers of arrest and deten-
tion, although in theory subject to a number of legal constraints, is not in 
practice subject to effective judicial control: 
- The courts do not probe the factual basis of such suspicion as gives rise to 
an arrest, even when the law requires that such suspicion must be "rea-
sonable". 
- Persons suspected of involvement in specific (terrorist) offences can 
nonetheless be arrested under powers of arrest intended for cases when 
there is only a general suspicion of involvement in terrorism; and such 
persons are consequently denied their common-law right to know the 
specific offences of which they are suspected. This practice has been ac-
cepted by the courts. 
- The courts have also held that repeated arrests and detentions in quick 
succession of the same person on the same suspicion are not unlawful. 
- Effectively, arrests and detentions by the police under the emergency 
powers are unchallengeable in habeas corpus proceedings. 
- Ex post facto court proceedings equally do not provide an effective rem-
edy in practice. 
Arrests and detentions by the army under their emergency powers are 
subject to fewer legal constraints than those under police powers and, conse-
quently, to less strict judicial control. As a result, and in view of the judicial 
attitude towards the exercise of police powers in the emergency, arrests and 
detentions by the army must be regarded as equally unchallengeable in prac-
tice, whether in habeas corpus or in ex post facto proceedings. 
This justifies the conclusion, drawn by Amnesty International in its Am-
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nesty International Report 1981 that: 
"There was therefore no effective remedy against arbitrary use of the emergency 
powers of arrests and detention by the police - contrary to international law." 
Furthermore, the courts in Northern Ireland have absolved themselves 
from providing immediate relief against ill-treatment of prisoners and pres-
umably even against torture in custody. 
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Chapter 2 lnterrn~ation 
(t) Questioning in Ordinarv ( 'irmmstances: 
the lramework 
-- the rules 
fti! Questwning of Terrorist Suspects.· 
- the framework 
the rules 
( 111 J Supervision 
( i 1') ( 'oncltHions 
It was clearly envisaged that interrogation oftcrrorist suspt~cts would not on-
ly ne more prolonged, out also of a more severe nature than ordinary ques-
tioning. The stated atm of mtcrrogation is to ootain confessions. Lord Di-
plock 's recommendations were aimed at rcmovmg legal oostacles which dis-
couraged the police: 
" ... from creating, hy means which do not involve physical violence, the threat of it 
or any other inhuman or degrading treatment, a situation in which a gllllty man is 
more likclv than he would otherwtsc have heen to overcome his iniual reluctance to 
• 
.,peak and to unhurden himself to hts questioners ... ( L>ip/ock Report, para I.J I). 
Bennett J. agreed that "persistent, forceful questioning may ne needed" to 
ootain a confession, which does "not imply the use of unlawful means." (pa-
ra 37). 
No separate institutional or legal framework has oeen developed to regul-
ate police questioning of terrorist suspects, however, in spite of the different 
nature of such interrogations. Any analysis of the constraints on police ques-
tioning of terrorist suspects must therefore start with a discussion of the ordi-
nary situation and its (acknowledged) defects. 
(i) Questioning in Ordinary Circumstances 
The homework 
Although the questioning of suspects is a departure from the original role of 
the police, they have maintained their constitutional independence from 
both the Executive and, apart from ordinary civil and criminal liability, from 
the courts. As the Note to the Judges' Rules (discussed below) points out: 
"The J udgcs control the conduct of trials and the admission of evtdence against 
persons on trial hdorc them; they do not control or in any way initiate or supervise 
police activities or conduct." 
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Thus, as Str Henry Fishn remarked: 
• 
"In Fngland and Walt·s (unlike many other countrieq no contemporaneous )Uth-
ctal control is exercised over tht· tnterrogation of ,u.,pects ami other., hy the police or 
over the taking of .,tatemenh" ( hsher Report. para 15.2). 
Nor is the pre-trial inwstigation (including the questioning of suspects) 
suojcct to contemporaneous control oy a quasi-judicial authority or author-
tty otherwise independent from the police - such as a puolic prosecutor. In 
partkular. the Director of Puolic Prosecutions does not fulfil this role. 
In sum. no outside institutions cxtst to supervise police questioning con-
temporaneously. 
The Rules 
In these circumstances, clear and precise rules on questioning. allowing for 
close ex post facto control. would appear to ne required. However, question-
ing having developed within a legal vacuum ( aoove, chapter 1 (iii ), there are 
no specific rules of law governing the manner in which it is to ne carried out, 
save that the police, like cvcryoody else, arc suojcct to the civil and criminal 
law of the land and can ne sued, for example, for wrongful imprisonment, or 
prosecuted, for example, for assault. 
It is only when statements made oy a suspect in police detention are ten-
dered in evidence in a suoscqucnt trial that the main legal constraint on po-
lice questioning oecomes operative: 
" ... it is a fundamental condition of the admissibility in evidence against any per-
son. equally of any oral answer given hy that person to a question put hy a police offi-
cer and of any statement made hy that person, that it shall have heen voluntary. in the 
sense that it has n' •t heen ohtaincd from him hy fear of prejudice or hope of advan-
tage. exercised or held out hy a person in authority, or hy oppression" (the so-called 
'voluntariness rule·. stated in principle (e) prefaced to the Judges' Rules discussed 
he low). 
Apart from ordinary civil and crimina/liability. the 'voluntariness rule' is 
the only rule of law pertaining to the manner in which persons in police cus-
tody are treated. 
The primary function of the principle as an exclusionary rule at the trial 
stage and its importance to attaining fairness in English criminal proceedings 
are discussed below (Chapter 4 and Part Ill). As regards the pre-trial stage, 
however, it ootains its direct importance from the fact that the judiciary have 
drawn up within the principle a set of guidelines called the Judges' Rules. 
The Judges' Rules do not themselves have the force of law, but explain to po-
lice officers engaged in the investigation of crime the conditions under which 
the courts would be likely to admit in evidence statements made by persons 
suspected of or charged with crime, and seek to ensure that any statement 
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lenden:d tn ev1denn: -;hould he a purely volunlary -;tatemenl and lhercfore 
admi'Sihlc. 
In 1he1r d1fferen1 vcrS~om tn lime, 1he Judj!es' Rules have gradually come 
lo accepl police lJUesllomng. Whereas earlier versions were very restrictive 
1 owards lJUl'SIH mtng (sec FtJirer Report. paras I 'i. 10 - I 2 ), the present Rules 
dearly au:epl lhe prarlll'l'. Rule I states: 
"I. When a pohn: officer" trvmg to discover whet her. or hy whom. an offence has 
hcen commmcd, he IS t:ntukd to 4ues11on any person, whelhcr suspected or not. 
from whom he thmks that usl'fulmformatum mav he ohtamcd. ThiS IS so wheth<·r or 
not the person m 4uestum has heen taken 1nto custody so long as he has not he<·n 
charged w1th the offence or mformed that he may he prosecuted tor 1!." 
The Rules set a limllto legllnnate lJUCstiomng. 1f read toj!cthcr with princ-
iple (d), prefaced lP the Rules: 
'That when a police uff~eer who IS makmg cn4umes of any person aho11t an off-
.:nce has enough evidence to prefer a charge against that person for the offence. he 
should without delay cause that person to he charged or m formed that he may he 
prw.ecuted for the offcm:e;" 
Following a charge, Rule Ill (h) hecomes operative: 
"lt 1s only in exceptional cases that 4uestions relating to the offence should he put 
to the accused person after he has heen charged or informed that he may he prose-
cuted. Such 4ucst1ons may he put where they arc necessary for the purpose of pre-
venting or mm1miLing harm or loss to some other person or to the puhhc or for clear-
ing up an ambiguity in a previous answer or statement." 
Otherwise, the Rules mainly stipulate that suspects be cautioned at differ-
ent stages of questioning; and prescribe the manner in whtch written state-
ments made after caution should be taken. The cautions advise the suspect 
of his right to silence and inform him that what he says may be used as evid-
ence. 
To the Judges' Rules proper have been appended a number of" Adminis-
trative Directions", which arc a statement of guidance for police officers, 
drawn up by the Home Office with the approval of the Judges. The current 
version of the Judges' Rules and Administrative Directions are contained in 
a (public) Home Office circular of that name of 1978. 
The Administrative Directions concern such issues as the accuracy of tak-
ing down statements; the fmms to be used; records of refreshments taken by 
a suspect, of cautions, and of charges; and interrogation of children and 
mentally handicapped persons. The most important Directions for the pur-
pose of this analysis are: 
34 
' 
--------------------------
"~. Comfort and rc!rcsh mcnt. 
Reason a hie arrangements should he madl' for the comfort and refreshment of per-
sons hemg 4ues1ioncd. Whenever pracllcahle hoth the per-< m heing 4uestioned or 
making a statement and the officers asking the 4ucstions or takmg the statement 
should he seated." 
and 
"7. f-acilities for defence 
(a) A person in custody should he suppli<·d on rc4ucst with wntmg matenals. 
Provided that no hmdrance "rcasonahly likely to he caused to the processes of m-
vcstigation or the administration of JW•Ilce: 
( i) he should he allowed to speak on the telephone to his solicitor or to his friends: 
(li) his letters should he sent hy post or otherwise with the least possihle delay; 
(iii) telegram' should he \ent at once. at hiS own expense. 
(h) Person' in custody !>hould not only he m formed orally of the nghts and factlit-
lt:s available to them. hut Ill addllion notices describing them '>hould he displayed at 
convenient and conspicuous places at police stations and the attention of persons in 
custody should he drawn to these notices." 
The latter Direction elaborate~ on principle (a) prefaced to the Judges' 
Rules, 
'That every person at any stage of an investigation should he a hie to communicate 
and to consult privately with a solicitor. This is so even if he is in custody, provided 
that in such a case no unreasonahle delay or hindrance is caused to the processes of 
investigation or the administration of JUstice by his doing so". 
The covering letter to the Judges' Rules and Administrative Directions, 
also published in the Home Office circular, states further that 
"The Rules should constantly he home in mind, as should the general principles 
which the Judges have set out heforc the Rules. But in addition to complying with the 
Rules, interrogating officers should always try to he fair to the person who is heing 
4ucstioned, and scrupulously avoid any method which could he regarded as in any 
way unfair or oppressive." 
Apart from the Judges' Rules and Administrative Directions, Home Of-
fice circulars have been issued to chief officers of police, with the agreement 
of the Lord Chief Justice, dealing with interrogation and amplifying or de-
fining the Administrative Directions (Fisher Report, para 15.2). In addition 
to the Judges' Rules, Administrative Directions, and Home Office circulars, 
there are for each police force a body of orders. Neither the Home Office cir-
culars to chief police officers nor the force orders are publicly available. As 
Sir Henry Fisher remarked: 
"It may appear strange that provisions which affect fundamental rights of individ-
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ual citltcn,, and wh1ch 111 other n>untfl<'' arc treated as le ~tal or even (as m th<' USA J 
con\tltutlonal fl)!ht'. should 1n hl)!land and Wak·s lx· )!OVerncd hv rules made hv the 
Jud~tc' and hv admm1strat1\l' thr<·cuom whtch may he vaned hy the 1-.xccutlvc at anv 
ttnl<'. lt may '""m strange that th~: consc4ucncc of a hreach 'hould he at the most to 
!(IVl' a <hsnctlon to the Jlld)!c to l'Xcludt· cndcnce (and 1f a tllt:lum m I{ v. l'ra~tcr" 
nght. maylx· not even that. smcc the rourt there seemed to sav that the Jud~cs' Ruk., 
and Ad m umt rat t\l' 1>1 re et 11 >ns added not h 111g to the gc lll'ral rule that statements and 
an,wcrs to h<: admlssthlc must he voluntary). lt may '<'em strange that Home< >ffin· 
cm:ulars whiCh amplify or ddin<: the I Yfl4 Admtnt,tratlve Directions should not 
have he~:n gtvcn a c1rcularum whiCh cn.,ured that thev came to the knowledge of the 
legal profc"ton. dc.,plt<' the tact r hat thcv may he capahlc of formtng the has is of dt:f· 
cnc<' 'uhmt"1om and aftecttng the rour.,e of cnmtnal tnab. It may wcll.,ecm stran· 
gest of all that (as appears from the evtdcnce g1ven at 1 Sir Henry\Jin4u1ry) "'me'<'· 
ntor police offtcers and lawyer' arc not, even today. aware of one of the I Yfl4 Ad· 
mtnl\trattvc l>lrcctton.,, and admtt frank!\· that tt "not oh<·ycd" ( f11hn Report. para 
I ". ~) 
He adds: 
"I venture to express the opimon that the ha lance between the effectiveness of po-
lice mvesttgatlons and protection for the tnd1vidual1s important enough to be go-
verned h) law and that the consc4ucnces of a hrcach oft he Ruks should he clear and 
ccrtatn .. (Fisher Report. para 15.7 ). 
And indeed the Royal ( 'ommtssion on Criminal Procedure has recom-
mended: 
"that all aspects of the treatment of a suspect in custody. including the conduct of 
mtcrviews, should he regulated hy statute. which should hring up to date and l'Xtend 
the scope of the current provtsions" ( R( '( P Report, para 5.12. summarizing para 
4.11~). 
(ii) Questioning of Terrorist Suspects 
The l'ramework 
No separate institutional framework was set up for the 4ucstioning of terror-
ist suspects. As in ordinary law, therefore, no outside institutions exist to su-
pervise police questioning contemporaneously (Bennett J.'s proposals for 
improved internal supervision hy the police arc discussed in section ( iii) of 
this chapter). 
The Rules 
As was mentioned ahovc, apart from ordinary civil and criminal liability, the 
only rule of law pertaining to the manner in which persons in police custody 
are treated is the "voluntariness rule". Thts rule is specifically ahrogatcd in 
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terrorist cases. yet no other rules of law have hccn introduced to regulate the 
interrogation of terrorist suspects (other than the outlawing of torture. and 
inhuman and degrading treatment). 
The status of non-legal rules, such as the Judges· Rules and A dmim.ltra· 
tit·e lhrectiom. has hccomc 4uitc unclear. Although tn certain respects they 
arc said still to apply, in others they have hccornc trrelcvant. Most important. 
as a result of the ahnlition of the "voluntariness rule" (within which they 
were construed). thl'Y have lost their coherence and sense as guiding princi-
ples for the 4uestioning of suspects. 
Although police regulations have a solely internal effect, they are the 
most detailed regulations in existence and have hecomc of paramount im-
portance now that the Judges' Rules and Administrative Directions have 
lost so much of their force. However. in response to an Amnesty Interna-
tional rc4ucst for a copy of the RUC Force Orders and Code. the Northern 
Ireland Office wrote on 1 H Decem her 1 YH I: 
"The f-orce Orders and Code are confidential internal instructions which are not 
a\ailahle for public inspection. Besides regulating the conditions in which prisoners 
arc kept. they cover the whole range of police activities. We do not think it would lx• 
appropriate for this material to he made publicly ava1lahle." 
N evert he less, the Bennett Report discusses extensively the regulations 
concerning the treatment of prisoners, in force at the time of his inquiry (sec 
Chapter 6 of the Bennett Report). Although these regulations do not appear 
to distinguish hetween terrorist and ordinary suspects, they have clearly 
heen drawn up with the situation in Northern Ireland in mind. With the 
changes introduced as a result of his report, Ben nett J. 's summary is still gen-
erally applicahle. As he points out, 
"It is traditional in the police forces of the British Isles that responsihility for the 
custody and welfare of prisoners, and for dealing with with their needs and request 
and for outside enquiries in relation to them, lies with the uniformed branch, while 
responsihility for 4uestioning them lies with detective officers." (para !!7). 
Furthermore, 
" .. .it is worth recalling a further matter of fact of general application to the ques-
tioning of prisoners in police forces in the British Isles: this is that the actual interview 
process is inviolate in the sense that interviews are conducted hy a limited number of 
police officers out of the sight and hearing, not only of members of the puhlic and the 
prisoner's friends and advisers, hut also of other police officers. To a limited ext-
ent ... the procedures in the RUC' already depart helpfully from this general practice" 
(para 89). 
The regulations were meticulous in all respects regarding the duties of un-
iformed officers, in particular as regards keeping precise and accurate re-
cords of every event that befell a prisoner wh1lst in custody ( Bennett Report, 
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para 93). But, \l)(lllfiGmtly. the RI!( (ode, and thl· standmg order' for the 
interrogation centres. were 
" .. I o a I ar!!<' ~ xlenl "le m r<'!(a rd mg t hnkl a tkd ~ond uct In he ohsL·rved sp<'<:t fi<:<tl· 
lv hy tntervt<·wmg officers" (para '1'1 ). 
l'hc general prmt\ton' whtch dtd apply dtrc.:tly to llllervicws indudcd a 
duty nn irllcrvtewtng offit:er> to keep record' (also of complainh); special 
care for the rncntallv -.uhrwrmaL a' well a' the rcqturcmcnt (further dis-
cussed hclnw) that: 
.. "-h<·rc tl "anttupated I hat stalcmL·nts rL·sullmg tromml<TVIL'Ws will he u,cd 111 
L'VIdcncc 111 suhwqll<'nl ntmtnal prm:e<·dlll!(s. such statements must he taken mac-
n lfllancL' wilh kgal rL'lJ utrcmenl\ and I hL' Judges· I{ ules .. (para I I 11 ). 
Thl· ('ode further c:ontaincd rc:gulattons which applied equally to all po-
hc:c offit:er.,, the most Important of whteh were the regulations whic:h prohi-
hited ill-tn:atmcnt (paras 102-103). The Code stated that a police offic:er 
must not suhjeet a prisoner to any "degrading physical or mental ill-treat-
ment"; that all rcasonahlc comfort must he afforded to prisoners, in particu-
lar. that they he given adequate opportumty to sleep and that they should not 
he without food for long periods. The use of improper language was equally 
forhidden (paras I 04-106 ). Furthermore. at the time of Ben nett J. 's inquiry 
the RUC ('ode expanded on the rule that police officers have limited discre-
tion to deny a suspcc:t access w a solicitor in certain circumstances, although, 
in fact, solicitors were never allowl·d to \CC tcrrori.st suspect\ in police cus-
tody ( Bennett Report, para 122 and 123 ). 
Within hts hncf lknnctt J. made a numhcr of ret:ommcndations. Het ore 
discussing these, it is important to note that the Ben nett Committee did not 
investigate the fairness or efficacy of criminal proceedings in the Diplock 
( 'ourts. The terms of the announcement of the appointment of the Commit-
tee specifically exdudcd from the scope of its inquiry another examination 
of the rules on the admissihility of statements in the Diplock Courts, or oft he 
emergency legislation generally (para 3). lt did, however, "review police 
practit:cs and proccdurt:' in the interrogation of prisoner' so us to emu re so 
fur U-'> possihle that ill-treatment oj prisoners cannot take place." (para 20, 
emphasis added). 
In other words, the Bcnnt:tt proposals were aimed at preventing ill-treat-
ment of suspects in cu~tody, hut not at produt:ing conditions of interview 
that arc condut:ive towards ohtaining reliuhle statements. 
Ben nett J .'s recommendations concerned mainly improved supervision 
over the implementation of the rules for questioning. which will he discussed 
hdow. But hi' report abo wntaincd a numhcr of recommendations which 
affected the rules themselves. The government accepted "the hroad conclu-
sions of the Committee" and "virtually" all its recommendations. On 2 July 
I •-nr.;, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland gave some examples to the 
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House of ( 'ommon' of amendments to lknrll'lt .1.·, rccommcndatlllll'. < >n 
thl' soml·what hmttcd puhhc matcnal avatlahle. 11 would appear that the fol-
lowlll)! can now he ~atd ahout the rules for llltcrrogatll>n of person-. arrt:stcd 
under the emergency lcgislatum 111 Northern lrdand: 
I CiENERAL 
- Interrogation t:ontinue' to hl· t:arncd out 111 pnvate. Improved t:ontrol hy 
,en tor police offit:t:rs through doscd-t:ircult televtswn ( dtscussed helow) 1\ 
visual only~ this "does not hrcak the c<mfidcntlality of what ts \atd Ill the m-
tcrvicw room·· ( Benne/1 Report, para 227). 
· · Pnsoncrs have an ahsolute nght of at:CC\S to a soltt:itor after 4S hour' of 
detention. and, if detention is prolonged. after the next 4S hours. 
-This ahsolute right ts without prejudice to tht:tr common-law right of ac-
cess at any time, sUhJcct to the limited dist:rctlon of the pohce to deny access 
if "unreasonahle delay or hmdrancc is caused to the processl'' of investiga-
tion or the administration of justice ... " (Principle ( t:) prdat:ed to the J udgcs · 
Rules). Consultation should normally he within sight, hut out of hearing, of 
police officers (as Bennett J. recommended), hut the government has statl~d 
that "the interviews should he suhject to monitoring hy sight and 'ound". at 
least in cases (which the govt:rnmcnt thought would he few) "where 1t IS con-
sidered necessary". 
-- Prisoners should he provided with a printed notice of thl'ir rights to keep 
for themselves. 
11 AS TO THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERROGATION 
~ Interrogation sessions should go on no longer than the penod hctwccn 
normal mealtimes and should n<>t continue during mealtimes. 
~ Interrogation sessions should not t:ommence or continue after midnight 
except for urgent operational reasons. 
~ Not more than two officers should he present at the interrogation of one 
prisoner at any one time. 
~Not more than four teams of two officers should he concerned with inter-
rogation of one prisoner. (Ben nett J. here recommended a maximum of 
three teams of two officers.) 
~ Female prisoners should he interviewed hy women officers. 
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lii AS TO llH·. CONDlCI OF I>EilTIIVI:S DliRIN<i INTERRO-
(iATION 
A new. separate ("ode of ( "onduet for mterviewmg officers has hcen intro-
duced which forms a '<eparate part of the R l 1(' (',)de. Thts Cmk of Conduct. 
like the rest oft he R l T Code. 1.., -.enl't. hut would appear to m elude the fol-
lowing rules: 
-- A prohthition of assault and other unlawful use of force against prisoners. 
- A prohihition of '"degrading phy-.ical or mental ill-treatment". Thi'< 
should spectfically include: 
(a) any order or actton requtnng a pn.,oner to strip or expose himself or 
herself; 
(h) any order or action requiring a prisoner to adopt or maintain any un-
natural or humiliating posture; 
(c) any order or action requiring a ptisoner to carry out unnecessarily any 
physically exhausting or demanding action or to adopt or maintain any such 
stance; 
(d) the use of ohscenities, insults or insulting language ahout the prisoner, 
his family, friends or associates, his political heliefs, religion or race; 
(e) the use of threats of physical force or of such things as hcing ahan-
doned in a hostile area; and 
(f) the use of threats of sexual assault or mishchaviour. ( Bennett Report, 
para 180). 
-A requirement for interviewing officers to identify themselves hy name or 
numhcr to the prisoner. 
In sum, it would appear that any physical or mental ill-treatment of the 
kind described ahovc is contrary to the RUC regulations. Other forms of 
pressure are, however, not proscribed. These arc usually discussed only in 
their relation to the admissibility of statements, and this analysis will also 
consider them under that heading, below. But it is useful first to see what 
kind of questioning would appear to be allowed (or at least not forbidden) 
under the RUC Code. 
Firstly, it is clear that "decisive", "persistent", "forceful" questioning is 
accepted practice and indeed commended by Lord Diplock and Bennett J., 
although Boy le et al. rightly remark that the right of silence of a prisoner sub-
jected to such questioning "is implicitly if not formally denied" ( Ten Years 
On, p. 36). 
Secondly, the use ofthreats (other than of "physical force or of such things 
as being abandoned in a public area"); of promises; or of inducements would 
not appear to be anywhere specifically forbidden. In particular, the require-
ment that statements which are to be used in evidence must be taken "in ac-
cordance with legal requirements and the Judges' Rules" does not appear to 
constitute such a prohibition. That requirement would seem to relate only to 
the need to administer a for mal caution to a suspect and not, in the legal con-
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text of the Dtplock ( 'ourh. to principle (c) prefaced to (i.e. not part of) the 
Judges' Rules, which states a legal principle which does not apply in those 
courts: it is no longer a "legal requirement" that a statement tendered m 
evidence shall have hccn "voluntary. in the sense that it has not hccn oh-
taincd ... hy fear of prejudice, or hope of advantage, exercised or held out hy 
a person m authority. or hy oppression". 
Such pressures could take a variety of forms: threats to prolong the deten-
tion; or to suhjcct the person concerned to repeated arrests followmg re-
lease; threats to arrest relatives, including children of the suspect; promises 
to drop certain charges; or not to charge relatives, including children of the 
suspect; financial inducements; a comhination of these. The promtse not to 
arrest and/ or prosecute relatives is a strong inducement, espectally m cases 
where arms or explosives have heen found on premises: the occupier and 
any person residing on, hahitually using. or found on those premises at the 
time of the discovery arc presumed to he in possession and therefore hahlc to 
prosecution. Although such a person may he able to discharge the onus 
placed upon him to prove that he "did not at that ttme know of tts presence_•~ 
the premises in question, or, if he did know, that he had no control over tt 
(section 9 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act), the hring-
ing of charges would almost certainly mean detention in prison pendmg pro-
ceedings for the relatives concerned. 
( iii) Supervision 
There is no contemporaneous judicial supervision over questioning (above, 
section (i)). Indeed, it is clear from the ruling in re Martin Lynch (ahovc, 
Chapter I ( v)) that the courts will not grant the writ of habeas corpus( the on-
ly form of immediate judicial relief) even against ill-treatment of suspects by 
the police. Bennett J., having rejected suggestions of independent contem-
poraneous supervision over police questioning, judicial or otherwise (Ben-
nett Report, Chapter 11 ), therefore concentrates his proposals on measures 
for improved supervision of interrogation within the police force: 
"the supervision and control of interrogation should not he given to any independ-
ent hody of persons, hut should remain in the hands of the police themselves" (para 
203). 
The allegations ofill-treatment which led to Bennctt J. 's inquiry were only 
made against detective officers; it was not suggested that umformed mem-
hers of the RUC were involved in the ill-treatment. Bennett J. concluded: 
"The integrity of the uniformed branch therefore seems to afford a solid founda-
tion on which an effective system of supervision can he based" (para 205 ). 
He added: 
"No doubt part at least of the reason why allegations are not made against the un-
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1formed branch 1' I hat thcv have no rc-.pomJbJhty. and art· known to haw nonl'. tor 
the.· ·-..w.:l'c.'"" · ot lJlll'rrogatJon. and nP al'lJVL' mvol\"t'nll'flllll tnlc.·rvJcY. "· I h1' "'L'l'Ol\ tu 
u' to he a kature 'Acll 'Aorth prt''l'f\ln!(,. (para 2111>). 
Hts proposals therefore huild on the distinetHm hl'lwecn the du!ie\ of un-
Iformed police officer' on the one hand and detL'C!Jves on the other. 
.. At prc,cnt the umtormcd eh Jet mspcctor or Inspector has overall rc,ponslhillly 
for the wcll-bc111g of pn">rl<'f' outwlc the intcn1c'A room, and for th1s purpo'" ht• 
has the l'ollcctJvc a1d ol the qat! under h1s command; wh1il'. lml<lc the Jntcrvlt''-' 
room. rcsp<nlsJhihty rt''" With tht• 'l'llH>r mtcnJC\1.111!! otfil'cr" (para 217 ). 
That position t'> strcngthL·ncd tn Ben nett .1. 's proposals, in that he rccom-
mcnlb: 
- that mtcrv1cws must rake place tn an inll~rview room and nowhere else: 
--that prisoners should he delivered to the mtervtcw room hy uniformed of-
ficers. rather than collected hy detective officers from outside their cells: 
-- that detective officers emerging from the intcrvtcw room with the pnsoncr 
(in order. for example, to take his fingerprints) should be accompamed 
wherever they go hy a uniformed officer: 
-- and that provisions should he made in tht• RU< · ('ode to these effects. 
So far Ben nett J. \ proposals do not affect what happens m side the inter-
view room. He said: 
"lt is our VIew that the existing position, whereby detective officers have respon-
sihilitv for mlervicws and the umformcd staff stay outside, should hasically he up-
held. Th1s 1s partly "'that the dist111ction of functions hetwcen the two branches of 
the force may he maintained. hut also because we arc satisfied as a general matter 
that the efficiency of interviews would he impaired if persons with objects other than 
the promotion of dialo!(UC between the 111tcrvicwcr and the suspect were present." 
(para 21H).' 
From this point, Bcnnett J. proposes to change the emphasis of the in-
structions to uniformed inspectors: 
"The interviewer is not going to he helped hy unifo1med officers entering spas-
modically, either, hut to this extent we believe that efficiency must suffer as the price 
of reassurance. 
We recommend that it should be made entirely plain to the uniformed inspec-
tors that their responsibility for the welfare of prisoners extends to periods spent 
in an interview room. 'Ibis should be done hy means of both an amendment to the 
RUC Code and an addition to the standing orders for Castlereagh and Gough. 
Satisfactory provision is already made in the RUC' Code, in general terms, for any 
officer detecting a breach of the law or of force instructions to direct the member of 
the force concerned to desist, hut we recommend that it should be made explicitly 
dear, bv means of an amendment to the Code, that if necessan he should enter 
- -
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the intl.'n·il.'w room for thi• purp<ISI.' and •top the intel"'iew. Th1' rc4uircment 
'hould also applv to any hre<ll'h of the code of conduct for mtervJeWJn!( officers 
wh1ch we have rccommt•nded m ( 'haptcr I 0. and to any events withm the interview 
room wh1ch sec m to the observer to he reasonably likely tolt'ad to a breach of the law 
or mstructlllll'>. The part of the RU< · ('ode whH:h la vs down the dulle., of the super-
VJsm~t mspel'tor at present puh this matter m ne!!at1ve form. for 11 IS stated that 'un-
less for ~tnnd or suffiCient cause. the mspector need not enter the mterv1ew room 
wh1lc an interview IS 111 pro!o(rC'>s'. We rcwmmcnd that the 111structions to mspector' 
,hould he made positive 111 their emphas1s; 1f errors are to he made. it 1s better that 
thev should he crror' of cnmm1"ion ratht:r than omisSJ<m. Wh1k the ~teneral under-
sta~dm~t should he that the mspector 'hould not enter unnecessarily. we douht if it 1' 
ne..:essarv or desirable to emphasitc this 111 formal111struct10n>" (paras 21H-220. 
on~tinalcmphasi' ). 
The responstbtlity of umformed officers for the welfare of pnsoners tn in-
tcrvtew room'> I'> to he made effective through extended measures of vtsual 
supervision. Bcnnett J. recommendt•d that "spy-holes" should he mstalled 
in all rooms in police stations in Northern Ireland where interviews take 
place and where they were not already installed (para 222). Most important, 
however, given the serious limitations to the effectiveness of "spy-holes" 
(details of these limitations arc given in para 221 ), he recommended 
"that closed-circuit television cameras should be installed in all intel"'ie~ 
rooms in the police offices and police stations used for the interrogation of terror-
ist suspects and other persons arrested for scheduled offl.'ncl.'s." (para 224, original 
emphasis). 
He added: 
"What we have in mind is that the main momtoring screens should he -;itcd in a 
room used hy the chief inspector or mspector [members of the uniformed branch I 
for other purposes and that he should combine their use With his existing duties. 
Thus, when he was not on the corridor outside the interview rooms, he could watch 
the screens: or, when he was engaged elsewhere, he could appoint one of his staff to 
do so. Instant means of communication should he provided between officers watch-
ing the screens and those in the corridor. The screens should also he available to seni-
or detective officers in charge of interviews, who should use them frequently. and 
who might find them useful for general observation of the progress of interviews as 
well as for the detection of any misconduct; and they should he used also hy any visit-
ing senior officer. 
In addition to assisting the chief inspector or inspector in immediate charge of the 
place where interrogation takes place, we believe that closed-circuit television 
would also offer enhanced opportunities for practical supervision by the Divisional 
Commander or sub-Divisional Commander, who could he provided with a single 
screen in their own rooms and the facility to select each interview room in turn for 
display. Although it is not to be supposed that they could spare very much time for 
watching systematically, we believe that such provision would he welcomed hy seni-
43 
or uniformed officers. who at present have a degree of responsihility for the conduct 
of interviews (which responsihility should m our view he re-affirmed), hut who lack 
effective means for carrying this responsihility into effect. We accordinaly recom-
mend that thiN facility ~hould he provided to the ~enior uniformed oHicer normal-
ly workina in each huildina or group of buildinaN where the interroaation of ter-
rorist suspects takes place, up to the level of chief superintendent. It could of course 
he further extended upwards to assistant chief constables and downwards to officers 
relieving the chief superintendent or superintendent in his ahsence. if desired." (pa-
ras 225-226, original emphasis). 
Closed-circuit television for the monitoring of interviews has been intro-
duced in the interrogation centres in Northern Ireland. Although com-
plaints and allegations of physical ill-treatment had dropped sharply even 
before its introduction, closed-circuit television is an important safeguard 
against a recurrence of a practice of such ill-treatment. 
It is important to note, however, the limitations of this monitoring. It is 
restricted to visual monitoring: no one can hear what is heing said hy the de-
tectives or prisoner. Only police officers have access to the video-screens, 
and no recording is made. 
It is difficult to assess the effect of Bennett J. 's proposals on the diligence 
with which unifonned officers carry out their supervision. Bennett J. said: 
"Despite the 'clean bill of health' given to the uniformed branch, the fact has to he 
faced that none of our witnesses recalled a case in which a uniformed officer had ac-
tually seen ill-treatment occurring and had taken steps (as the RUC Code would re-
4uirc him to do) to make an immediate report of it, or had later acknowledged hav-
ing witnessed ill-treatment in a statement to the Complaints and Discipline Branch 
of the RUC The most that has happened, according to the evidence that we have 
heard, is that a chief inspector has opened the door of an interview room when he 
heard an unusual noise. It would not he right to conclude from this fact alone that su-
pervision hy uniformed officers has proved defective, but our view is that fully effec-
tive supervision demands a higher level of activity on the part of uniformed officers". 
(para 208). 
Bennett J. therefore stresses the need for assiduity and persistence of the 
individual officer, the importance of strength of character and commitment 
to duty of uniformed staff and the' essential' requirement that the uniformed 
chief inspector or inspector should continue to have immediate access to and 
support from his Divisional Commander or sub-Divisional Commander 
(paras 214 and 215). 
Even if diligently carried out, however, visual supervision is largely res-
tricted to detecting and stopping physical ill-treatment, the aim of Ben nett 
J. 's recommendations. Threats, promises or the holding out of inducements 
are unlikely to be detected. 
Bennett J. acknowledges that: 
"The fact that in Northern Ireland so much reliance is placed on confession in-
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creases the force of the argument that a rcliahlc r~cord ,., de\lrahle" (para I '!'I). 
His proposals. nonetheless, "stop conclusrvcly short of recommending 
video-recording" (para 231 ). One of his considerations was "the evidence of 
our police witnesses, and our own impress1on .... that some suspects need to 
he allowed a certam room for manoeuvre in what story they tell afterwards tf 
they are to he frank with the police at the time when they are interviewed" 
(para 20 I). 
Whatever one thinks of this ar~ument, it is clear that the increased super-
vtsion resulting from the Hennett proposals, while. 1f diligently applied, go-
ing some way towards preventin~ ill-treatment, does not otherwise affect the 
conditions of interrogation so as to ensure the reliability of confessions ob-
tained as a result. In particular, this supervision cannot corroborate what was 
said during the interrogation. and in this respect does not add to tht! reliahil-
ity of the record of the interrogation. 
(iv) Conclusions 
The interrogation of terrorist suspects is not only more prolonged than ordi-
nary questioning, it is also of a different nature. Yet the institutional frame-
work for ordinary questioning was retained, which does not provide for con-
temporaneous supervision independent of the police. 
This increased internal supervision over interrogation hy uniformed po-
lice officers is visual only and, while (if diligently applied) going some way 
towards preventing ill-treatment, does not otherwise affect the conditions of 
interrogation so as to ensure the reliability of confessions obtained as a re-
sult. In particular, this supervision cannot corroborate what was said during 
interrogation, and in this respect does not add to the reliability of the record 
of interrogation. 
The only rule of law specifically pertaining to questioning of suspects (the 
"voluntariness rule") has been explicitly abrogated with regard to the inter-
rogation ofterrorist suspects. Although the direct effect of this change in the 
law regards the conduct of the trial, it has also removed the cohesion and 
sense from such subordinate rules for questioning as were specifically con-
strued within the "voluntariness rule": the Judges' Rules and Administrative 
Directions. 
Apart from being subject to the ordinary civil and criminal law, the main 
constraints on police interrogation are therefore found in internal regul-
ations, wh1ch now include a Code of Conduct for interviewing officers. 
However, the detailed contents of the regulations, and of the Code of Con-
duct, are secret. 
Although "degrading physical and mental ill-treatment" is forbidden, 
and now spelt out to some extent in the Code, it would appear from what is 
known about the rules that 
-- forceful, persistent questioning is allowed, which implicitly denies the 
prisoner his right to silence; and which would he regarded as "oppressive" in 
ordinary circumstances; 
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-- stat.:ment~ may he mduc.:d hy ·•fear of preJudic.:. or hope of advantage·· 
hdd out hy mtervtcwmg offic.:rs m the cours.: of pnvatc mtcrrogatum scs-
• 
\lOllS: 
- access to a solicitor may still h.: d.:nied for 4X hours and consultation may 
• • 
haw to take place in th.: pr.:s.:nc.: of a scmor uniform.:d polic.: offic.:r. rath.:r 
than within sight hut out of hearing of th.: polic.:. 
This justtfi.:s the concluston that th.: present rules on poll~:.: qu.:sttontng. 
whik ( tf properly tmplcmcntcd) gomg som.: way towards prcwnting physt-
caltll-tr.:atm.:nt. do not contain ~aft: guards to emurc the primafanerdiahil-
tty of stat.:mcnts ohtatned as a result of mtcrrogatton. Nett her the .. voluntar-
mess" north.: rcliahtltty of statem.:nts made to the police as a r.:sult of Inter-
rogation can thcrdor.: he taken for granted even when th.: tnt.:rrogatton was 
in full accordance with the law and wtth the rules and regulations appltcahk 
to such interrogations. 
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Chapter 3 hum pulice interro~atinn tu trial 
If the police. after int.:rrogation. helicw to have suffictent cvtdenc.: agatnst a 
susp.:ct of his mvolwment in an offcncl·, they will charge him and bring htm 
hdor.: a magistrate. In e<tses of schnlulcd offences. the purpose of this initial 
appearance hdore a magistrate ts in practtcc restricted to providing the de-
fendant with legal aid. An application for hail can subsequently he made to 
the High Court: if the defendant does not apply, or if hail is refused. he re-
matns in custody. Some time later the polin· submit thetr file on the case to 
the Director of Puhhc Prosecutions. who reviews the selection of charges 
preferred hy the police tn the light of evidence in the file. The accused is com-
mitted for trial tn anoth.:r appearance before the magistrate. 
Thts proccs-, has hecn described 111 some detail hy Hoylc et al .. ( in their 
hook Ten }'ears On) who also provtde a statistical analysis, raising c.:rtain 
seriom issues of a general nature, somL' of which arc dtscussed in tht· main 
text of this report. 
This process, and thes.: issu.:s. howewr. art: not of very great impact to th.: 
concerns discussed h.:re. For this r.:ason, and for r.:asons of space, this chap-
ter will thL·refore h.: restrict.:d to stmply stating th.: conclusions which in this 
respect can he drawn from the hook of Hoyket al.': followed by a brief dis-
cussion of an investigation of complaints about treatm.:nt in police custody, 
which is carried out in the pre-trial stag.:". 
The only practical function of the initial app.:aranc.: bdore a magistrate in 
cases of scheduled offences is to ensure that the defendant knows of and ex-
ercises his right to legal aid. Bail cannot he granted, nor is there any real con-
sideration of the evidence against the accused or of the charges (Boy le et al .. 
op. cit., pp. 65-titi ). 
Bail may only be granted on application to the High Court and is less read-
ily available. Some juveniles have spent long periods in custody on remand 
on relatively minor charges (Roylc et al., op. cit., pp. 66-67) . 
Committal proceedings in cases of scheduled offences arc more or less a 
formality. In practical terms they serve mainly to give formal notice to the 
defendant and his legal adviser of the charges and the evidence which they 
will have tc• face at the trial. Any effective opportunity for the defence to 
challenge the prosecution case at this stage has been eliminated. The ma-
gistrate too is not in a position to exercise any effective control over the 
prosecution at this stage (Royle et al., op. cit., pp. 68-o9) 
Plea- and charge-bargaining takes place in the "Diplock" courts as in 
other British courts ( Boyle et al., op. cit., pp. o9-70). Since it "pays" to plead 
guilty, in the sense that this is likely to lead to a lower sentence, there is a cer-
tain amount of pressure on those who made a confession as a result of inter-
rogation to plead guilty, unless there is evidence that that confession was ob-
tained as a result of ill-treatment. 
Although the Director of Public Prosecution has been able to exercise a 
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valuahk control over police prosecutton pract11.:c and to en'>ure an .:ven-
hand.:d approach in ~:ases agamst I .oyalish and Repuhhcans ( ren Fean ( Jn, 
p. oH). his offi~:t· cannot he equated wnh that of the puhlic procurator or in-
vestigating judge of inquisttorial systems. nor his review with that oft he se of-
ficiab. This is important in view of a change 111 procedure for dealing with 
certain cases. noted by Hcnnctt L 
"The D1rector often finds him.,l'lf in tht• pmttum of h<wmg he fort• him the case for 
consideration for the prosecution of an accused person for a '>Cht·dulcd offence. 1n 
which the prinupal evidence again\t the accused is his voluntary confe"ion ob-
tained during interrogation. when a complaint has heen made by the <Kcu,ed allcg· 
ing against the officer or officer' who were concernt•d in tht• interrogation that he or 
tht·y have as.,aulted or ill-tn:ated him. Any such allegation by the accu\ed i., dearly 
most Important a' the obv1ous foundation for a submi.,sion based un '''et ion X oftht· 
I <J7X Act that h1' confessum i.s inadmi\Siblc. In •>rder to a"i't h1m in dealing with th1s 
matter. the Director. in a special direction issued .. on IS February I <J7X to the Chief 
Con.,tablc. requested that the evidence with regard to the treatment of any such per-
son and the alkgatiom made should he rnvcstigatcd. and that he bt· supplied with all 
the available mformation he fore giving his direction tor pro'>ccution or non-pro,e-
cution of the accused. The purpose of this request is stated by the Director to~ 
both to enable a decision to be reached as to whether a particular statement 
should he given in evidence on behalf of the ('rnwn, and to enable counsel to be 
instructed properly for the conduct of the prosecution and, where appropriate, for 
counsel to advise with regard to the ability of the prosecution to discharge the 
burden of proof which lies upon the Crown under section 6( 2) (now section 
K( 2 I ). 
This direction rt•quirc' the investigating officer to make findings in his report 
about any rnjury sustained by the complainant while in police custody, and the cause 
of any such injury. Moreover. the direction provides: 'lt i' necessary to know from 
the out-.:t the accused person's account of his treatment while in custody' and it goes 
on to request that the accused person he invited to provide a detailed statement of his 
evidence in support of his complaint or allegation. Proper provision is made for the 
accused to he made aware that he i' under no obligation to giw a statement, and, 
where the accused is represented by a solicitor, for the invitation to he made through 
the solicitor." (para 2H9, emphasis added) 
The Chief Constable is bound to comply with the Director's request for 
infm mation, but, such an investigation not being part oft he ordinary pre-tri-
al inquiries (see below), has to rely on a procedure not normally used to this 
end: 
"The Director's request for evidence regarding the facts of the complainant's treat-
ment and the complaint or allegation, and m particular his suggestion that the ac-
cused person should he invited to provide a detailed statement of his evidence in 
support of his complaint or allegation, in effect obliges the Chief Constable to 
commence the formal investigation of a complaint under the Police Act, since this is 
the only basis which his officers can have for an approach to th~: complainant at this 
'tage." ( Bennett Report, para 3110) 
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As Ben nett l put tt: 
"the l'\ldenn· '"ll)!ht to he obtamt•d h the 111Vest1gatmg offi,Tr ahout the ;:omplamt 
I' also w.ed ... !m the purpo\e of n>n'>llkfln)! tht• presentation of tht• Crown case 1n 
the pro\ecut1on of the complainant" (para l~~~ 
m fact. pending proceedings a!!ainst tht• complatnant. thts is the only pur-
pose of the investigation; further constdcration of the complaint is deferred 
until after the triaL' This contrast\ with the situation in England and Wale~. 
where the complaint ts regarded as hcing in effect mh flit/ice and where 
therefore hoth the investigations of and the adJudicatiom on complaints arc 
dcft~rrcd until after the conclusion of proceedings against the complainant 
(with very rare exceptions) ( Bennett Report, para-. 2()0-2') I). 
Bennett J. considered: 
"Whether it i'> right in principle for the n>mplaml\ procedure to ht· ust•d for a pur-
pose for which it was not intended." (para .1111 ). 
He could not, however, make a conclusive recommendation on this mat-
ter. hecause it was not within his terms of reference to advise on how the Di-
rector of Puhlic Prosecutions should exercise his powers in relation to crimi-
nal proceedings. (para 3o2) ''. 
The carrying out at this stage of a pre-trial investigation into the factual 
hasis of (part of) the defence case. for the hcnefit of the Director of Puhlic 
Prosecutions, ill accords with the latter's role in an accusatorial system, as 
described a hove. If properly conducted. it aims, not at discovering whether 
there is evidence against the accused, hut at whether the evidence adduced 
by the accused in response is capable of undermining the prosecution evid-
ence. In other words, all the circumstances of a particular aspect of the case 
are examined, but by an official who is involved in preparing the prosecution 
case within an accusatorial. rather than an inquisitorial, system. Ben nett J. 
remarked: 
"lt may he said that the investigation of a complaint will consciously or uncon-
sciously he influenced by the wish to support the Crown case against the complai-
nant." (para 35 2 ). 
He adds, elsewhere: 
"We can understand the advantages from the Director's point of view of being in-
fm med as fully as possible on the evidence relevant to the issue of the admissibility of 
a statement before making his decision as to prosecution; indeed the procedure, if 
successful, amounts to obtaining a preview of part at least of the accused person's 
defence." (para 361, emphasis added). 
It is not surprising in the circumstances that "very often the attempt to ob-
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tam a detatkd statement frt >Ill the acntsed per'< >11 tatls. hn:ausc he ts advtsed 
hy hts -.oliotor not to reveal hts defence m thts way" (para Jfl I). 
Bcnnctt J. reported that hctwccn I July I <J76 and I July I Y7X, "The Di-
rector of Publtr Prosecutions declined to prosecute in 7 cases (involving I I 
persons) on the hasts that he wa~ not satisfied by the prosl·cullon proof;, tn re-
lation to section fl of the IY73 Act. 1" .. (para 156). 
The Director's request of 15 1-chruary I Y7X can have had little effect on 
those figures, gtvcn the delays prior to the Director's review of the police 
files. Later figures arc not known. It is not possible. t hercforc, to establish the 
effect of the rc4ucst 10 practice. There must. however. be considerable 
doubts about its value. 
First of all, there is the natural reluctance of the defence to disclose thctr 
case to the prosecution before the tnal, which hampers the investigation. But 
even when the Director is in a position to assess the evidence ahout a com-
plaint. this assessment is a marginal one only: he will lkclinc to prosecute if 
he is satisfied that the prosecution cannot discharge the onus placed upon it 
to prove heyond reason a hie doubt that a statement was not obtained as art'· 
suit of torture. or inhuman or degrading treatment. Presumably, this extends 
to cases in which there is clear evidence of ill-treatment (sec Chapter 4 ). If 
the evidence of such treatment is less clear-cut, the matter will he left to the 
trial judge, as arc other factors which might affect the reliability of a confes-
sion (sec Chapters 4 and 5 ). 
The investigation therefore does not contribute to the prima facie reliabil-
ity of statements tendered in evidence in court and, the defence having no 
access to the investigation (other than bcmg asked to make a statement to the 
investigating officer), it serves only to strengthen the prosecution's hand. 
)() 
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PART 11 The .. Diplock" courts 
A tnalt-. a ht·ann~ of evtdence wtthtn a framework of law. allowtng for a 
"wet~hmg' of that cvtdcncc hy a tnhunal of fact. Fn~ltsh law dtstmgutshl·s 
more dearly than many other k~al-.y,tcms hetWl'l'nmattl·r-. of law and mat-
ters of fact: and tht.., dt,tinctton I'- undcrlmcd when the functions of the court 
arc spill hctwccn the ]Ud~c a-.ma,tcr of proccdmc and thl· JUry as tribunal of 
fact. In ordmarv law. all cases of '-lTIOll' cnmo: (-.o calkd "tndtctahk of-
• 
fences") arc triahlc hdorc a Jlld~o: silt m~ wtth a Jury. 
The ordinary law sets a 'tnct framo:work for the ht·ann~ of cvtdcnco:. and 11 
. . 
ts the JUd~c who l'll'-Urc' stnct adho:rem:o: to tht' framework: he rule' on the 
"admissthility" of o:vtdenn:; he i' tho: umpiro: ovo:r thl· manner tn whtch 
prosecution and ddo:ncc prc,ent thetr ca,e; he sums up the cvtdencc and m-
structs the JUry on the law as rc~ards hurdcn and standard of proof; ell:. 
The JllfY ts the tnhunal of faLl. "wci~hm~" the cvtdence presented to them 
wtthin the framework 'et hv the law. Tht' mvolvcmcnt of onlinary ctttlcn' 111 
• • 
the administration of JUSt tee 1' not only regarded as an important constitu-
tional. democratic. princtple. but ClJUally as an important ,afc~uard m cn-
sunng the fatrncss of criminal procccdmgs (sec hclow. Chapter 5 ). 
Triab in the .. Diplock .. courts dtffcr from ordinary proceedings 111 two un-
portant respects: owin~ to a major chan~c in the law. the evidence which can 
lawfully he considered hy the tnhunal of fact in reaching tls verdict can now 
include certain statements made hv the accust•d whtch would he "inadmissi-
• 
ble" in ordinary law. And the court ttsclf stts without a Jury: although most 
"scheduled" (i.e. terrorism-related) offences arc, hy thctr nature, serious, 
the (single) judge in the" Diplock" courts both rules on the law and "weighs" 
the evidence. 
The effect of these two changes 111 the law will he dtscusscd in thl follow-
ing chapters. 
Before embarking upon this discussion, however. 11 ts useful to note the 
different categories of cases that come before the .. Diplock" courts, in terms 
of the attitude taken by the accused, since these catcgoncs arc affected thf-
ferently hy these changes in the law. First of all, it must he noted that where 
an accused pleads guilty to the charges laid against him, the accusatorial sys-
tem of criminal justice rc4uircs no further "weighing" oft he evidence: such a 
plea, if accepted by the prosecution, suffices to convict. In such cases (which 
form the majority in the "Diplock" courts), the changes in the law discussed 
below do not affect the trial against the accused (although they may have af-
fected his willingness to pat1icipatc in plea- or charge-bargaining). 
A (declining) number of other defendants, in particular Republicans, re-
fuse to recognise the legitimacy of the court; they do not enter a plea and take 
no part in the proceedings. In such case~ a plea of not guilty ts formally en-
tl'rt'd on their behalf hut, as Boylc et al. observed: 
"smco: no defence is offered. a rdusalto rccogni>c the court amoullls tor pracucal 
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purposes to a plea of !ZUilty, though the prosecution must, of course, hring some cnn-
vincin!Z evidence of !Zuilt." (Ten Years On, p. ~'I) 
Since neither the 'admissihility" nor the rcliahility of the evidence pro-
duced hy the prosecution is challenged, the outcome of such cases is there-
fore also not in practice affected hy the changes in the law. 
There are also "partial pleas": 
"cases in which the defendant pleads guilty tn some, hut not all nf the charges 
agamst him, without securing the co-operation of the prosecution in withdrawing 
the remaining charges ... 
In most of these !cases I the defendant was successful in tht• sense that the contest-
ed charges were either dropped nr suhstituted hy other less serious charges. 
lt seems likely that most of these cases invnlvt>d an attempted charge-hargain 
which was offered hy the defence hut rl.'jected hy the prosecution." ( Ten Years On, 
p. 75) 
In cases where the defendant is convicted only of charges to which he 
pleads guilty, the outcome of the case is again not affected hy the change in 
the law. 
The most important category of cases for the purpose of this analysis arc 
those in which the defendants pleaded not guilty to all the charges against 
them. As Boyle et al. ohscrve: 
"The most striking feature of the cases in which the defendant contested all 
charges. hut was convicted on all or most of them, was the high proportion of alleged 
confessions. In at least three-quarters of the cases the defendants were alleged to 
have made a voluntary statement. In all hut a few of these this was the only suhstan-
tial evidence in the prosecution case, though there were a numher of other cases in 
which there was also some indication that the defendant had heen named hy accom-
plices. The essence of the defence in many of these cases was clearly the inadmissihil-
ity of the alleged confession. In only ahout one-third oft he cases for whtch full details 
of the initial prosecution cases were availahle to us did there appear to he strong in-
dependent evidence, hy way of identification, fingerprints and the like, pointing to 
the guilt of the accused." ( Ten Years On, pp. 7fl- 77) 
Furthermore, in about half the cases in the sample studied hy Boyle et al. 
in which defendants were acquitted this appeared to have hccn the result of 
the rejection of alleged confessions. ( Ten Years On, p. 77) 
In contested cases in which an (alleged) confession is the only evidence 
against the accused, the changes in the law discussed he low are therefore of 
crucial importance. Following the discussion of the effect of these changes in 
the law on trials in the 'Diplock" courts, the crucial issue of the rcliahility of 
confessions is discussed in the concluding part of this analysis. 
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Chapter 4 The "admissibility" of statements ( alle~edly 1 made to 
the police as evidence in court 
(i) "Admissibility" in Ordinary Law 
(ii) "AdmiHibility" in the "l>iplock" ( ·oum 
( iii J Conclusions 
English law has traditionally known rules which exclude certain evidence. 
and in particular certain statements hy the accused, from the consideration 
of the trihunal of fact. The importance of these rules in setting the legal 
framework for the "weighing" of the evidence hy the jury stems from the 
absence of strict legal or institutional safeguards operating at the time of po-
lice questioning. As was mentioned earlier. the main rules regarding the 
questioning of suspects (and certainly the only applicahlc rule of law) do not 
purport to protect suspects from oppressive questtoning, hut rather seek to 
protect accused persons from heing convicted on the hasis of statements ob-
tained as a result of oppressive questioning. The procedural safeguard of ex-
clusionary rules in English law therefore serves the same purpose as contem-
poraneous (institutional or procedural) safeguards attending police ques-
tioning in other legal systems: they seck to minimize the risk of unrcliahlc 
(and in many legal systems also of unfairly ohtained) statements becoming 
the hasis for a conviction. The link hctwcen. in particular, the main exclu-
sionary rule (the so- called "voluntariness-rule" discussed helow) and rclia-
hility has hecn clearly stated hy the Royal Commission on Criminal Proce-
dure, even though, while this link is "in legal terms exact; in psychological 
terms it is uncertain, to say the least." ( RCCP Report, para 4.73). 
The question of the legal approach to rdiahihty is further discussed in the 
concluding chapter of this analysis. 
(i) "Admissibility" in Ordinary Law 
The most important cxclusionary rule in English law is the "voluntariness 
rule": 
"'lt is a fundamental condition oft he admissihility in evidence against any person, 
equally of any oral answer given hy that person to a question put hy a police officer 
and of any statement made hy that person, that it shall have heen voluntary. in the 
sense that it has not hcen ohtained from htm hy fear of prejudice or hope of advan-
tage, exen:ised or held out hy a person in authority, or hy oppression." 
The onus is on the prosecution to prove heyond reasonable douht that a 
statement was voluntary in this sense. 
The circumstances that may constitute oppression arc many, such as the 
length and numhcr of interviews, the period in hctween, refreshments, etc .. 
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and rnav al'>o depend on the chawctcn'>!ic'> of the pcr'>on who make' the 
-,ta!l'nwnt ('>l'l' Sarh-. J. 111 R 1 l'rte~tler ( lli:'ifl) :'i I Cr. App Rep. I). The 
< 'ourt • >f Appeal ha-, ad< >ptcd t hl· f< >11< >Will)! de'>ntptu >n of", >ppre.,.,tvc quc-,-
ttonm{' m R 1 l'raxer (I 471) )fl ( 'r. A pp. Rep. I 'i 1,1 fl I: 
"qut•stlomng "h1ch hv lh nature. durall"n "r other att<'ndant nr,·urn,tanl'l'' ( ln-
cludmg tht· tal'! o1cu,todv) nnt<'' hopn (\lll'h as the hopt.· of release) or kar,. or"' 
affet·b :he mmd oil he 'us pc et that h" \\ill numhk' and he 'Jll'ilk' "ht•n otht·rw~St' 
he \\ould hah· \lil\l'd 'dent. .. 
The Northern lnsh ~1tuat10n pnor to the tntroductton of spec1allegislation 
111 thts field has hcen 'umman1nl hv Bovk PI al. as follows: 
. ' 
" ... the Nonhern Ireland JUdges wntmucd to apply the e'tahlishcd common la" 
rule' on the admi.,.,ihilit\ of wnfcs'lon,. Durmg J<J7 2 111 a numher of test rases the 
JUd!(e' held thatconfl'''"'m ohtamcd dunng prolon)!ed interrogation were involun-
tarY and therefore 1nadrmssihlc. 
In R v Flvnn und Leonardthe l.onl <'hid Justice descrihed the dett.•n!ion centre at 
Holywood as 'a set-up officially organised and operated to ohtain mformation ... 
from persons who would otherwise have he en less than willing to give it'; he went on 
to 'ay that in g.:neral 'admi"iom made hy pcr;,ons under thi;, typt.· of interrogation in 
this setting will often tail to qualify a' voluntary statements'. A suhstantial numher of 
other prosecutions w.:re ahandoned hv the l>ir.:ctor of Puhlic Prosecutions on the 
• 
ground that confessions ohtained in such circum;,tances were unlikely to he held ad-
• 
missihk." (fen Yeurs On, p. IX). 
Beyond applying the "voluntariness rule" as further defined above, the 
courts have a discretion to exclude evidencl' if its admission "would operate 
unfairly against the accused". The extent of this discretion is not quite dear, 
hut would appear to cover in particular the exclusion of evidence of little 
probative value, which though technically admissible, would he dispropor-
tionately disadvantageous to the accused if admitted. lt would appear that 
the discretion is used mainly to exclude character evidence in certain cases 
( cf Cross, On Evidence, 5th ed., pp. 29 ff). 
(ii) "Admissibility" in the "IJiplock" Courts 
Although R v F/ynn and Leonard (mentioned above) closely followed Eng-
lish precedents, such as R v Prager, Lord Diplock considered that in the cir-
cumstances such rulings were: 
"hampering the course of justice in the cas·~ of terrorist crimes ant! compelling the 
authorities responsible for public order and safety to resort to detention in a signifi-
cant numher of cases which could otherwise he dealt with hoth effectively and fairly 
by trial in a court of law." (para. H7) 
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Lord Dtplock considered: 
"the draconian remed\·, that allmculpatory admissions alle!(ed to have he en made 
hy the accused should he 'admissihle · in evidence, and that a coun of Jaw should con-
fine ib attention to tht·two questions rdevant to the gu1lt of the accusetL i.e. whether 
the alle!(t'd admi.,sum was in fact madt• and. 1f ,o, wh.:ther tht· circumstances in wh1ch 
1l wa' made g1vc any rea,on to 'uppo'e that the accused may have heen inrulpating 
himself falsely. The logK of thl' solution i' that the function of a court of law is to tlc-
t.:rmine wlwthcr the accused IS truly guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Its 
funl'tion IS not to llisnphnt: tht• police force, over which 1t has no lhrect power' of 
controL ry the mdirect method of lettin!( a guiltv man !(O frt:e to commit further 
cnmes against puhlic order and safety. In the case of a hardened terrorist this is a like-
ly result of thl\ method of markmg the court''tlisapproval of tht• hehaviour of the po-
lice. 
Nevcrthde", we thmk thatiO!(IC ou!(ht to ytt'ld to the con'!deration that the repu-
tation of couns of JUstice would he sullied 1f they countenanced convictions on evid-
enct· ohtamed by methods wh"h flout universally accepted standards of hehaviour. 
We consider therefore that although the current technical rult•s, practice and JUdicial 
discret10ns as to the admissih1lity of confession ought to he suspended for the dura-
tion of the emergency in respect of Scheduled Offences, they should he replaced hy a 
Simple legislative provision that: 
(I) Any inculpatory admissiOn made by the accused may he g1vcn in evidence un-
less it IS proved on a balance of probabilities that it was ohtained by subJecting the ac-
cused to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment; and 
( 2) The accused shall not he liahle to he convicted on any inculpatory admission 
made hy him and given in .:vidence if, after 1l has been given in evidence, it is similarly 
proved that it was ohtamt:d hy suhJCCting him to torture or to inhuman or de!(rading 
treatment 
In recommending this exception to the admissihility of confessions we have 
adopted the wording of Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights ant! Fundamental Freedoms. It is a simple concept. which we do not 
think the judiciary in Northern Ireland would find it difficult to apply in practice. 1t 
would not render inadmissible statements obtained as a result of building up a psy-
chological atmosphere in which the initial des1re of the person heing questioned to 
remain silent is replaced by an urge to confide in the questioner, or statements pre-
ceded by promises of favours or indications of the consequences which might follow 
if the person questioned persisted in refusing to answer. Such matters, of course, 
might affect the reliability of the confession as establishing the guilt of the accused 
and should he fully investigated on that issue. They would not affect its initial admis-
sibility in evidence unless they could be fairly regarded as so outrageous as to amount 
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment" (paras H8 - 90 ). 
Consequently. the law on the admissibility of statements in evidence has 
been fundamentally altered in trials in the" Diploek" courts. Section 8 of the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 11 provides: 
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"8. A dmtsmm.l hr per1on1 charl(ed wah schetiuled offence.\ 
(I) In any crimmal procee<lings for a scheduled offence, or two or more offences 
whach arc or include scheduled offences, a statement made hy the accused may he 
given m l'Vidt~ncc hy the prosecution 10 so far as -
(a) 11 is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedmgs; and 
(h) 11 i-. not excluded hy the murt 10 pursuance of subsection (2) helow. 
( 2) If. in any such proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence 
a statement made hy the accused, pnmajacieev1dence is adduced that the accused 
wao, subJected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment 10 order to induce 
him to make the -.tatement,the court shall. unless the pr<JSI.'Cutlon satisfies 1tthatthe 
statement was not so obtained -
(a) exclude the statement. or 
(h) if the statement has hecn received in evidence, either · 
(i) continue the trial disregarding the '>tatement; or 
( ii) direct that the trial shall he restarted he fore a differently constituted court (he-
fori.' which the statement in question shall he inadmissible). 
( 3) This section does not appl~ to a summary trial." 
Somewhat different from Lord Diplock's proposal, the onus of proof for 
the defence is to adduce prima facie evidence that a statement was obtained 
as a result of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. The crown can then 
rebut this only by proving beyond reasonable doubt that the statement was 
not so obtained. The latter is in line with the normal standard of proof re-
quired of the prosecution in ~·oir dire 1: cases relating to confessions (see 
Cross, On Evidence, 4th ed., pp 04-65). 
That section 8 serves explicitly to change both law and practice concern-
ing the admissibility of statements was stated unequivocally by the Lord 
Chief Justice for Northern Ireland in R v Corey and others (Judgement deliv-
ered on 6 December 1973): 
"Accordingly, section 6( 2) would merely he a stah:ment of the obvious if it did 
not, in conjunction with section 6( I). render admissible much that previously must 
have heen excluded. There is no need now to satisfy the judge that a statement is vo-
luntary in the sometimes technical sense which that word has acquired in relation to 
criminal trials." 
McGonigal LJ. in the leading case of R v McCormick and others ( 1977) 
NI 4 referred to the interpretation of the words "torture, inhuman and de-
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grading treatment" by the organs of the European Convention on Human 
Raghts and. construing the words in the scctaon accordingly, concluded that 
statements would be lawfully admissible in evidence under this section even 
if the interviewing officer had used "a moderate degree of physical maltreat-
ment'' for the purpose of obtaining the statement (but see further below). 
Irrespective of whether one accepts that the "technical" requtrements of 
"voluntariness" have gone beyond minimizing the risk of unreliable state-
ments being produced in court. it is clear that section 8 does not fulfil that ba-
sic fum:tion of the ordinary law on the admissibility of statements. As the 
Lord Chief Justice said in R v Mcgrath ( 1980) N.l. 91 ): 
"The scheme of section !! ( I ) is to abrogate the common law rule concerning the 
adm1ssihilitv of statements, hut the umversal adm1ssihilitv of relevant statements of 
• • 
1hc accused introduced hy that subsection 1s then qualified hy reference to the words 
taken from article J 1 of the European ( 'onventlon on Human Rights I· the object of 
wh1ch was to outlaw certain forms of conduct and not simply to obviate the admis-
sion of unreliable evidence. The same object may he attributed to section 8 ( 2 ), he-
cause, for example, it has nothmg to say concemmg the holding out of inducement-. 
( howcwr great) to a suspect. although the latter course could tend strongly to des-
troy the reliability of a confession." 
Therefore, even proof that a prisoner was subjected to torture, or to inhu-
man or degrading treatment does not suffice to exclude a statement, unles~ it 
is also proved that that treatment was meted out "in order to" induce the 
statement ( R. v. McCormick); and that there was a certain amount of mens 
rea on the part of the person inflicting the treatment. To quote again the 
Lord Chief Justice in the McGrath case: 
"Our view. therefore. is that section !!( 2) i~ aimed at discouraging the deliberate 
infliction of suffering rather than contemplatmg the incidental effect on a suspect 
who becomes the victim of conduct which is not deliherately bad conduct." 
In sum, the emergency legislation not only obviated the "technical" re-
quirement of "voluntariness", but equally removed from the law on admis-
sibility the basic function of minimizing the risk that unreliable statements 
arc brought before the tribunal of fact. As was mentioned above (Chapter 
2), the rules on interrogation also do not fulfil this function. As a result, for 
trials held in the "Diplock" courts, there arc no binding rules of law at any 
stage of the criminal justice process to safeguard against the risk of unreliable 
confessions becoming the basis for a conviction: under the emergency legis-
lation, if applied without mitigation, accused are only protected from being 
convicted on the basis of unreliable statement evidence by the care with 
which the tribunal of fact "weighs" the evidence, in particular the evidence 
about the manner in which a confession was obtained. 
This was clearly the intention of Lord Diplock when he recommended 
that statements should only be inadmissible if obtained as a result of torture, 
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or inhuman or degrading treatment; and that not only thl' law and practice, 
hut also judicial discretion as to the admtsstbility of confessions he su-
spended. with the result that statements would he brought heforc the trihu-
nal of fact although thetr reliahility could clearly he open to question (sec pa-
ras XIHIO of the l>iplock Report, quoted a hove). 
Nonetheless, the courts in Northern Ireland have held that they haw re-
tained a certain discretion 10 this respect. This was stated hy the Lord Chief 
.lust ice in R I' ( 'orev as follows: 
• 
"there 1s always a discretion, unless 11 is expressly removed. to exclude any admis-
sihle evidenn· on the ground that (hy reason of any g1ven Clrcum\tance) its prejudi-
ctal effect outweighs its prohatiw value and that to admit the e\'ldence would not he 
in the interest of justice ... 
McGonigal L.J .. having interpreted section X (than section fl) in accord-
ance with the European Convention on Human Rights as allowing "a mod-
crate degree of physical maltreatment" ( R \' McCormick, cited a hove) went 
on to say: 
"That does not mean however that these courts Will tolerate or permit phys1cal 
maltreatment of a lesser degree deliherately carried out f('r the purpose of. or which 
has the effect of, inducing a person interviewed to make a statement. Not only would 
such conduct amount to an assault and in itself he an offence under the ordinary cri-
minal law hut it would he repugnant to all principles of Justice to allow such conduct 
to he used as a means towards an end, however Jesirahle that end might he made to 
" appear 
and pointed to the J udgcs' discretionary powers, 
"which provide an extra-statutory control over the means hy which statements arc 
induced and ohtained." 
However, 
"If he exercises his discretion without regard to section 6 he will in all prohahility 
exclude statements ohtained in circumstances not considered hy Parliament to war-
rant exclusion. 1t would indeed not he difficult to envisage cases of maltreatment 
falling short of section 6 conduct, which the trial judge could consider would he suffi-
cient to justify the exercise of his discretion. The effect of the exercise of the discre-
tion if unfettered hy the existence of section 6 might he, therefore, to negate the ef-
fect of section 6 and under the guise of the discretionary power have the effect of 
reinstating the old common law test insofar as it depended on the proof of physical or 
mental maltreatment. In my opinion the judicial discretion should not he exercised 
so as to defeat the will of Parliament as expressed in the section. While I do not sug-
geM its exercise should he excluded in a case of maltreatment falling short of section 
6 conduct, it should only he exercised in such cases where failure to exercise it might 
create injustice hy admitting a statement which though admissible under the section 
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and relevant on its face was in iuelf, and I underline the words, suspect hy reason of 
the method hy which it was ohtained, and hy that I do not mean only a method de-
signed and adopted for the purpose of ohtaining it, hut a method as a result of which 
it was ohtained. This would require consideration not only of the conduct itself hut 
also, and since the effect of any conduct varies according to the individual receiving 
it. possihly equally important. its effect on the individual and whether, to use the 
words of the Commission Report already referred to, the maltreatment was such as 
to dnve the individual to act against hi' will or conscience. 1t is within these guide-
lines that it appears to me the judicial discretion should he exercised m cases of phy-
sical maltreatment." 
Hen nett J.. after discussing this case. observes: 
"We have looked at reports of other cases to try to discover examples of the exer-
cise of the courts' discretion which might provide a guide to mterrogating officers 
and others as to what is permissihle and what is nut in the conduct of interrogation. 
Few of such rulings are fully reported. The reports appearing in the press are neces-
sarily so condensed and selective that it is often difficult to discern precisely on what 
• 
!(rounds a statement has heen ruk:d inadmissihle. 
1t is nevertheless clear that any statement which may have heen obtained hy the 
use of physical violence or ill-treatment would not he admitted. In less extreme 
cases, there is the difficulty that, hecause the principles on which the discretion will 
he exercised are so hroadly stated and the facts of individual cases are so infinitely 
various. it is hard to predict what the judge's ruling will he. The courts have on occa-
sion expressly refused invitations hy counsel to define the circumstances in which the 
Judicial discretion to exclude otherwise admissihle evidence might he exercised, on 
the ground that each case depends on its own particular facts." (para tl4 ). 
And Hoyle et al. state: 
"In practice contested confessions have heen excluded mainly where the judge 
has heen satisfied by the medical evidence that there has heen physical maltreatment 
and that that maltreatment was used in order to ohtain a confession, that is that it was 
used hy detectives hefore the confession was made. There have heen a substantial 
numher of such cases." (Ten Years On, p. 48, emphasis added). 
Later on they state: 
" ... there was ample evidence of hreaches of the Judges' Rules in the process of 
questioning, in that charges were delayed and questioning continued long after clear 
admissions of guilt had heen made. There were also some examples in the written re-
cords of questioning of improper threats or inducements. 
We are not aware of any case in which a statement has heen held to he inadmissi-
hle merely on the ground of such breaches ofthe Judges' Rules. In a few cases judges 
have used their residual discretion to exclude statements obtained by trickery or 
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-other improper practices. In one case in our sample the JUdge excluded an oral ad-
mission obtained from a defendant by a false claim by the detectives that 'they had 
ample evidence against him' and that there was a witness who could tdentify him, 
and after an assurance that what he said would not be wntten down and used in evid-
ence; as there was no other evidence against him, the defendant was acquitted. In an-
other trial in December 1979 the judge admitted a statement made by a 15 year old 
schoolboy who was attending a school for the mentally handicapped at the time of 
the interview, and who was assessed as having the mental age of a child of eight, 
though it was accepted that the administrative direction requiring the presence of a 
parent or relative in such a case had not been complied with." (Ten Years On, p. 49). 
In McGrath the trial judge admitted a confession in evidence, although 
the accused (who had been arrested, detained and interrogated repeatedly) 
had told both his own and a police doctor that "he couldn't take any more in-
. . ., 
tervtewmg. 
It would appear that confessions apparently obtained as a result of physi-
cal maltreatment (falling short of torture, or inhuman or degrading treat-
ment) are usually excluded from evidence by the judge in the exercise of his 
discretion. Beyond this, there are no clear principles to guide the judges on 
how to exercise their discretion. In practice, the judges do not appear to 
make consistent use of their discretion so as to exclude confessions the relia-
bility of which is open to question on other grounds. Neither statements ob-
tained as a result of repeated, prolonged and forceful questioning, nor state-
ments obtained as a result of threats or promises are as a rule excluded. 
Individual instances to the contrary appear to be the exception. The con-
sequences of this policy will be discussed in the next chapter. 
(iii) Conclusions 
The law regarding the admissibility in evidence of statements made by a su-
spect in police custody has been fundamentally altered. Involuntary state-
ments are legally admissible evidence, unless induced by torture, or by inhu-
man or degrading treatment. This change has not only obviated "technical" 
legal requirements, but has also removed from the law on admissibility the 
basic function of minimizing the risk that unreliable statements are brought 
before the tribunal of fact. The rules on interrogation also do not fulfil this 
function. 
As a result, for trials held in the "Diplock" courts, there are no binding 
rules of law at any stage of the criminal justice process to safeguard against 
the risk of unreliable confessions becoming the basis for a conviction: under 
the emergency legislation, if applied without mitigation, accused are only 
protected from being convicted on the basis of unreliable statement evid-
ence by the care with which the tribunal offact "weighs" the evidence, in par-
ticular the evidence about the manner in which a confession was obtained. 
Nonetheless (and contrary to Lord Diplock's proposals), the courts have 
retained a discretion to exclude evidence on the grounds that "its prejudicial 
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effect outweighs its probative value and that to admit the evidence would not 
be in the interests of justice". 
It would appear that the courts usually exercise this discretion to exclude 
confessions apparently obtained as a result of physical maltreatment falling 
short of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. Beyond this, there is no 
consistent judicial practice, but neither statements obtained as a result of re-
peated, prolonged and forceful questioning, nor statements obtained as a re-
sult of threats or promises are as a rule excluded. 
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Chapter 5 The "wei~hin~" of the el'idence 
(i) Judge and Jury 
(ii) Admiuihilitv and Reliahilitv 
. . 
( ii i) The Nature of the Evidence 
(iv) ( 'onclusiom 
(i) Judge and Jury 
In ordinary procet•dings, all persons accused of serious offences have the 
right to he tried by jury 1 '. In constitutional terms. the participation of ordi-
nary citizens in the administration of justice is regarded as an important ex-
pressiOn of the democratic nature of the state; and the abolition of the jury 
consequently as a diminution of democracy. In criminal legal tetms, the right 
to a trial by jury is considered an important safeguard in guaranteeing ac-
cused persons a fair trial. It shields the accused from abuse of the criminal 
justice system by the state. in that it takes away the ultimate decision on guilt 
or innocence from officers of the state, and places it in the hands of "peers'' 
of the accused. 14 Injury trials, the ultimate decision on guilt or innocence is 
not taken by officers of the law, of the state, hut by ordinary people. 
As a result, on certain issues (such as the factors detennining the legal ad-
missibility of a confession on the one hand, and its reliability on the other) 
this means that two distinct, legal and non-legal, decisions may have to be 
made. 
The jury's "weighing" ofthe evidence not being a matter oflaw,their ver-
dict need not state the reasons for their conclusions. There are nonetheless a 
number of important safeguards against subjective and arbitrary jury deci-
• SIOns. 
First, the jury must take its assessment on the basis of admissible evidence, 
properly presented, and thus within a strict framework of law. The law on the 
admissibility of evidence ensures that certain kinds of evidence, in particular 
certain confessions, are altogether excluded from the jury's consideration. 
The rules of procedure at the trial seek to ensure that admissible evidence is 
fairly presented, in particular through examination and cross-examination 
of witnesses. 
Following the hearing of evidence, the jury must be properly instructed as 
to the onus and standard of proof required for a conviction; ultimately, in 
criminal proceedings, the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the 
accused beyond reasonable doubt. 
Secondly, the jury is required to reach its decision, if not by unanimity, 
then at least by a very high degree of consensus: not one man or woman, but 
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at least I 0 out of a random group of 12 must agree on an accused's guilt he-
fore a verdict of "guilty" can he entered. This high degree of consensus re-
quired of a relatively large group of randomly chosen people is. in ordinary 
circumstances, a major safeguard against hi as and prejudice or other suhjcc-
tive factors influencing the decision of the trihunal of fact and thcrchy en-
sures its ohJectivity. 
An additional safeguard can he found in the duty of the judge to withdraw 
a case from the jury if, on the evidence produced, he is satisfied that the jury 
would not he justified 10 convicting the accused. All these safeguards oper-
ate in favour of the accused: certain kinds of relevant evidence, in particular 
statements, arc excluded. e.g. hecause it is prima facie of douhtful rcliahility 
or of relatively little prohativc value (this fact is not altered hy the argument, 
put forward hy Lord Diplock, that the law on admissihility has moved he-
yond this test); not a simple majority, hut at least I 0 out of 12 jurors need to 
he convinced of the guilt of the accused, and the power of the judge to with-
draw a case from the jury can only he exercised in favour of the accused. 
At the same time, the jury system can hrcak down in Circumstances such 
as prevail in Northern Ireland, where hias and prejudice, hut ahovc all inti-
midation, can result in "perverse" jury verdicts. 
Lord Diplock noted that the judges in Northern Ireland had hccn more 
ready than judges in England to withdraw a case from the jury ifthey had any 
douht as to the guilt of the accused. Lord Diplock felt that, 
"While the danger of perverse convictions by partisan Juries can in practice he 
averted by the judge. though only at the risk of his assuming to himself the role of 
decider of fact, there is no corresponding safeguard in a JUry trial against the danger 
of perverse acquittals .... 
... We think that matters have now reached a stage in Northern Ireland at which it 
would not he safe to continue to rely upon methods hitherto used for securing impar-
tial trial by a jury of terrorist crimes, ... " (para 37). 
He therefore recommended that for "scheduled" offences, 1' 
" ... trial by judge alone should take the place oftrial hy jury for the dura-
tion of the emergency" (para 38). 
Trials in the "Diplock" courts arc therefore held without a jury: Section 7 
of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 (consolidating 
the original 1973 version, as amended in 1975) reads, in part: 
"7. Mode of trial on indictment of scheduled offences 
( I) A trial on indictment of a scheduled offence shall he conducted by the court 
without a jury. 
( 2) The court trying a scheduled offence on indictment under this section shall 
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' have all the power,, authorities amltunsdictJon whtch I he court would have if it had 
heen '1tting With a JllrV. Jndudlll!( power to determ111e .tnv quesllon and to make any 
findmg wh1ch would. apart from thts sec11on. he requ1red to he determined or made 
hy a 1urv. and rl'ft•rcnces 111 anv enaclmt·nt to a turv or the Vl'rdict or find Ill!! of a tury 
shall he construed accordin!(ly 111 rl'lat1on to a trial under th1s 'cction." 
In this respect. the pos1t10n of the JUdges in the" D1plock" courts therefore 
rcscmhlcs that of Magistrates, who try minor offences in summary proceed-
mgs, as well as morl' se now. cases in which the accused has waived his right to 
a JUry trial. (However, Magistrate' cannot try the mo'>t scnous of offences.) 
Magistrates sit without a Jury. A-. regards many issues of law. affecting the 
framework for the "weighing" of the evidence. the Clerk of the Magistrates 
court to some extent fulfils the role of master of procedure. On those issues. 
there is therefore still a duality of functions in spite of the ahsence of a jury. 
On other issues. such as the ruling on the admissihility of statements, the Ma-
gistrates themselves fulfil the function of hoth judge and jury. A Magistrates' 
court. however. is usually made up of a plurality of Magistrates so that the 
"weighing" of the evidence does not fall on the shoulders of one man or 
woman alone. That "weighing", moreover, takes place within the ordinary 
framework of the law (elucidated hy the Clerk of the court), so that involun-
tary confessions cannot hecome the hasis for a conviction. And although the 
safeguards attending a trial in a Magistrates' court may fall somewhat short 
of those attending trial hy jury in the Crown Court, it must he realized that 
Magistrates have compulsory jurisdiction in minor cases only; and that even 
in cases of indictahle offences tried hy a Magistrates' court, the maximum 
sentencing power is 12 months only. Any accused charged with a serious off-
ence retains the right to opt for a trial hy jury in the Crown Court. 
The single judges in the "Diplock" courts, hy contrast, can and often do 
impose sentences of life imprisonment on the hasis of confessions which 
would he inadmissihle in a Magistrates' court (or any other ordinary court of 
law) as falling short of the legal requirement of "voluntariness". 
(ii) Admissibilitv and Reliahilitv 
• • 
Professor Cross remarks that "trials within trials" (in which the "admissibil-
ity" of confessions are ruled upon), "are something of an unreality in cases 
tried hefore magistrates, hecause the question of admissibility has to be de-
termined by the same tribunal as that which pronounces on liahility." (Cross, 
On Evidence, 5th ed, p. 73) 
This "unreality", however, stems from the fact that in Magistrates' courts 
the tribunal is supposed to pronounce on the reliahility of a confession which 
that tribunal itself has already held to he purely "voluntary", and not ob-
tained as a result of thrt:ats, promises or oppression. In the" Diplock" courts, 
hy contrast, matters affecting the reliability of a confession no longer affect 
its initial admissihility. As was made clear a hove, neither the "voluntariness" 
nor the reliability of "admissihle" confessions can he taken for granted in the 
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.. Diplock" court\ ( Sl'C Chapter 4 ). In other words, matters which might af-
fect the reliahility of a confession (threats, promises, oppression) arc, in law. 
supposed to he fully investigated after the ruling on the admissibility. 
In fact, the "unreality" of such a secondary "weighing" of the evidence. 
noted hy Professor Cross with regard to Magistrates" courts, can equally he 
noted in the "Diplock" courts: following extensive hearings on the "admis-
sibility" of an (alleged) confession, covering fully the circumstances in which 
it was taken, there is no suhscqucnt inquiry specifically to deal with the rclia-
hility of the confession. 
No case has hecn hrought to the author's attention where an accused was 
acquitted though his confession was ruled admissihle. If such cases exist, 
they arc extremely rare. Rather than addressing the question of reliahility as 
a separate issue, the JUdges in the "Diplock" courts appear to suhsume this 
task under the exercise of their discretion to exclude evidence, the admission 
of which would operate unfairly against the accused. When defence counsel 
suhmit that a statement is unreliable, they too tend to place the emphasis on a 
request that the court cxcrciscs its discretion to exclude the statement, rather 
than on the argument that the court should acquit hecause the statement is 
unreliable, irrespective of its admissibility (although the latter argument is 
usually not left out altogether). 
However, as was observed above, there are no clear principles to guide 
the judge on how to exercise his discretion in cases where the factors affect-
ing the reliability of a confession fall short of physical maltreatment. This, to-
gether with the fact that the judges in the "Diplock" courts sit alone, in-
creases the risk that subjective factors come to influence the findings of fact -
at least in cases where disputed confessions are the only real issue. Such sub-
jective factors need not constitute bias on the part of the judge, but may in-
clude "case-hardening": the negative effect of constant involvement in the 
administration of justice on the detachment and objectivity of judges. Boylc 
et al. have provided convincing statistical evidence of "case-hardening" in 
the "Diplock" courts. 
(iii) The nature of the evidence 
It was noted in the introductory remarks of Part 11 that in the vast majority of 
cases in the "Dip lock" courts the only substantial evidence against the ac-
cused consists of a confession allegedly made by the defendant to the police 
in the course of interrogation. As Boyle et al. observe: 
"The overall nature of the evidence in most Diplock trials does have a significant 
impact on the nature of the proceedings ... [T)he basis of the prosecution case in the 
vast majority of cases is either a formal written statement by the defendant or on oral 
admission during questioning. Tht>re are rarely any witnesses whose evidence relates 
directly to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Most are called only to establish 
that the particular shooting or bombing or other incident actually took place. Such 
witnesses, whether civilian or memhers of the security forces, are merely taken 
through their written depositions in a routine manner. The statements or admission 
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by the defendant will then he produced. If the case is not contested the judge will 
convict and proceed directly to a consideration of any submission or evidence in mi-
tigation hefore giving sentence. Such cases rarely last more than a few hours, unless 
there is a large numher of charges or defendants. In contested cases the main issue is 
likely to he the admissibility and validity of the alleged confession or admission. The 
hearing of the evtdence from all involved in the process of arrest and interrogation in 
what are tenned 'statement fights' ofthis kind may take up to several weeks. But the 
focus of the proceedings is not on the alleged offences but on what happened in the 
police station." (Ten Years On, pp 58.- 59) 
Ben nett J. discussed the general difficulties of establishing what hap-
pened in the interrogation room in the context of the investigation of com-
plaints; hut the evidentiary problems facing the judges in "statement fights" 
in the "Diplock" courts are no different. 1" 
Ben nett J. observes: 
"It has heen alleged in the past that there has heen a 'wall of silence· among detec-
tive officers who interrogate prisoners - in other words, a conspiracy to prevent the 
facts from coming out, extending to Widespread refusals to make any statement to 
the officers investigating complaints. This is not the position today; we have come 
across no case in which an officer has refused a statement. The statements that are 
made, however, do not take the investigating officer very far. The evidence from po-
lice officers seems often to consist of short statements to the effect that the alleg-
ations are wholly denied (from detective officers who interrogate prisoners) or that 
nothing untoward was seen or heard (from uniformed officers)." (para 344). 
The same can be said about the evidence given by police officers in the 
course of "statement fights". Bennett J. adds: 
"Independent Witnesses 
As matters stand, there are not likely to be independent witnesses to the events in 
question - witnesses, that is to say, who do not have a personal interest in the out-
come of the investigation .... [T)he detective officers and the prisoner are nmmally 
alone in the interview room, and their conversation cannot normally be overheard. 
lbus, so far lllliiiiY miseondud short of physical ill-treatment is eoneemed, there is 
little prosped at present of fiodin& independent witneues. As regards physical ill-
treatment, there is perhaps a slightly greater possibility of finding witnesses, because 
other police officers may have heard a commotion or have looked through the 'spy-
hole' at the critical moment. But no statement to this effect seems in fact to have been 
made to an investigating officer. 
Other Evidence 
In these circumstances, investigations resolve themselves into considering the word 
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of the complainant against the word of the police officers against whom the com-
plaint is made. together with any circumstantial evidence that may he available hy 
way of forensic examination of the interview room or medical examination of the 
prisoner. Although we are informed that forensic examinations arc regularly carried 
out. they do not seem In yield a great amount of evidence. An enormous weight 
therefore hangs on medical evidence. although this can only hc of value in cases in 
which the complaints arc of physical oppression (and not necessarily in all of those. 
since an assault can take plact• without leaving marks). 
fvidence from medical examination 
A doctor may say, as a result of a medical examination, that the prisoner's condition 
is or is not consistent with his allegations. Fven if inJury is found, however, alterna-
tive explanations may he offert·d or inferred. The only alternative explanation most 
commonly advanced hy the RUC is '>clf-intlicted injury. An experienced doctor may 
hc ahle in some cases. and to a higher degree of certainty. to distinguish this from in-
jury resulting from assault, having regard to the nature. extent and site of injuries. In 
any case, many of the examples of self-intli<:ted injuries that have hcen mentioned to 
us- for example, swallowing foreign bodies or cutting wrists with knives- are clearly 
not of a nature to deceive a doctor into hclieving that an assault had taken place, hut 
must hc assumed to have had some other reason. such as halting the process of inter-
rogation. In other cases. however, there may he room for doubt. 
Results from in ve.wigation.> 
For one or other of the reasons given above. or a combination of them, most inves-
til!ations of complaints are unsatisfying in the sense that they do not lead to a 
clear-cut result in terms of deciding whether the ennts complained of did or did 
not take place or whether particular officers were or were not responsible for 
them" (paras 345 - 34H, emphasis added). 
It must he recalled that in spite of the increased supervision over interro-
gation following Bennett J. 's recommendations, there is still no corrobora-
tion of what is said during the interrogation. 
Bennett J. emphasizes, 
"that the standard of proof required in order to obtain a finding of guilt against a 
police officer, as against any other person, and whether in criminal or disciplinary 
proceedings. is proof hcyond reasonahle doubt" (para 341'1). 
The absence of any successful criminal or disciplinary proceedings against 
police officers regarding maltreatment 'lf suspects in custody is no doubt re-
lated to this. 
In "statement fights", the onus as regards the "admissibility" of a confes-
sion under Section 8 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 
1978 is on the defence to make a prima facie case of "torture, or inhuman or 
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degrading treatment"; the prosecutiOn mw.t then rebut thi., case beyond all 
reasonable doubt ( sl.'c Chaptl'r 4 ). ( itvl'n thl' rl'lattVl' n~adml'" of thl' "Dt-
plock" courts to accept that the defence has made a prtma fa ere case under 
Section X, it is suprising, in vil'W of the evidentiary difficulties noted above, 
how often these courts have accepted that the prosecution have discharged 
the onus of proof laid upon them to establish beyond reasonable doubt that 
such treatment did not occur. Moreover. the ultimate "weighing" of the 
evidence by the tribunal of fact in the "Diplock" courts is supposed to he 
covered by the normal, fundamental, rule of crimmallaw "in duhto pro reo". 
I.e. the judges in the "Diplock" courts, like JUries or magiMratcs in ordinary 
courts, must acquit if there is any reasonable doubt about the guilt of the ac-
cused. But, again. it is surprising in view of the evidentiary difficulties noted 
by Ben nett J ., that in assessing the reliability of a confession (allegedly) madl' 
to the police m the course of interrogation. the judges m the "Diplock" 
courts so often find that the circumstances in which the confession was ob-
tained, have been established with such clarity as to leave no doubt about the 
guilt of the accused. This. crucial. issue will he discussed in Part Ill of this an-
alysis. 
(iv) Conclusions 
Trials in the "Diplock" courts arc held without a jury; a judge. sitting alone. 
acts both as master of procedure and as tribunal of fact. 
The law envisages an assessment of the reliability of confessions, inde-
pendent of and subsequent to the judge's ruling on "admissibility". But in 
fact, rather than addressing the question of reliability separately. the JUdges 
in the "Diplock" courts appear to subsume this task under their rulings on 
the "admissibility" of confessions. 
A similar practice has been noted in the Magistrates" courts (Cross, On 
E~·idence). But whereas Magistrates apparently (and maybe not unreason-
ably) subsume their assessment on the reliability of a confession under their 
testing of its "voluntariness". the judges in the "Diplock" courts appear to 
subsume their assessment on the reliability of a confession under the exer-
cise of their discretion to exclude evidence, the admission of which would 
operate unfairly against the accused. 
However. as was observed above (Chapter 4), there arc no clear princi-
ples to guide the judges on how to exercise this discretion in cases where the 
factors affecting the reliability of a confession fall short of physical maltreat-
ment. The assessment of the reliability of confessions therefore takes place in 
a much less strict legal framework than is imposed on fact-finding in ordi-
nary courts, including Magistrates' courts. 
This, together with the fact that the judges in the "Diplock" courts sit 
alone (without either a jury or assessors), increases the risk that subjective 
factors come to influence the findings of fact- at least in cases where disput-
ed confessions are the only real issue. Such subjective factors need not con-
stitute bias on the part of the judge, but may include "case-hardening" : the 
negative effect of constant involvement in the administration of justice on 
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the detachment and ohjectivity of judges. 
Most of the defendants in the "Diplock" courts who protest their innoc-
ence hy contesting their case arc convicted on the hasis of confessions ( alle-
gedly) made hy them in the course of police interrogation. Hy convicting 
them on this hasis. the judges in the "Diplock" courts tmply that the circum-
stances in which confessions are ohtained can he estahlished with such clar-
ity as to leave no douht ahout either the admissihility or the reliahility of 
those confessiom. Thts is surprising in view of the evidentiary prohlems re-
garding what happened in the interrogation room. noted hy Hennett J. 
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Chapter 6 Other adjudications 
(iJ Appeals 
( ii J Complaints against the Police 
( ili) ( ·onclusion.\ 
(iJ Appeals 
The ( 'ourt of Appeal in Northem Ireland can hear appeals from trials in the 
"Diplock" courts as well as from trials in the ordinary cnminal courts. There 
arc two kinds of appeal: appeal against conviction and appeal against sent-
ence. In ordinary law, an accused may appeal against his conviction on any 
ground which involves a question of law alone. Appeals against conviction 
on grounds of fact, or of mixed law and fact, require either a certificate by the 
trial judge or leave of appeal by the Court of Appeal. Appeals against sent-
ence also require leave hy the Court of Appeal. 
The law regarding trials in the" Diplock" courts, however, grants virtually 
unlimited rights of appeal. Section 7 (6) of the Northern Ireland ( Emergen-
o.:y Provisions) Act 1978 reads: 
"A person convicted of any offence on a trial under this section without a jury 
may. not withstanding anything in Section H of the ( 'riminal Appeal (Northern Ire-
! land) Act I Y6H, appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal under that section-
(a) against his conviction, on any ground, without the leave oft he Court of Crimi-
nal Appeal or a certificate of the judge of the court of trial: and 
(b) against sentence passed on conviction, without that leave, unless the sentence 
is one fixed by law." 
The reasons for which the Court of Appeal will uphold ("allow") an ap-
peal from a" Diplock" court are the same as those regarding ordinary trials: 
if the appeal judges are of the opinion: 
(a) that the conviction should be set aside on the ground that under all the 
circumstances of the case it is unsafe or unsatisfactory; 
(b) that the judgement of the court of trial should be set aside on the 
ground of a wrong decision of any question of law; or 
(c) that there was a "material irregularity" in the course of the trial. 
The Court of Appeal may nonetheless dismiss an appeal if it considers 
that no miscarriage of justice has actually occurred. (Section 8 of the Crimi-
nal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1968, the Northern Irish equivalent of 
section 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, regarding England and Wales). 
Within this framework there are a wide variety of grounds of appeal (see 
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A rchholt~ paras tJ 1.1 - 9 2J ). Many of these grounds of appeal relate to the 
setting of the legal framework with m which the trihunal of fact 'weighs" the 
evidence (sec a how. ( ·haptcr :'i ), e.g. dcfcch in thl· tndictmcnt; wrongful ad· 
mission or exclusion of evidence; misdtrcction of the jury, "material irregu-
larities" 'iuch as interruption hy the JUdge making it impossihlc for defending 
counsel to present his defence fairly, or such as disclosure of previous con-
victions of the defendant to the Jury; etc. 
Other grounds of appeal of a more or less .. technical" nature include the 
ground that the findtng of a JUry was ambiguous (e.g. 1f the jury have "nega-
tived" hy their findtng the existence of some essential clement of the offence 
charged); or questions as to the constitution of thcjury or misconduct of one 
• 
or more Jurymen. 
But there arc also a numher of grounds of appeal which extend hcyond 
"technical" issues and which contain an clement of review of the "weighing" 
of the evidence hy the tribunal of fact. For instance. the ground of appeal that 
the judge wrongfully refused to Withdraw a case from the jury implies an as-
sessment of the weight of the evidence. This ground covers the case where 
the evidence adduced at the trial could not possibly prove the offence 
charged. But where there was evidence against the accused capable of prov-
ing his guilt of the offence in the indictment, the Court of Appeal will notal-
low the appeal on this ground. Seemingly wider is the test whether "under all 
circumstances of the case I the verdict I is unsafe or unsatisfactory". In apply-
ing this test the Appeal Court must "ask itself the subjective question wheth-
er it is content to allow the verdict to stand or whether lurking douhts cause it 
to wonder whether injustice has been done." (cf. A rchhold. para HtJtJ ). Such 
reviews arc, however, in practice very limited in scope: thus, it is not a suffi-
cient ground of appeal that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; 
nor is it sufficient merely to show that the case against the appellant was a 
very weak one; nor is it enough that the members of the Court of Appeal feel 
some douht as to the correctness of the verdict; nor that the judge of the 
court of trial has given a certificate on that ground; or that the trial judge cer-
tified that the jury's verdict was unreasonahlc. As the Court of Appeal once 
put it, that court would never suhstitute its own opinion for that of the jury 
(Archhold. para tJ20). 
In all cases where the verdict relied on a real "weighing" of lawful, and 
properly presented, evidence, however limited (and in which no fresh evid-
ence has cast doubts on the wrdict ), the Court of Appeal respects the find-
ings by the tribunal of fact, 1f only because that tribunal had the opportunity. 
denied to the Court of Appeal, to see and hear witnesses being examined and 
cross-examined. "Admissible" (extra-judicial) confessions, heing lawful 
and, if believed, sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused, are not subject to 
any particular scrutiny on appeal; the 4uestion of wh.:thcr the confession 
was made, and if so, whether it was relialJie, 1s a factual matter left to the jury. 
It is also important to note that matters within the discretion of the trial 
judge do not afford grounds for appeal. lt would appear that the decision by 
the trial judge on whether or not he should exercise his discretion to exclude 
otherwise admissible evidence because its admission would operate unfairly 
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against the accused, is not therefore suhJect to review on appeal ( cf. Arch-
hold. para tJ24, where five examples arc given of judicial discrl·tions not af-
fordmg a ground of appeaL hut the discretion to exclude evidence is not in-
cluded in these examples). 
As regards trials in the" Diplock" courts, the ( 'ourt of Appeal in Northern 
Ireland will e4ually consider grounds of appeal which relate to the setting hy 
the trial judge of the legal framework within which the trihunal of fact 
"weighed" the evidence. However, as was shown earlier, at least as regards 
statements made hy the accused. this framework is much less strict in the 
"Diplock" courts. Consequently, whereas in ordinary proceedings the 
( 'ourt of Appeal would review whether the trial court, in ruling on the ad-
missihility of a statement, had properly addressed the issue of the "voluntari-
ness" of that statement, in reviewing a case from the "Diplock" courts the 
Appeal Court needs to assess only whether the trial judge had properly con-
sidered whether a confession was ohtained as a result of "torture, or of inhu-
man or degrading treatment." 
In the "Diplock" courts, the law in this respect has hecn somewhat miti-
gated by the exercise of judicial discretion (a hove, Chapter 4 ). Given the po-
sition that matters within the discretion of the trial judge do not appear to af-
ford grounds of appeaL however, this aspect of rulings in the "Diplock" 
courts would appear to he excluded from consideration hy the Court of Ap-
peal. 
E4ually, in line with nonual practice, the Court of Appeal's review would 
not appear to extend to the "weighing" of the evidence by the trihunal of 
fact, as long as it is clear that that tribunal (in the" Diplock" courts: the single 
judge) had before it admissihle evidence legally capahle of proving the guilt 
of the accused. 
In practice the ( 'ourt of Appeal may not always he so restrictive in its re-
view; it certainly has not restricted its hearings to issues and evidence entirely 
within these limits. On the other hand, the author has not found any .Jecision 
by the Court of Appeal clearly extending the scope of that court's review be-
yond what was stated ahove. Whatever the precise extent of the Court of 
Appeal's supervision, the following is clear as regards the crucial issue in the 
"Diplock" courts: the assessment of the reliability of a confession hy the 
single judge in the" Diplock" courts is not tested on appeal. once it has been 
accepted by the Court of Appeal that the trial judge was correct in his inter-
pretation of the words "torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment", and 
that he had at least considered whether to exercise his discretion to exclude 
the confession. 
In certain circumstances, further appeal is poss1blc from the Court of Ap-
peal to the House of Lords, which constitutes the h1ghest court in criminal 
matters in England and Wales, and Northern Ireland. In the virtual ahsencc 
of any such appeals as regards cases from the" Diplock" courts however, this 
aspect of the law will not he discussed here. Suffice it to say that judicial re-
spect for the sovereignty of Parliament enshrined in the (unwritten) consti-
tution, and the absence of a Bill of Rights of supra-statutory standing, make 
clear statutory texts unimpeachable irrespective of their effect on human 
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rights such as the right to a fatr trial. As to JUdicial interpretation, the JUdicial 
deference towards the Executive, such as is apparent from the ruling in the 
case of Martin Lynch (ahovc. Chapter I (v)) merely follows English prece-
dents from the second world war (sec David Lowry, Terrorism and Human 
Rights: counter-in.~urgency and necessity at common law, in: Notrc Dame 
Lawyer, Octoher 1977 ). The chances of a successful appeal to the House of 
Lords arc therefore slim. lt ts nonetheless rcgrcttahlc that the highest domes-
tic court has not hccn sctzcd to rule on certain important issues of law and 
• practice. 
(11) ( ·ompllllnt.\ agamst the police 
Where someone who has heen questioned by the police complains of his 
treatment during mterrogation, this complaint is investigated and adjudtcat-
cd upon within a complex machinery, involving at least four different au-
thorities: the Chief Constable. the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Po-
• 
lice Complaints Board, and the Northern Ireland Police Authority. As was 
mentioned above, in England and Wales both the investigations of and the 
adjudtcations on such complaints arc deferred until after any proceedings 
against the complainant, but in Northern Ireland the investigation has been 
hrought forward for the benefit of the Director of Public Prosecutions in as-
sessing the evidence against the complainant- a purpose for which it was not 
intended. Following this investigation, the complaints file rests with the Di-
rector of Public Prosecutions until after the proceedings against the complai-
nant; apart from the initial investigation, the complaints machinery there-
fore does not affect trials in the "Diplock" courts. Without going into too 
much detail, some brief remarks will nonetheless he made. 
There has been considerable doubt about the effectiveness of the com-
plaints machinery in view of the absence of any action against police officers 
involved in the ill-treatment of detainees in the recent past: in spite of con-
cern expressed at the time by medical officers working in the interrogation 
centres; in spite of prima facie evidence of ill-treatment as recorded by Am-
nesty International and by Bennett J.; in spite of considerable amounts hav-
ing been paid as damages to victims hy the police; and in spite of judicial 
findings against the police, no criminal or disciplinary sanctions have result-
edagainstanypoliceofficer(BennettReport,paras 159,160,163,155, 157, 
350, and 338). Bennett J. therefore dealt with the procedures in consider-
able detail (Parts IV and V of the Bennett Report). His proposals regarded 
mainly the introduction of a separate code of conduct and practice for inter-
rogation (above, Chapter 2 (ii)); improved supervision by the uniformed 
branch of the RUC (Chapter 2 (iii)); and improved co-operation and ex-
change of information between the different authorities concerned. Bennett 
J. also re-emphasized the need for all involved to be diligent in the exercise of 
their functions. 
It is impossible to assess to what extent the Bennett recommendations 
have increased the effectiveness of the complaints machinery in practice, in 
the absence of any significant numbers of complaints since his report - the 
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more so, since many of his recommendations related to attitudes and ap-
proaches rather than rules and rcgulattons, or_ hcing of a purely mtcrnal na-
ture. escape ohscrvation hy outsiders. Suffice it to say that the effectiveness 
of the complaints machinery continues to stand or fall with the willingness of 
police offin·rs from the uniformed hranch of the Rll( ·.if necessary, to give 
evidence against colleagues from the detective hranch. 
Civil proceedings have provided a limited measure of satisfaction to vic-
tims of ill-treatment in custody. in that sums of money have hccn paid to 
them hy the police. When such payments were made in out-of-court 'iettle-
mcnts (as happened in most cases arising out of the l97tl-l Y77 period), 
however, there is no judicial finding against the police, who do not formally 
acknowledge that there was any mishehaviour on their part - although. as 
Bennctt J. said, "the inference from these settled claims is ohvious." (para 
I )5 ). This, together with the fact that civil proceedings often take years to 
conclude. and that no individual police officer need have hcen held liahlc, al-
so reduces the effectiveness of the remedy in a sense wider than the individu-
al case. 
Even if fully effective, however, the scope of civil. criminal and discipli-
nary remedies is limited in that tests applied in such proceedings are restrict-
l'd to the lawfulness or regularity of police hehaviour. lt is clearly assumed 
that "decisive", "forceful" and "persistent" questioning is, as such, lawful 
( Bennett Report, para 37) and does not therefore give rise to a remedy. The 
rules and regulations for interrogation also allow for questioning which 
could affect at least the rcliahility of a confession (Chapter 2 ( ii) ). The onus 
and standards of proof in proceedings on a complaint arc furthermore less 
favourable to a complainant than the evidentiary rules relating to the "ad-
missibility" and reliability of a confession are to an accused in a criminal trial 
-even in the "Diplock" courts. Consequently, the evidentiary problems re-
lating to the circumstances of interrogation in which confcsstons were made, 
referred to in Chapter 5 as regards the assessment of the reliability of a con-
fession. apply a fortiori to proceedings on a complaint. 
Proceedings on complaints about interrogation therefore not only do not 
affect trials against the complainant in that adjudications on them are de-
ferred until after the trial of the complainant; they also do not add to the test-
ing of the reliability of confessions. The absence of successful complaints 
about interrogation, whether in civil, criminal or disciplinary proceedings, 
cannot he taken as an indication of the reliability of confessions which arc the 
outcome of such interrogations. or of the soundness of convictions based on 
such confessions. 
( iii) Conclusions 
The law regarding trials in the "Diplock" courts grants virtually unlimited 
rights of appeaL The change in the law on the admissibility of statements in 
the "Diplock" courts, combined with the fact that appellate review does not 
extend to the exercise of discretion by the trial judge, has, however, substan-
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tially reduced the extent of the Court of Appeal's supervision, in particular 
as regards confessions. 
The assessment of the reliability of a confession by the single judge in the 
"Diplock" courts (acting as tribunal of fact) is not tested on appeal, once it is 
accepted by the Court of Appeal that the trial judge has properly addressed 
the issue of whether the confession was obtained as a result of "torture, or of 
inhuman or degrading treatment", and that he had considered whether to 
exercise his discretion to exclude the confession. 
The chances of a successful appeal from the Court of Appeal to the House 
of Lords are slim. It is nonetheless regrettable that the highest domestic court 
has not been seized to rule on certain important issues of law and practice. 
Proceedings on complaints about interrogation do not affect trials against 
the complainant. They also do not add to the testing of the reliability of a 
confession. The absence of successful complaints about interrogation can-
not be taken as an indication of the fairness or soundness of proceedings in 
the "Diplock" courts. 
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PART Ill The assessment 
Chapter 7 The crucial is.•me 
( i) Reliability 
(ii) The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 
(i) Reliability 
lt has been shown in the first two parts of this analysis how the emergency 
legislation has affected every stage of the criminal justice process linked to 
the "Diplock" courts. The police and the army have been given extremely 
wide and de facto unchallengeable powers of arrest and detention. "Force-
ful", "decisive" and "persistent" interrogation is allowed, in which the right 
to silence is implicitly denied. Interrogation is not under effective (i.e. con-
temporaneous) judicial control; unlawful treatment of prisoners does not 
give rise to the remedy of habeas corpus. At no stage of the pre-trial pro-
ceedings has the defence any effective opportunity to challenge the prosecu-
tion case. The availability of bail is limited. At the trial, statements obtained 
by "oppressive" methods are admissible, as long as these methods did not 
amount to torture, or to inhuman or degrading treatment, or unless there is 
evidence of physical ill-treatment. 
Trial by jury has been abolished: the single judge has taken over the func-
tion of the jury as tribunal of fact and "weighs" the evidence in a legal frame-
work (set by himself) which is much less strict than in ordinary trials. In most 
cases the evidence against the accused consists solely of his own (alleged) 
confession made during police interrogation. In such cases, the "weighing" 
of the evidence is in fact subsumed under the judge's ruling on the admissib-
ility of the confession: confessions, once admitted as evidence. arc not in 
practice tested further on their reliability. The scope of appellate review is li-
mited, at lea~t as regards the crucial issues of the exercise of judicial discre-
tion in ruling on the admissibility of a confession, and of the "weighing" of 
confessions by the judge acting as tribunal of fact. 
A number of these aspects of the special system of criminal justice, such as 
the absence of safeguards against arbitrary arrests and detentions, and the 
non-availability of habeas corpus against unlawful treatment in custody, by 
themselves raise serious issues concerning human rights. But the analysis of 
the law has shown that, for the purpose of determining the fairness of tri-
als in the "Dipioc:k" courts, the single most important issue regards the re-
of confessioas obtaiaed duriag iaterrogatioa. As was shown above: 
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-· the rules on mtcrrogation arc not aimed at ohtaining rcliahlc confessions 
and indeed allow for mctiH•ds of interrogation which can seriously affect 
their rcliahility; 
--- the prc-tnal investigation carried out on hchalf of the Dtrcctor of Puhlic 
Prosecutions is not aimed at ensuring that only prima fa ne rcliahlc confes-
sions arc tendered in cvidl·ncc; 
-the tests applied hy the judges in the "Diplock .. courts in ruling on the ad-
missihility of confessions do not as a rule extend hcyond ensuring that con-
fessions tendered in evidence hy the prosecution were not ohtaincd as a re-
sult of physical ill-treatment; 
-- although these tests leave out many aspects of interrogation which can 
seriously affect the rcliahility of confessions. the courts tn practice subsume 
their "weighing" of the rcliahility of a confession under their ruling on 1ts ad-
missihilitv . 
• 
The "Diplock" courts convict in the vast maJority of cases in which a con-
fession (allegedly) made by the accused in the course of police interrogation 
is the only evidence of his guilt. as long as there was no evidence that physical 
ill-treatment (or worse) was used to obtain that confession. In doing so, the 
courts implicitly assume the reliability of confessions obtained as a result of 
interrogation in which such treatment did not occur. lt was already pointed 
out that it is surprising, in view of the evidentiary problems arising out of the 
private nature of interrogation, that the courts so often hold that it has been 
established beyond reasonable doubt that nothing untoward has occurred 
which might have affected the reliability of a confession. 
But even if that is left aside, there must he serious doubt ahout the as-
sumption that confessions obtained as a result of "forceful", "decisive" and 
"persistent" interrogation arc reliahle even if nothing untoward occurred. 
Boylc et al. discuss the issue as follows: 
"The purpose of modern interrogation, as was made clear by the Diplock Com-
mittee, is to hreak the suspect's will to resist and to induce him to co-operate with his 
interrogators. This can often he achieved, according to the psychological evidence, 
in a relatively short time by isolating the suspect from all contacts which would 
strengthen his will to resist, hy increasing the level of stress and fatigue, and by creat-
ing a general sense of uncertainty. Some psychologists, notably William Sargant, 
have compared this process to the experimental neurosis produced by Pavlov in 
some of h1s dogs by varying positive and negative rewards for certain actions. What-
ever the scientific explanation, it is clear ~hat the conditions at Castlereagh and 
Gough Barracks. and to a lesser extent in other police stations, approximate closely 
to those generally regarded as likely tu 'break' even the strongest wills. The ~uspect is 
isolated for at least three and perhaps up to seven days from all contact other than 
7H 
With h1s mtcrroj!ators and j!Oalcrs. He cxpenem:cs oh vu IUS strc". hoth fmm h1s nat-
ural fears ahout possible long-term 1mpn"mment and from the Wllkspread stones 
about ht•atmgs and torture mllll'ted on some suspects. He 1s likely to suffer mneas-
mg fatigue. not least fmm havmg twen kept awake lrom verv earlv m the· mornmg of 
his Initial arrest until late that n1ght and from the d1ffkulty of sleeping m surh a 
strange environment. And he nm't fal'c a long senes of 1nterv1ews w1th tWP or thret· 
team' of tktcl'tlve' who mav well alternate thc1r tact 1cs to appear sometimes fnendl\ 
and \omeumcs threatemng. Lven1f there I' no phys1cal \Jolence, the likelihood that 
'uspccts will do anything to plca\c their captors. includmg makmg a fai'C confession. 
clearly increast•s w1th the length of lime they arc reqUired to undergo thcsc cnmhmed 
pre...,urcs. Manv of tho'e released fmm ( ·astlcrt•agh and other mtt•rrogatum l'cntrn 
have g1ven convmcing accounts of the sense of di"mcntatlon they have expenenl'ed 
Even in the police record' of mtcrrogallom there arc occa\Jnnal references to tht· 
difficulty that a suspect w1ll have 1n · holdmgout ·fort he full penod of h1s detention a' 
a ground for making an early omfc"1on. Somt• of those held under the Prevention ol 
Terrorism Act were clearly threatened with havmg to undergo the full seven-day pt•-
riod if they thd not co-operate. 
I'he use of pressures of this kmd 1mght perhaps ht· thought hy some to he JUS!ih-
ahlc if they helped to bring to JUs lice those rcsptmslblc for senous terronst offem:es. 
The danger IS that they may also result in false confessions. 1t has hccn estahlished 
hcyond reasonable doubt that there have been a numhcr of wrongful convicllons 111 
Britain based on apparently voluntary confessions, as for instance 111 the Maxwcll 
Con fait case. There arc no cases 111 Northern Ireland where 1t has hcen "'clearly es-
tablished that someone has he en wrongly convicted on the basis ola false confessiOn. 
But tht~re have hct·n a suhstantml numhcr of cast's 111 which seriou;, doubts have hcen 
raised about the validity of confessions induced by prolonged interrogation." 
The issue has hcen dealt with in the context of a maJor, official review of 
English cnminal procedure. whtch raises points relevant to this analysis. 
This review, by thl· Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure. wtll there-
fore be discussed hclow. with particular reference to the issue of rcliahilitv. 
-
(ii) The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP) was appointed in 
February l97H. 
"to examine. having regard both to the interests of the community in bringing of-
fenders to JUstice and to the rights and liberties of persons suspected or accused of 
crime, and taking into account also the need for the efficient and economical use of 
resources, whether changes art: needed in England and Wales in 
( 1) the powers and duties of the police in respect oft he investigation of criminal of-
fences and the rights and duties of suspect and accused persons, mduding the means 
by wh1ch they are secured; 
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( ii) the process of and responsihilit y for the prosecution of criminaloffences: and 
( iii) such other features of cnminal procedure and t•vidence as relate to the a hove: 
and to make recommendations". ( Roval Warrant of .ll'ehruary IIJ7X. c1tcd tn the 
RCCI' Report, page iv). 
The Commission therefore reviewed the whole "process estahlished hy 
law, regulation and practice through which persons suspcctl·d of any crimc 
arc hrought to trial". and ohserved in this context: 
"In understanding the pre-trial procedure one important point must he made at 
the start. Although specifically directing enquiry to the pre-trial procedure. the Roy-
al Commission's terms of reference do not, indeed cannot. exclude discussion of the 
trial, for in f<:O~~:Iand and Wales it is tht> naturt> of the trial itself which lal'flt>ly dt>ter· 
mines the prt>·trial proct>dure. This kind of criminal trial is in effect a conte.~t he· 
tween two sides, designed to provide an answer to a specific accusation and question, 
'Is it estahlished heyond reasonahle douht that the suspect has committed the off· 
ence with which he or she is accused''' This is called the ·accusatorial' (or 'adversar-
ial') system in contrast to the 'inquisitorial' system, which places much more of the 
criminal investigation under the control of the courts. often hy the appointment of a 
judge to direct it. Under the accusatorial procedure it is assumed that the relevant 
circumstances will have heen investigated hefore the accused is hrought heforc a 
court, and a trial then takes place which is set in motion hy the accusation that the 
prosecution has seen fit to advance. 
In England and Wales, therefore. the emphasis in pre-trial investigation, once a 
suspect has heen identified, lies in discovering whether there is evidence that will 
support a prosecution oft he suspect or cause him to he eliminated from the enquiry. 
The prior investigation of a suspect by the police and the circumstances in which 
statements are madt> by him and produced in evidence at trial (and the rules that 
govern these matters) form part of the central core of the whole criminal process. 
Tht>refore, in understanding any one part, it is not just that tht> whole system has 
to form the context of discu.~sion but that the accusatorial naturt> of the trial itM>If 
broadly dictates the nature of the pre·trial proct>ss." ( RCCP Report, paras l.(l -
1.7, emphasis added). 
When subsequently the Commission discussed whether a person should 
be put under some pressure to answer questions, in that refusal to do so 
could be used as evidence against him, they remarked: 
"Such a change could be regarded as acceptable only if, at a minimum, the suspect 
were to be provided at all stages oft he investigation with full knowledge of his rights, 
complete information about the evidence available to the police at the time, and an 
exact understanding of the consequences of silence. But that could be done only if 
the critical phase of investigation, that is the phase at which silence could be used ad-
versely to the accused, was to become more structured and formal than it is now; in 
effect, responsibility for and conduct of this phase of the investigation, close to 
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chargt:. would haw hecornL· a qua\1-)tHIIctHI rathn than a poiKL' funcli<lll. rhat 
would seem to I hose of us who takt· I h1s VICW to haw radical u .nseq uenccs for the· tri-
al. If an invt>~tijlation Wt>rt' to ht> wnducted in what would, in t'fft>t't, ht> an inqui~i­
torial mode.(tht> majority of the ( 'ommi~~ion I do not think that the prewnt 11n·us· 
11torial s~stem rnuld remain." ( R( '( 1' Report. para 4 'i2. t'lllpha"' addt•d). 
lt is impossihle. Wtthin the scope of thts analyst~. to discuss the many im· 
port ant issues dealt with hv the ( 'ommtsston. Suffice 11 to say that in manv re-
• • • 
spcch the emergency system of cnmmal JU~IIce hnked wllh the ''Diplock" 
courts departs from mmtmum requirements of the f;nghsh accusatorial sys· 
tern as formulated hy the ( 'ommisswn, to whtch the Commtssam tn its own 
proposals allow~ no exccptions. Thts apphes to thc hroadcst pnnciplcs of 
fatrncss. opcnncss and workahthty formulatcd hy thc ( ·omrmsston ( sce 
RCCI' Report, para 2. I H ff). e. g.: 
" .. If a 'U'f'l'c·t ha' a nght he '>hould he made d~<Hc of lt. He '>hould he a hie to L'Xer-
cise 1t. 1f he wtshes. and watve 1!. 1f he WIShes. If the nghtiS to he wnhl'id from htm he 
'ihould know not only that 1t "hemg Withheld hut why 1t IS. If he IS to he requ1rcd to 
'uhmnto a particular tnvesllgallvl' procedure. he should he told under what power 
the requtrement ts made and ho~ 11 can he enforced 1f he rl'fw,es. . . 
I>ectsiOns, to the extent that 11 1s possthlc, should he explamcd to the su>pect. Thev 
should ah,o he wntten down. together with a narrative of the events wh1lc a person is 
tn custody. They can then he avatlahle for thl' record, for tn'pection and. if need he. 
challenge hy supervisory officers, hy the suspe.:t or hiS legal adv1ser. and hy the 
courts." ( RCCI' Report, para' 2. I 'I and 2. 20 ). 
The "Diplock'' system also departs from more specific requirements of 
the English system of criminal justice as formulated hy the Commission, 
such as the principle that somcone can only hc arrL'sted on reasonahle suspt-
cion of involvement in a criminal offence 1 '; or that an arrested person must 
he informed ofthe factual hasis for his arrest. All of these issues arc worthy of 
consideration in the context of the "Dipiock" court system. 
However, this discussion of the Commission's proposals will be restnctcd 
to the (linked) issues of powers of detention for qucslloning; rules for ques-
tioning; admissihility of statements in court; and evidentiary rules relating to 
confessions. 
The Commission formulated and expanded upon a "necessity principle" 
for detention ( RCCP Report, para 3.7tl) and proposed that the need for det-
ention he reviewed every six hours, with a maximum length of detention of 
24 hours - with one exception: 
"The exception to the requirement to release a suspect within 24 hours or to bring 
him heforc a court the next day will he for those suspectt:d of grave offences. We ac-
cept that there are circumstances which prolong an investigation and delay charging 
heyond 24 hours (the need to check forensic evidence. for example); and where the 
police should not rekase the suspect, hecause for example, he is likely to ahscond. 
Such cases are a small minority. hut provision must be made for them if the police arc 
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to he ahlc to 'olve grave offence' and hrmg per.,on' accu,cd of them hcfore the 
court,. We con\lder, however, that the provt,ton for detention heyond 24 hour' un-
charged can he JUStified only 111 respect of 'enou' cnmes, and that not later than 24 
hours after 11 pe!'llon is brou~thl into 11 police station under aRest there should be 
,ome form of outside check upon the wa~ that the police are uen:isina their dis-
cretion to detain. We therefore propose that where 11 suspe,·t has not been charaed 
within 24 hours the polke should be required to brina him before 11 maaistrates' 
wur1 siHina in private ~as the person will not have been chai'Jled 1. Provision 
should be made for the suspect to be leaall~ represented ... 
Thc court should he cmpowcred to authorist• a furl her limited period in custody, to 
relca'c on hail or to re least' unconditionally. In making that decision the courl would 
u..e thc 'iame cnteria a' the police will he using to Justify continuing detention upon 
arrest. The magi,trate\ \hould he ahlc to fix a period of not more than 24 hours in 
which the person should he charged or. if still uncharged, hrought hefore them again. 
At any suhscquent appcarancc they should havc the same power hut suhject to a 
right of appeal" ( RCCP Report. para 3.10f>. emphasi' added) 
When a magistrates' court is not availahlc (e.g. on a Sunday). a solicitor is 
to he given access: 
"The primary function of the visit will he to ensure that the suspect's welfare and 
interests are heing attended to, thus hringing a measure of openness at this stage of 
the process. The visit hy the solicitor would therefore not he to give legal advice, hut 
he has the knowledge and experience to give it if requested. This visit would not re-
move the requirement for the suspect to he brought before a court on that or the next 
day, and we recommend that consideration should he given to providing facilities, 
particularly in cities, for magistrates' courts to sit on Sundays if required for this pur-
pose." ( RCCP Report, para 3.107). 
As to supervision over questioning, the Commission remarked: 
"We consider that what is the general practice needs to he reaffirmed, namely 
that, as soon as a suspect is brought into a police station under arrest, accountable 
responsibiliry for his welfare, for seeing that he is aware of his rights, for answering 
enquiries ahout his whereabouts and for decisions on his detention passes out of the 
hands of arresting or investigating officer and into the hands of another officer. 
We take the view that where the numher of suspects dealt with at a police station 
warrants it, there should he an officer whose sole responsibility should he for receiv-
ing, hooking in, supervising and charging suspects. He should be of no less a rank 
than sergeant and should he of the uniformed branch. He should be responsible to 
the sub-divisional commander". ( RCCP Report, para 3.112. emphasis added) 
This proposal gains in importance in view of a further proposal by the 
Commission: 
"The powers of arrest and the criteria restricting detention that we have proposed 
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'hould he set out 111 a single statute. and the variou' procedures surrounding them 
and tor dealing with the treatment of JlCr,ons 111 cu'>tody should he controlled hy suh-
ordinate legt,latton.An~ failure b~ the police to meet these standards should occa-
sion disciplinary re,·iew." (RlTP Report, para 3.1 D. cmphasi' addedj. 
With regard to questioning itself. the ( 'ommission confirmed that an at-
tempt to 
··n:qlllrc a suspect to an,wer <juestlons 111 relation to a suspiCton that mtght as yet 
he unsuhstantiated and unspecified·~· would in effect he suhver1mg that principle of 
the accu~atorial ~ystcm ll'l'lf (that it "the duty of the proset'Utlon to prove the pris-
oner\ gUilt)" ( RCCI' Report, para 4. 3 7 read together with para 4 .. l'i ). 
Extensive research was carried out on he half of the Commission into the 
psychological aspects of interrogation. (Royal Commission on Criminal 
Procedure, Research Studies No. I and No. 2: Police Interrogation. The 
Psychological Approach. A case study of currt·nt practice. London, 
H.M.S.O. IIJXO). This research, which cannot here he discussed in detail. 
ratses serious douhts ahout the reliahility of confessions ohtained as a result 
of interrogation, in particular if the display of authority hy the interrogator is 
comhined with such factors as isolation and/ or fatigue. which tmpair a su-
spect's "decision-making performance". (case study, pp. 42-43). The re-
searchers concluded that such impairment arises, "where interrogation 
takes place after midnight; when the suspect ha~ lost more than 5 hours 
sleep; or when the interrogation continues for more than one hour without a 
hreak." (case study, p. 42). 
The authority of the interrogation can make a suspect "obedient" in that 
• 
tt, 
"predisposes the suspect to give up the responsihility of making the decision for 
himself in favour of acquiescing to the demands of his interrogator ... 
In the situation where the interrogator has formed a view of the possible guilt of 
the suspect, the risk of indirectly conveying important information about the crime 
and the part played by the suspect will be greater. If in such a case the suspect is both 
innocent and fully ohedient, the risk of a false confession will also he high." (case 
study, p. 43 ). 
The researchers argue from the psychological literature that, 
"in principle, false confessions can be elicited by the application to an innocent 
suspect of techniques which may also be successful in obtaining true confessions 
from the guilry, but the stale of knowledge is not sufficient to assist in detecting 
false confessions when they have been obtained (assuming that there is no other 
evidence which casts doubt on their reliabiliry )". (case study, pp. 25-26, emphasis 
added). 
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Thi~ ~tudv earned out on hehalf of the Royal ( 'ommis'>H>n on Cnminal 
- -
Procedure wtth parttcular rderenn· to Fngh~h norm-. of en m mal pron·dure 
(thou)!.h drawing on and confirmmg international psycholo)!.tcal research) 
must cast senou~ douht on mterrogat ion- and "Diplock" court -practice m 
Northern Ireland. Many of the features of mterro)!.ation, identified as affect-
ing the rchahihty of confessions. arc almost mstitutional parts of interroga-
tion m Northern lreland.e.)!.. tsolatton; fatigue; also the strong display of au-
thority implicit m "forcdul". "persl\tent" and "dectstve" 4uesttoning. The 
revelation that the pressure-. whtch may cause guilty suspects to confess arc 
no different from those which may compelmnoccnt suspt•cts to make a false 
confcsston, de~.troys the argument. put forward hy Lord Diplock and at least 
tmplicttly accepted hy Hen nett J .. that tt IS acccptahle m the cirwmstances m 
Northern Ireland to put '>trong psychological pre.,.,urt· on suspe~.:h to con-
fess, and to rely on such confcssums to convtct. even Wtthout corrohoration. 
The ( 'ommtssion considered the rules for the 4uestionmg of suspects wllh 
the hencfit of the rt·sulh of thts study tnto the psyehologtcal aspects of Inter-
rogation. The ( '<•mmt~\ton clearly linked "voluntarines~" and rdiahility: 
"The Jud~te.,· Rules arc mtemkd to !liVe a framework for poli~e ~ondu~t during 
interrogation. The presumption hehmd the Judges' Rules is that the circumstances 
of police qucst1omng arc of their very nature cocn:1vc, that this can affect the free-
dom of choice and JUdgement of the sw.pect (ami his ah11ity to excrc1se hts right of sil-
en~c), and that m "'"":qucnn· the reliahility (the truth) of statements made m cus-
tody has to be most ngorously tested. This presumption finds its expression in the 
'voluntanncss' rule which ts stated m paragraph (e) of the preamble to the Judges' 
Rules: ·It i' a fundamental conditton of the admissibility m ev1dcnce against any per-
son. equally of any mal answer given by that person to a question put by a police offi-
cer and of any statement made hy that person. that it shall have heen voluntary, in the 
sense that it has not been obtained from him hy fear of prejudice or hope of advan-
tage, exercised or held out by a person in authority, or hy oppression ... "' ( RCCI' 
Report, para 4.oli) 
However, the "voluntariness" rule was felt to he unsatisfactory by the 
( 'ommission in that the concept of" oppression", as developed hy the courts, 
was considered so imprecise that the police cannot know when they arc 
breaking the rule forbidding "oppressive 4uestioning" ( RCCP Report, paras 
4.71 - 4.72). The Commission then stated: 
"Another serious douht about the validity of the rule seems to us to have emerged 
from our research. The criteria of 'fear of prejudice and hope of advantage' are of 
long standing in the JUdges' approach to determining the 'voluntariness' of a confes-
sion and, hence. its reliability. The link hetween involuntariness on these criteria and 
unreliability is in legal tenus exact; in psychological terms it is uncertain, to say the 
least. The addition of oppression in the 19t>Os may bring the legal notion of involun-
tariness rather closer to the psychological interpretation of that term, but as we have 
pointed out the imprecision of that word makes it difficult to use as a guide for regu-
l-!4 
' 
I at 1n!! 1 ht• rond urt of m t crro!!a 11om What our rcsearrh SU!l)tl'Sts IS I hat In psycholo!(· 
IGtltt•rms rustmh 1n 1tsclf and quc-.tlonmg m rustody devcl<>p forces upon many su-
spt'i.'ts wh1ch. 111 I onl Madkrmoll's wonb, so affect the1r m1nds that the1r wills 
numhle and thev speak when otherwtse lht·v would have 'taycd \!lent. Those forces 
do not fall withm the legal ddintt1on of factors that would render a confession invo-
luntary and thercfort• unreliahlt• In other words. legal and pwrhologlcal'voluntan-
ncss ·do not match. This taken togct her wtth the incfft·cuvene" ol pnnc1plc (e) of the 
.I udges · Rules as a rule of conduct for the polin·. m our Vtcw puts m douht the value of 
rctammg the voluntanness rule. 
Hut the way the police treat the suspect dunng hts time m custody must he rt•gulat-
ed and the police must have some gu1dance upon how mtervicws should he conduct-
ed. The conditions of custod~ and ques.tionin~e must be sut:h as to Ri"e as much 
cnnfident:e as possible that conles.sions obtained by que~tionin~e in t:ustod~ are re· 
liable. Rut there can nCV(~r he certainty. And that places an enormous responsibility 
upon the police to check upon the details of confessions. We understand that this is 
good police practice now. We recommend that it should hecome general practice. 
Becau~ of their familiarity with the conditions of custody the pohce may underes-
timate and, indeed, may not even fully understand the effect that custody has upon 
suspects. However we do not accept the suggestion that a person should never he 
convicted upon his confession alone uncorrohorated by any other evidence. To do 
so would, unless the cnteria for prosecution were changed. mean that those who 
were willing to confess and to plead guilty could not even he charged unless or until 
other evtdence of their guilt had heen secured. That has such considerahle implic-
ations for the resource and organizational aspects of pre-trial procedure and for the 
right of the accused to a speedy disposal as to he altogether too drastic a way of rem-
oving the risk of false confessions. People do confess to offences and are convicted, 
sometimes on a plea of guilty, where there is no other material evidence We do not 
consider that it would he in the interests of justice to introduce rules of evidence 
which would have the effect of precluding this. But when the evidence against the ac-
cused is his own confesston, all concerned with a prosecution, the police, the prose-
cuting agency and the court, should, as a matter of practice, seek every means of 
checking the validity of that confession. 
In order to secure that the maximum possible reliance for evidential purposes can 
he placed upon suspects" statements in all cases where they arc made, what is re-
quired are workable and enforceable guidelines for the police, criteria that the courts 
can apply without a feat of imagination that sometimes defies belief. and a clear and 
enforceable statement of the rights and safeguards for the suspect in custody. In ad-
dition, police training on interviewing should he developed in ways which will not 
only improve their interview techniques but also bring home to them the powerful 
psychological forces that are at play upon the suspect and the dangers that are at-
tendant upon these. If these requirements can he met.... we recommend that it 
should he left to the jury and magistrates to assess the reliability of confession evid-
ence upon the facts presented to them." ( RCCP Report, paras 4. 7 3- 4. 75, emphasis 
added) 
The Commission considered certain elements in the safeguarding of the 
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rights of suspects. These elements, 
"may he put in terms of certain rights that should in all circumstances. or all hut 
the most exceptional circumstances he accorded to the suspect in custody and of 
which he should he informed in writin~~: and orally when he arrives at the police sta-
tion: the right not to he held incommunicado, the right to legal advice, the right of 
particularly vulnerahle people to special protection, the right to he fairly interviewed 
and to he properly cared for." ( RCCP Report. para 4. 77) 
With regard to the right of access to legal advice, the Commission stated: 
"What means can he devised for making effective as one of the principles for the 
conduct of pre-trial investigation the right to legal advice which is set out in the 
Judges' Rules? Let us he clear what this is. lt is the riaht to consult a lawyer private-
ly, before or, if requested by the suspect, durina a police interview. It should not he 
dependent upon the suspect's happening to he aware that he has the right or upon his 
having his own solicitor or upon the convenience of the police. But it does not, 
should not and cannot mean that the suspect •hould he compelled to consult a lawyer 
or. having consulted one, to take the advice that is tendered. The suspect should he 
f01mally notified of his right and that should he a matter of record on the custody 
sheet. If he waives it that should likewise he recorded and he should he invited to sign 
the record .... 
If he wishes to exercise it and has no solicitor, some new arrangements will he ne-
cessary to make one available. Unless there are pre!l8ing reasons to the contrary he 
should not be interviewed until he has consulted the solicitor of his choice .... 
The right to legal advice as we have described it does not hring with it a right vested 
in the solicitor to be present during an interview. The right is that of the suspect. He 
may ask for and be afforded the facility to receive legal advice. He can take it or not a~ 
he pleases. He may decide that he wants a solicitor to be present during interview 
and that he will not answer police questions without one. But that should be a 
matter for the suspect to decide. The police will, no douht, take it into account in de-
ciding how to proceed. 'lbere may also be circumstances where they may wish a soli-
citor to be present, for example in the investigation of a highly complex fraud. We 
would suggest that the practice of having a solicitor present should be encouraged.lf 
a solicitor is present at an interview. he should have no wider formal function than to 
offer the suspect advice if it is requested." ( RCCP Report, paras 4.87- 4.88, empha-
sis added) 
The Commission envisages 
"certain limited and exceptional circumstances when the interests of the suspect 
in this respect have to be suhordinated to those of other individuals who may be at 
risk and, where particularly serious offences are involved, to those ofthe wider inter-
ests of the community. However, conferring the discretion to withhold access must 
not bring with it the risk that it will be used improperly.ln particular, we do not con-
sider it justification for withholding access, that a solicitor may advise 
his client not to speak: that is the suspect's rixht. Nor should the police refuse ac-
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cess where secrecy is dc~uahle hut not 1mperat1ve. The police could allow access hut 
make the solicitor aware of the1r position and record that they have done so. If the 
solicitor hehaved improperly. he could and should then he made suhJect to the disci-
plinary procedures of his profession. If there are. as the police assert, ~ohcitors who 
are m collusion with criminals. they should he hrought out mto the open and re-
moved from the profession. 
Accordingly our general view i~ that the power to refuse access should he exer-
Cised only in exceptional cases. In the first place it should he limited to cases where 
the person in custody is suspected of a grave offence. Further, even in the case of 
such offences, the nght should he withheld only where there are reasonahle grounds 
to heheve that the time taken 10 arrange for legal adv1ce to he avallahle will involve a 
risk of harm to persons or serious damage to property; or that giving access to a legal 
adviser may lead to one or more of the followmg: 
(a) cv1dence of the offence or offences under investigation will he interfered with: 
(h) witnesses to those offences will he harmed or threatened; 
(c) other persons suspected of commtttmg those offences will be alerted; 
or 
(d) the recovery of the proceeds of those offences will he impeded. 
Where the power to refuse access is exercised, it should be done only on the au-
thority of a suh-divisional commander or ahove, and the grounds should be re-
corded on the custody sheet. These can be the subject of later review, for example by 
the inspectorate of constabulary, and the practice in the force could he brought to the 
attention of the police authonty." ( RCCP Report, paras 4.90 - 4.91, emphasis 
added). 
The grounds for refusing access to a solicitor, mentioned above, do not of-
ten arise in the context of Northern Ireland: the large majority of arrests take 
place in dawn "swoops" which are all but secret to the public. Associates of 
the suspect will therefore be aware of the arrest. The risks of interference 
with evidence, harm or threats to witnesses, or impediments to the recovery 
of proceeds of offences will not in practice be reduced by refusing an arrest-
ed suspect access to legal advice. 
The Commission, also having considered other elements in safeguarding 
the rights of suspects, developed a 
"framework for ensuring that a suspect is aware of his rights while he is in custody 
and of the decisions that are being made about him and that the decisions are respon-
sihly and accountably taken." ( RCCP Report, para 4.109). 
As was shown above, the Commission also made proposals for improving 
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the \UperVt\ton of the treatmcnt ot detained 'II'J1l'l'h !'he ( 'omml\"on then 
came to Interrogation tt\cll: 
• 
"h•r the al:lual conduct ut questtonmg we ru:ed to replace the vaguem''' of tht· 
Judge,· Rulco, wtth a set ot mstructluns. whtch provtde strcngtht•ned o,ak~uanls to 
tht· suspt'l't and clear and workahk ~utdchm·, fur the poltn· 
We ..:all thl\ a cmk ot pra<.:ttl'l' tor the rc~ulatton of mtervtew., and recommend 
that tt shoukl he contamed 111 'uhordmate legislation suhJe<.:t to affirmative resolu-
tion of Parliament and made hv the Home Se..:rctarv after ..:onsultation with the po-
. . 
lice. the JUdtctarv and persons wtth the n:kvant <'X pert medKal and psy<.:hologiCal cx-
pencncc. The code nf pral·til:e will ~ part nf the Jleneral provisions JlOnminJl thl.' 
treatment nf jWI"nm in wstnd~ that we ha,.e been denlopinJl .... and it should ht> 
aimed at producinJ~wnditinns nf interview that minimise the risk of unreliable 
statements. Its provtstons wtll also amount to a 'tatcment of what " vtcwcd as ac-
ccptahlc pral'ltl'l' when the poiKe ha\c lt> tnlcr\tev. tiHl\e who arc reas~>nahly 
suspected 111 nmnecllon with an offence. 
So. as well as the sanctu•n'> attached to !Is breach ... 11 wtll carry an element of soctal 
and moraltmperauve. Wt• do not propt>'<' spelling out m detatl what its provtstons 
should he, hut we rt•eommcnd thattt should deal wtth the followmg matters: the right 
of access to legal advtcc. o,pcctaltreatment of JUVcnt:,,_ and others. the modes of note 
takmg. the takmg of statements, and the use of tape recorders, and the givmg of the 
cautions .... ; the cxisllng provtston of the Admmistratlvc Oirccttons on the comfort 
and refreshment of persons hemg interviewed: and the length, timing and circum-
stances of quesllomng. whtch would hl· its main Innovative feature. 
The sort of provisions we have m mmd should take realisllc account of the pres-
sures upon the police and upon suspects and should, therefore. have some degree of 
flexihility huilt into them, hut nercise of that flexibility should be only upon rea· 
sonable grounds and should ~ acwuntable. We would suggest for consideration 
provisions that required an mtcrvtew to he hroken for hrief refreshment and for 
meals after specified limes: that precluded Interviewing at night if the suspect had 
heen interviewed for any suhstantial period m the day or immediately after a suspect 
had heen woken up ( 11 would he unrealistic to prohthit all interviews at night since if 
that were so a person arrested late in the evening might have to he held overmght ); 
that prohihited questioning after a suspect had heen held incommunicadoheyond a 
specified period: that prevented interviewing persons suhstantially under the mflu-
ence of drugs or alcohol; that precluded more than a specified nu m her of officers he-
ing present at any one time; that -.et conditions of lighting, ventilation and seating for 
the interview room. As we say. these provisions will have to he worked out in detail 
hy those with expert knowledge. What we have suggested is meant only to provide 
broad guidance as to the sorts of factor;, to he covered. 
We have also considered whether the code of practice should attempt to regulate 
the content of que.rioning, that is to indical<' what are pemHssthle and impermissihle 
tactics that the police may use m questioning. We take it for granted that there should 
he an explicit condemnation and prohihition of the use of violence or threats of viol-
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cncc or otht•r harmful acl!on. ctthcr to the \Uspect. hts family or any other person 
with whom he hao, a connection. Furth<'r m recognillon of the United Kingdom's in-
ternatiOnal treaty ohligattons we think It would he proper for the code of practice al-
"' to contain a spectfic prohihition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment 
(the words of Arllde 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rt!(hts and l·umlamcntal Freedom'). Society should puhlicly express its total reJec-
t ton of such hchavtour hy a pohce officer. 
Apart from thts, we have concluded that regulation of the nature of questioning is 
not, for a vanety of reaS<lllS, pracllcahlt: or desirahlc. The main prohlem lies with tac-
Ite'> aimed at producing confessions. First it Is difficult to define the tactics in such a 
way as to make it precisely clear what is prohihited and what IS not. For example if the 
w.e of hluff is considered undesirahle, is that to he taken to cover only outright lie' 
ahout the evidence that the police already have, or intenllonallailure to give the su-
spect full informallon ahout the position, or inadvertently doing so? This prohlem of 
dcfinillon IS one of the dekcts of the existing criteria for detetmining voluntariness 
and one of the reasons we arc suggesting it should he ahandoned. Sewndly, there is 
no pmnt attempting to han the explicit use of a particular tactic when its effect is im-
plicit m the situation m whtch the suspect finds htmself: for example prohihiting the 
explicit offering of hat I as an inducement to confess when people in custody often 
perceive, without heing told, that if they do confess they are more likely to he re-
leased. We prefer, then, rules whose hreach can he clearly demonstrated both at the 
ttme and ex post facto. We also emphasise agam the importance of training for the 
police not merely in the skills of interviewing, which we helieve ought to he taught on 
a more systematic hasis, but in the psychology of interviewing so that officers can he 
made more fully aware of its potential to produce false confessions as well as true 
ones. 
Finally the code should repeat the existing provision in the Judges' Rules which 
place a limit on questioning ahout a particular offence. At present questioning, other 
than in excepllonal circumstances, is not permitted after the suspect has heen 
charged with that offence and a person must he charged when the police have suffi-
cient evidence to do so. Witnesses to us have suggested that these provisions are un-
satisfactory for two reasons. They can he circumvented and questioning can he pro-
longed hy the police either making a holding charge on another offence or using the 
subjective element in judging the sufficiency of the evidence in order to delay charg-
ing. However we can see no fair or workahle alternative. There must he some termi-
nal pomt on questioning and the point of charge provides an event that is clearcut. 
'11te decision on whether there is sufficient evidence to charge cannot he made other 
than by the investigating officer on the basis of the evidence availahle to him. We 
consider that our proposals for accountable review of detention upon arrival at the 
police station after six hours, and after 24 hours will offer an adequate and independ-
ent safeguard against delayed charging and against the use of a holding charge to 
prolong questioning in custody." (RCCP Report, paras 4.109-4.114, emphasis 
added) 
As to the fmm of the rules, the Commission considered that all aspects of 
the rules governing the treatment of suspects in custody should be made stat-
utory ( RCCP Report, para 4.116 ). As to methods for enforcing the rules, the 
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( 'ommission welcomed the fact that the ( lovernmcnt was discussing propo-
sals that the invcsti!Zation of the most serious complaints should he under the 
direction of someone havmg judicial experience. The ( 'ommission also dis-
cussed review hy the courts. The most important tssue for the purpose of this 
analysts concerns the rules regarding the exclusion of confessions as evid-
ence in trials. The Commission said: 
"The rational!' behind the present law is that evidence of certain kinds is or 
may he so unreliable as to preclude its hein11 heard by the jucy: this is the so-called 
'reliability principle" for exclusion." ( RCCP Report, para 4. I 21. emphasis added). 
The cxclusionary rules arc not hased on a "disciplinary principle": 
"English JUdges have not seen themselves as havmg that function of contn>lling im-
proper police t>ehaviour: their main concern has always t>ecn wtth the reliahility of 
the evidence ... ( RCCP Report. para 4. 124 ). 
Having rejected an automatic exclusionary rule as a means of securing 
compliance with the proposed statutory rules. hut also having stressed that 
the right not to be Nubjected to prolonged questioning or to questioning 
after a long period held incommunicado are rights created in order to pro· 
duce reliable evidence ( RCCP Report, para 4.130), the ( 'ommission deve-
loped its own proposals. The police, the Commission said, 
"should know that if there was non-compliance. certain consequences will flow. 
Those conse4ucnces should depend on the purpose of the rule that has heen 
hreached. 
We would distinguish hetween the pnlVIsions for the treatment of suspects incus-
tody and for interviewing which deal with the prohibition on violence. threats of vi-
olence, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. and those provisions which are 
designed to provide an environment for interviewing which conduces. to the extent 
possible in custody. to the suspect's answers to question heing reliable. (that ts those 
designed to replace the voluntariness rule). 
In general. as we have said, we consider that the exclusion of evtdence is not a sa-
tisfactory way of enforcing compliance \\ith rules. However. in order to mark the 
seriousness of any breach of the rule prohibiting violence, threats of violence, tor· 
ture or inhuman or degrading treatment and society's abhorrence of such conduct, 
non-compliance with this prohibition should lead to the automatic exclusion of 
evidence so obtained. Proof of non-compliance would he a matter for the judge or 
magistrates to decide on the facts. 
But what should he the conse4uences of other breaches of the rules in relation to 
evidence subse4uently obtained'' For the reasons set out ahove a hreach of the rules 
hy the police should not, in the view of all hut one of us.lead to total immunity for the 
suspect from prosecution and conviction or to the automatic exclusion of evidence. 
But sin(e reliability is the primacy purpose of the code of practke for interviewinte 
suspects, the reliability of confessions obtained in its breach must be open toques· 
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lion: and it would not therefore he ri11ht for ~latement evidence in breach of the 
code to he accepted uncriticall~ and without comment hy the criminal courts. The 
advocate for any accused who contests the truth of a confession alleged to have t>een 
made hy him will have considcrahle scope for discrediting the evidence of that con-
fession if it has hccn ohtained when the provisions of the code have not t>een oh-
\erved. Rut it o;hould not fall simply to the defence to point out the unreliahility. The 
judJle should point out to the jucy or the mal{islrates he advised of the dan11ers in-
volved in aclin11 upon a statement whose reliability l'an be affected by breach of 
the code. They should he informed that under pressure a person may make an incri-
minating statement that is not true. that the code has heen introduced to control po-
lice hehaviour and minimise the risk of an untrue statement t>eing made and that if 
they are satisfied that a hreach of the code has occurred. it can t>e dangerous to act 
upon any statement made; accordinllly, they should look for independent support 
for it, before relyin11 upon it. The effect of that warning would he that where a 
hreach of the code has occurred, senior officers, and those responsihle for advising 
on the prosecution. will need to consider the availahility of other evidence he fore de-
ciding whether it is proper to permit the prosecution to proceed. We think thts will 
encourage what is already uniwrsally regarded as good police practtce: namely that 
so far as is possible evidence from 4uestioning should he checked and independent 
confirmation of its reliability should t>e sought." ( R( ·cp Report. paras 4. I J I - 4. I JJ. 
emphasis added). 
The Commission, in discussing the right of access to legal advice stated 
that 
''the lack of legal advice does not of itself result in statements which arc unrcliahlc 
and should not automatically lead to their exclusion as evidence." ( R( '( P Report. 
para 4.Y2 ). 
The right of access would, however. be contained in the rules for the treat-
ment of suspects in custody which the Commission proposed. Statements 
made after denial of access contrary to the rules would therefore require cor-
rohoration. It may he recalled also that, where a suspect is not released after 
24 hours, access to a lawyer and/ or a court is to be ohligatory. 
Thus, the Royal Commtssion on Criminal Procedure has developed a 
much stricter framework for questioning than pertains in Northern Ireland 
and, what is crucially important, has linked this framework with the reliahil-
ity of confe-;sions, requiring corroboration of confessions ohtained in breach 
of the rules, hecause such hrcaches raise douhts about their reliability. The 
Commission's proposals are controversial in certain respects in England, in 
that they actually extend police powers in that jurisdiction. But they provide 
an important yardstick for the special procedures in Northern Ireland, in 
particular where the reliahility of confessions as the sole hasis for convictions 
is concerned. 
Clearly, the nature, length and conditions of interrogation in Northern 
Ireland are such as to fall far short of the rules envisaged hy the Royal Corn-
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mission on ( 'riminal Procedure as necessary to ensure, as far as possible, that 
confessions obtained by the police arc reliable. By the standards of the Com-
mission (set on the basis of extensive research into the psychological effects 
of interrogation), convictions based solely on confessions obtained as a re-
sult of such "persistent", "forceful" and "decisive" interrogations arc not 
sound: under the Commission's proposals such confessions would require 
corroboration. 
Whatever one may feel about changes in "technical" aspects of a criminal 
justice system, the most fundamental requirement for all such systems must 
surely he that convictions are sound, in that they are based on reliable evid-
ence, properly tested. The English system of criminal justice contains safe-
guards, first to ensure that the nature. length and conditions of questioning 
are not such as to he likely to affect the reliability of a confession, and second 
to test the "voluntariness" of a statement before allowing it to come before 
the tribunal of fact. These safeguards are not mere "technical" and outdated 
aspects of the system- as Lord Diplock would have it. (Diplock Report, para 
73ff). The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure has re-affirmed that it 
is a fundamental requirement of the English system that it comprises rules 
for questioning aimed at ensuring the reliability of confesstons as well as tests 
of the reliability of confessions prior to those heing brought before the tribu-
nal of fact. This fundamental requirement for the attainment of soundness, 
reliability and fairness of convictions has been abrogated in the "Diplock" 
system of criminal justice in Northern Ireland. 
Certain aspects of the proposals by the Royal Commission are further-
more of interest in that, where the Commission suggests extending police 
powers, they also provide for improved safeguards against abuse. This ap-
plies in particular to the proposed judicial involvement in extended deten-
tion for questioning, with full provision for legal representation; to access to 
legal advice generally (also during interviews); and to "accountable respon-
sibility" in that "any failure by the police to meet (the standards set for them) 
should occasion disciplinary review". The (in camera) appearance before 
the magistrate in the course of prolonged detention could also provide an 
opportunity for the contemporaneous judicial testing of the regularity of the 
treatment accorded to a detainee, for which there is at present no opportun-
ity in Northern Ireland. 
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Chapter 8 International norms 
'The above analysis of the emergency legislation in Northern Ireland has 
shown that that legislation is defective in not providing effective, i.e. con-
temporaneous, judicial remedies against arbitrary arrest and detention; and 
against unlawful treatment of detainees. This raises serious questions about 
the extent to which the emergency legislation secures the internationally re-
cognized rights to liberty and security of the person, and to freedom from ar-
bitrary arrest and detention. However, the present discussion will he limited 
to international standards for a fair trial, leaving aside these wider issues, 
save insofar as they reflect directly on the fairness of trials. 
The U nivcrsal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted hy the General As-
sembly of the United Nations on I 0 December 194R, sets forth, inter alia, 
the following rights: 
Article 3: Everyone has the right to life. liberty and security of person. 
Article 5: No one shall he subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment. 
Article 8: Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent 
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by 
the constitution or by law. 
Article 9: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. 
Article I 0: Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal. in the determination of his rights 
and obligations and of any criminal charge against him. 
Article 11: 1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at 
which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence. 
The norms contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have 
been developed into legally binding nm ms in, in particular, the (UN) Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 1966) and in regional treat-
ies such as the (Council of Europe) European Convention on Human 
Rights ( 1950) and the (Organization of American States) American Con-
vention on Human Rights ( 1969). 
The first two instruments are of particular relevance, since the United 
Kingdom is a State-Party to them. The last instrument, though not binding 
on the United Kingdom, is relevant because, being of a more recent date, it 
can he argued to reflect more developed legal thought on the relevant 
nmms; it is therefore of persuasive importance in interpreting the earlier in-
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strumcnh. Of lcssL'r status than thL· trcattcs, hut agatn, as mdtcativc of dew-
loping legal thought, of use tn tnterprctatton. arL' lJ nitcd Nations document'> 
such as the Dcdaratton on the Protcctum of All Persons from Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Stand-
ard Mtmmum Rules for the Treatment of Pnsoncrs; the Draft Pnnciplcs on 
l·rcedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention; the Draft Body of Princtplc'> 
for the Protect ton of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprison-
ment; and documcnh such as Resolutions by the Parliamentary Assembly 
or the ( "ommittL~c of Mintstcr'> of the Council of Europe. 
Mention could also he made of the Resolutions of the X IIth International 
Penal Law Congress and of the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Offictab. Apart from the brief rL·marks about the l"asc-law 
concerning the European< "onvention on Human Rtghts, below, these doc-
uments cannot here he dtscusscd in detail; they ought, however, to he taken 
into constdcrallon in any review of the emergency lcgtslalton. 
In times of cmergmcy "threatening the hfc of the nation .. , the intcrna-
tumal human rights trcattes allow for derogation by state-parties from some 
(not all) of thl'tr international obligations, including the obligation to afford 
everyone a fatr trial m the determination of any criminal charge against him. 
Such dl'fogations must he ''to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation .. (International ( ·m·enant on ( ·n·i/ and Political Right.\, Article 
4; European Convention on Human Rights, Article 15; somewhat different-
ly, American Convention on Human Rights, Article 27). This allows states 
in certain circumstances to introduce administrative detention without trial 
(internment), as the authorities dtd in Northern Ireland between I 1171 and 
I 117 5. However, the United Kingdom Government (although it has declared 
that an emergency continues to exist in Northern Ireland) has always main-
tained that those convicted in the" Diplock"' courts have been found guilty of 
crimes in fatr proceedings. Indeed, Lord Diplock, in recommending the sett-
ing up of the courts, stressed that the changes he recommended fdl withm 
the minimum requirements of Article o of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, which lays down requirements for a fair trial ( Dip/ock Report, 
paras 12 - 14 ). 
The proceedings linked with trials in the .. Diplock" courts may therefore 
he judged on their conformtty with minimum international standards for a 
fair trial without taking into account the power of derogation in times of 
emergency. 
In many respects, trials in the .. Diplock" courts arc in accordance with 
these fundamental principles safeguarding the right to a fair trial. The tribu-
nals have been established by law; the proceedings arc held in accordance 
with the law. The judges arc independent from the executive and legally ex-
perienced; they arc impartial at least in the sense that they deal even-han-
dedly with defendants of dtffcrcnt polittcal and/ or religious persuasions. 
The accused is infmmcd before the trial of the accusations against him; he is 
afforded adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence, in-
cluding legal assistance of his own choice from the moment he is charged. If 
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necessary. his defence lawyer wtll he patd from public funds.< "ustody on re-
mand, by international standard'>, ts not exressivcly long. At the tnal, the 
defence has full procedural "equality of arms" wtth the prosecution: it can 
challenge prosecution evidence and cross-examine wttm~sscs. and can call 
witnesses and evidence on its own behalf. The trial is puhltc; the accused has 
a virtually unlimited right of appeal. 
At the same time, the effects of the emergency lcgtslation, referred to 
above put in question whether certain internationally rccogmzcd norms for 
a fair trial arc adhered to in practice. 
Thus, the "equality of arms" at the trial, though formally ensured. is fund-
amentally affected by a secret, inquisitorial, poltce inquiry which is not under 
effective JUdicial or quasi-judicial control. ( "onfcsstons obtained at this stage 
often prejudice the defendant's case at the trial, as was shown above. The 
Roval Commissum on ( "riminal Procedure rcmarknl: 
-
""If an mvesttgatton were to he earned outtn what would. m effect, he an '"4utstto-
rial mode .Jt he maJoril y of I he Corn m IS\ I< mj do noli htn k 1 hat tlw pn:'>cnt acClt\al on-
al.,y-;tcm could rematn ·· (IH"CP Report, para 4.'i2) 
Indeed, all developed "inquisitorial" systems of criminal JUstice - apart 
from having introduced basically accusatorial trial procedures - compnsc 
safeguards to ensure the objectivity and fairness of the prc-trial inquiries. 
This is not the place to set out the dtffcrcnt safeguards tn different national 
systems; suffice it to say that in different systems they can he of an adminis-
trative, a procedural and; or an evidentiary nature, and that they often in-
dude (at least for serious cases) a separate JUdicial prc-trial mqutry. 
The existence of such a vancty of safeguards serving the same aim- over-
all fairness- confirms the correctness of the approach taken in this respect by 
the organs of the European Convention on Human Rights. In assessing the 
fairness of criminal proceedings, the European Commisston of Human 
Rights have held that, whereas the specific safeguards enumerated in Article 
6.3 oft he Convention apply, basically. only to the trial phase of cri m mal pro-
ceedings (after ··charge .. ), the overall assessment of the fairness of a particu-
lar trial also covers aspects of prc-trial (prc-chargc) proceedings to the ext-
ent that they may have prejudiced the fairness of the proceedings at trial. 
This implies that the absence of safeguards for the upholding of a su-
spect's rights in the prc-trial phase may lead to unfairness in the trial phase of 
criminal proceedings. 
It can thaeforc he argued, both on the basis of the general existence of 
safeguards in developed "mquisitorial" systems (different though those 
safeguards may he in different systems) and on the basis of the approach tak-
en by the organs of the European Convention on Human Rights that if a cri-
minal JUstice system comprises an inquisitorial pre-trial phase, that system 
shall also comprise safeguards against unfair prejudice to the suspect's case 
at that stage. The "Diplock"" system is clearly deficient tn this respect. 
Boylc et al. have shown on the oasts of extensive practical and statistical 
n:scarch that justice in the "'Diplock" system has been affected by "case-
95 
hardening" of judges (Hoyle et al., op. cit., p.) This negative effect, if not on 
the impartiality,then nonetheless on the objectivity of trial judges, is not un-
related to the absence of safeguards in the pre-trial stage. As a result of this 
absence of safeguards the judges arc often confronted with conflicting 
claims about the circumstances in which an (alleged) confession was ob-
tained ~ claims which arc uncorroborated with reliable evidence on either 
side. As Royle et al. have shown, statistical evidence indicates that, in timl'. 
judges "harden" in dealing with allegations of irregulantics, tending to ac-
cept police testimony that nothing untoward happened and thereby. in d-
fect, shifting the burden of proof towards the accused. 
Furthermorc,the principle that release pending tnal should be tht' norm is 
not adhered to; even though detention on remand is not, by international 
standards, excessively long, Hoyle et al. and others have expressed concern 
about denial of hail and relatively long pre-trial detention in certain cases. 
The most important questions regarding adherence to international 
norms, however. relate to the freedom from self-incrimination and to the 
presumption of innocence. The principle that a person who is the suhject of a 
criminal investigation shall have the right not to he coerced into confessing is 
not stated explicitly in all human rights treaties; the European Convention 
on Human Rights, for instance. does not contain such an express provision. 
The principle is contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, to which the United Kingdom is a party. Article 14.3 (g) of the 
Covenant provides that in the determination of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone shall he entitled: 
"not to be compelled to testify agamst himself or to confess guilt." 
The principle is also explicitly stated in Article X 2 (g) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights. While not binding on the United Kingdom it 
has persuasive force, in particular in that it develops the above principle by 
adding, in Article X. 3: 
.. A confession of guilt oy the accused shall be valid only if it is made without coer-
cion of any kind". 
Also persuasive in this respect is the fact that the principle that no one 
shall be convicted on the basis of a confession obtained under duress is also 
explicitly stated in such documents as the United Nations Draft Principles on 
Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention (Articles 24 and 25) and the 
United Nations Draft Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons 
under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (Articles 19 and 23 ). 
But even though it is not always explicitly stated, the right not to be co-
erced into making a confession, and the right not to be convicted on the basis 
of a confession obtained under duress can be said to be implicit in the right to 
a fair trial, pronounced by all international human rights instruments. The 
first right can be said to flow from the presumption of innocence: to require a 
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suspect to talk subverts the principle that it i' the duty of the prosecution to 
prove the guilt of the accused- which io, not only the "golden thread'" runmng 
through Fnglish cnmmal JUstice ( RCCP Report. para 4 . .15. quotmg Lord 
San key). hut also a general principle of crnnmallaw. and an internationally 
recognized clement of a fair trial, recognized equally m accusatorial and m 
developed inquisitorial systems of criminal justice. Furthermore, the equally 
fundamental (and equally wtdcly rccogmzed) principle that the guilt of the 
accused must he established beyond reasonable doubt imphcs a prohtbitlon 
to convict on the basis of unreliable evidence, such as confessions obtained 
under duress. In the words of the Roval Commisston on Criminal Proc.:-
• 
dure: 
"lt i' not only •hat cxtrcm<' ml'ans of allt'mpting to l'Xtorl confl'ssiom, for cxampll' 
the rack and thumoscrew ... are aohorrent to any civtli!ed soc1cty. out that they and 
other less awful. though not necessanly less potent. means of applying pressure to an 
accused person to speak do not nec.:"arily produce speech m the truth ... ( RCCP 
Report, para 4 . ."lh) 
The explicit inclusion, in such recent international trcalles and documents 
as the American Convention on Human Rights. the Draft Principles on 
Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention, and the Draft Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Forn1 of Detention or 
Imprisonment, of the principle that confessions obtained under duress shall 
not form the basis of a conviction underlines the argument that that principle 
is an essential clement in attaining fairness in criminal proceedings. 
The institutionalized use in Northern Ireland of strong psychological 
pressure on suspects in order to induce them to confess appears to be in 
hreach of at least Article 14 3 (g) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Convictions based solely on contested confessions obtained 
under such duress furthermore raise doubts about the adherence by the 
"Diplock" courts to the presumption of innocence in all cases. These aspects 
of the "Diplock ·· court system therefore raise questions ahout the extent to 
which trials in the "Diplock" courts accord with international norms for a 
fair trial, contained in such international instruments as the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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Summary of conclusions 
For the purpose of determining the fairness of trials m the .. Dip lock .. courts, 
the single most important issue concerns the rcliah1lity of confessions oh-
taincd during interrogation. 
Results of a study earned out on he half of the (English) Royal ( 'ommis-
sion on Criminal Procedure into psychological effects of mtcrrogation, 
which drew on and confirmed international psychological research, must 
cast serious douht on interrogation and .. Diplock .. court-practice in Nor-
thern Ireland. Many of the features of interrogation. identified in the study as 
affecting the reliahility of confessions, art~ almost institutional parts of inter-
rogation m Northern In~land, e.g.: isolation; fatigue; also the strong display 
of authority implicit in "forceful", "persistent" and "decisive" questioning. 
The study revealed that the pressures which may cause guilty suspcch to 
confess arc no different from those which may compel innocent suspects to 
make a false confession. 
This destroys the argument, put forward hy Lord D1plock and at least im-
plicitly accepted hy Bcnnett J. that it is acceptable in th..: circumstances in 
Northern Ireland to has.: convictions in criminal courts sol..:ly on confessions 
ohtained as a result of strong psychological pr..:ssurc. without any corrobora-
tive evidence that they contain the truth. 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure. which, on hchalf of the 
British Government, carried out th..: most authoritative recent review of 
English criminal procedure, has developed in its proposals a framework of 
rules for questioning linked with the reliability of confessions. Confessions 
obtained in breach of these rules would. in the ( ·ommission 's proposals, re-
quire corroboration before a conviction could be based on them. Clearly, the 
nature, length and conditions of interrogation in Northern Ireland are such 
as to fall far shor1 of the rules envisaged by the Royal Commission as neces-
sary to ensure, as far as possible, that confessions obtained by the police arc 
reliable. By the standards of the Commission (set on the basis of extensive 
research into the psychological effects of interrogation) convictions based 
solely on confessions obtained as a result of such" forceful", .. persistent" and 
"decisive" questioning arc not sound. 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure has re-affirmed that it is a 
fundamental requirement of the English system of criminal justice that it 
comprises rules for questioning, aimed at ensuring the reliability of confes-
sions, as wdl as tests of the reliability of confessions prior to those confes-
sions being hrought bcfor..: the tribunal of fact. This fundam..:ntal (English) 
requirement for the attainment of soundn..:ss, reliability and fairness of con-
victions has been abrogated in the "Diplock" system of criminal justice. 
In many respects trials in the "Diplock" courts arc in accordance with 
fundamental international principles safeguarding the right to a fair trial, but 
certain aspects of the proceedings raise doubh about their compliance with 
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mtcrnational nor111s, e.g.: the absence of effective, i.e. contemporaneous, ju-
dicial remedies against arbitrary arrest and detention, and against unlawful 
treatment of detainees; the effect of a strongly inquisitorial prc-trial phase 
on the principle of "equality of anns"; the effect of case-hardening on the 
objectivity of judges; and the limited provisions for hail. 
The most important questions regarding adherence to international 
norms for a fair triaL however, relate to the freedom from self-incrimination 
and the presumption of innocence. The right not to he coerced into making a 
confession is explicitly stated in Article 14 (3) (g) of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the United Kingdom is a party. lt 
also flows from the presumption of innocence, contained in all human rights 
instruments. Furthermore, the equally fundamental (and internationally re-
cognized) principle that the guilt of the accused must he established beyond 
reasonable doubt implies a prohibition to convict on the basis of unreliable 
evidence, such as confessions obtained under duress. 
The institutionalized use in Northern Ireland of strong psychological 
pressure on suspects in order to induce them to confess appears to he in 
breach of at least Article 14 (3) (g) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. Convictions based solely on contested confessions ob-
tained under such duress furthermore raise serious doubts about the adher-
ence hy the ·• Diplock" courts to the presumption of innocence in all cases. 
These aspects of the "Diplock" court system therefore raise questions about 
the extent to which trials in the "Diplock" courts accord with international 
norms for a fair trial, contained in such international instruments as the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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FOOTNOTES 
• former Amnesty Internal tonal rc't•archcr for the l 'm red Kmgdom. the• lh•puhhc of Ireland. 
the Federal Rcpuhlir of ( icrmany and the ( ierman Dt·m<Kratll' Rc·puhilc: former Ht•ad ofF u· 
rope Region of Amnesty International's Research Depanment at"' lnternatumal Secret anal 
m l.ondon. The stutiy was prepared at tht· Max Planck Institute for foretgn and mternatlonal 
mmtnalla"' m 1-retburg 1m Are~Sgau. hderal Repuhhc of (ierman\ 
(I) The "hedule lists. mttr alia: murder: manslaughter: riot: ktdnappong: false 1mpmon· 
ment: 'erious a"ault: offences related to cxplo"ves. ftrearms. and petrol homt". c\Capc from 
pmon and as.mtmg m 'uch e\Capc. rohhery wtth ftrearms: mtlmtdatlon: htJackmg. contnhut· 
mg towards terrorism, af\on: damagmg property or thrcatcmng to damage propeny: homh 
hoaxc\; as well as offences created under tht· Act. such as memhershtp of pro\Cnhcd orgam7· 
atum~: unlawful collection of information of use to terrorist': and trammg m makmg or u~c of 
firearms or cxplo"'"· The hst can he altered hy ( )rder of the Secretarv of Stal<' for Nonhern 
Ireland. 
(2) Section .ll of the Act gtves the following dcfimttnns 
"'terrorist' means a pcn .. on who 1s or ha\ hccn concerned m tht· commP"'1on or attt.·mpted corn-· 
mi~ston of any act of tcrron!-.m or m lhrccting, orgamnng or trammg pt'r\OO"l for the purpo'c of 
. .. 
tcrron~m; 
and 
"'terrorism' means the u'e of violancc for political end' and mdudc' any u'c of vwlancc for 
the purpose of putting the puhlic or any 'cctlon of the puhlic in fear." 
( 3) For a brief discus""" of the ex po>r facto rcmcdtcs agam't unlawful or mcgular treat· 
men! dunng detentiOn, see hclow. Chapter 6. 
(4) Ben nett J. reJeC" "the alternatiVe arrangement under whtch a pantcular memht.·r of the 
umformed staff mtght take respon"hility for each pnsoner mdtvtdually, and throughout hiS 
detention" hccause "such responsibility would ... have little meaning unle" the designated of· 
ficer acompanied the prisoner wherever he went, including the mterview room." In his own 
proposals. however. the rcsponsthility of the umformed mspector for the welfare nf pnsoner-
cqually extends tu periods spent m an mterview room. 
( 5) The repon as suhmttted to Amnesty International, and as sent hy them to Baker J .• sum· 
manzed and quoted at some length from the relevant pans of Boy le et al.\ work: Ten }'eari 
On, pp. 65· 75. 
(6) Thts investigatwn. and ih limitations. were also set out m somewhat greater detatl m 
Amnesty International's analysis as sent hy them tu l:laker J. The relevant passages drew, m 
panicular, on the Bennett Repon, paras 2lN-291, 352, and 361-362. 
(7) This sectton requires that, in cases in the ·'Diplock" couns wherepr~mafaCieevidcnce 
has hcen adduced hy the defence that a statement was ohtamed as a result oftonure. inhuman 
or degrading treatment, the prosecution must rchut this prima jaueevidence before the state· 
ment can be used as evidence. The Crown must establish the is>ue hcyond reasonahle doubt 
(see Chapter 4). 
(M) The complaints procedure IS hrielly discussed in Chapter h. 
(9) In the same paragraph, Ben nett J. concluded that "the present practice ra~>es a serious 
i.sue concerning public confidence in the complaints procedure, which should be funher exa· 
mined.". Note that Ben nett J. was concerned with the effect of th•' change in procedure on the 
investigation of complaints, whereas this analysts deals With the effect of that change on tbc 
fairness of cnminal proceedings against the complainant. 
( 10) Now section M of the 1978 Act. See footnote (7) and Chapter 4. In the same period 
statements made by 15 persons were ruled inadmissible in the ·Dip lock" coun>. 
( 11) Previously •cction 6 of the Nonhern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 197 J and 
therdore referred to in coun judgements prior to 197M as "section 6". 
\ 12) Voirdirrsignifies a trial within a trial (held outside the presence oft he JUry) whose pur· 
pose IS to determine the truth from two conflicting statements. 
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( 1_\) In all hut tht.' m1 ''t \Cnt lU"' ca-.t.'\, an an.:w .. l'd can waiVl' h1.., nght to a JUry tr1al and opt for 
a tnal n~.·forc magl\tratc.., SI lOll' 3\pt.'Ch nt tnal\ Hl Ma~l\tratt:< court' art• dl~l'U~\t:d hdow' 
1 14) A Jury need not he empanelled tf the accu\ed plead' gutlty. "net· m that ca,e. m the 
l·.ngh'h arcu\atonal 'Y'll-'m. then·'"' no nt·cd for an av'ie..,..,mt·nt of t'VIllencc: ..,urh a plea. 1f ac-
cepted hy tht· pro,t.Tutlon, ..,uffin•.., to convJCt. 
( l'i) In ca'e' of 'l>me .. ,cht·dukd" offence' (mdudmg murder). Lord D1plock recom-
mended that tnal wtthout a JUry should he suhJCCt to a certtficatc hy the Dtrector of Puhlic 
l'ro\ecutton' In the lcgtslatum ha,cd on the Dip lock Report thiS wa' altered to a power hy the 
Attorney-General for Northern Ireland to cert1fy m any particular case that that case" not to 
he tried as a "scheduled" offence. 
1 In) ~or the onus and standard of pr<wJf in tht• different procecdmgs. sec hclow. 
1 17) But note that the Comm1Sston prop"'ed that m ccnam rare cucumstancc' ('uch a' 
murder on a tram)." the pohcc should he gtwn a power to detam people ... whtlc name' and ad-
dre"cs arc obtained or a ,u,pecttdenttfied or the matter otherwi'e rcM>Ived." ( RCCP Report, 
para .l 'IJ ). 
• 
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APPENDIX I 
SUMMARY OF AMNFSTY INTERNATIONAL'S FINDINGS RE-
GARDING THE SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE LINKED WITH 
THE "DIPLOCK" COURTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
As submitted, with the above analysis, to the UK government in December 
19M2 and to the Baker inquiry in August l9H3; and made public together 
with the AI Circular on the organization's concern regarding the criminal 
justice system in Northern Ireland (AI Circular EUR 45/0l/H4 of 17 
February 19H4 ), attached as Appendix 11. 
I. Salient Aspects of the System 
Amnesty International has drawn the following basic conclusions regarding 
the study of the law and the practice of this system. Brief notes and refer-
ences with respect to each conclusion have been included to indicate import-
ant considerations. 
(a) The police and the anny have been given wide and in effect unchal-
lengeable powers of arrest and detention. 
The police may arrest without warrant, and detain for up to 72 hours, 
anyone whom they suspect of "being a terrorist", according to Nor-
them Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, s.ll. The arrested 
person need not be suspected of any specific (scheduled) offence, nor 
is it specified that the suspicion must be reasonable or based on factual 
infmmation. The army has similarly wide powers of arrest, though 
linked with more limited powers of detention. Arrests under s.l2 of the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976 must be 
based on "reasonable suspicion". Persons arrested under this section 
may, with the approval of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
be detained for up to seven days. 
The courts do not probe for the basis of such suspicion as gave rise to an 
arrest and so arrests under all the above-mentioned powers are unchal-
lengeable in practice. 
There is also no judicial remedy against repeated arrests in quick suc-
cession of the same person on the same suspicion (ruling by the Lord 
Chief Justice for Northern Ireland in June 1980 on a habeas corpus ap-
plication in re Martin Lynch). 
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(h) "Forceful", ''llectstvc" and "pcrststcnt" mtcrrogation is allowed. in 
which the nght to stlcncc ts implicitly denied. 
The words "forceful". "dccistve" and "persistent" wcrt• used hy Hen-
nett J. to dcscrihc the kind of interrogation used in Northern Ireland 
which, he said. "does not imply the use of unlawful means" (para-
graphs ]o and 37 of Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Police In-
terrogation Procedures in Northern Ireland. March 1979 - hereafter 
referred to as the Bennett Report. sec also paragraphs H4 and 91 of 
Report of the ( ·ommisswn to consi,!er legal procedures to deal with ter-
rorist actil'ities in Northern Ireland, Dccemhcr 1972 - hereafter re-
ferred to as the !Jiplock Report). 
It is clear from the Hen nett Report and the 1Y72 Diplock Report that 
these forms of interrogation arc specifically aimed at tnducing prison-
ers to speak who without them would have stayed silent. 
(c) Interrogation is not under contemporaneous judicial control. 
There is no institutional judicial involvement in police questioning. 
The Lord Chief Justice for Northern Ireland has further held that "the 
treatment and conditions of detention accorded to a person lawfully 
detained do not therefore give rise to the remedy of habeas corpus" (in 
re Martin Lynch). 
It may he noted that the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure re-
commended that the introduction in England of lawful detention for 
questioning hcyond 24 hours should he linked to a hearing heforc ma-
giStrates (Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Report, para. 
3.106). 
(d) The opportunities for the defence effectively to challenge the prosecu-
tion case in the pre-trial proceedings have been substantially reduced. 
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Bail may he granted only by a High Court Judge, and a separate appli-
cation must he made for this purpose, according to s.2 of the Northern 
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978. The initial appearance be-
fore the magistrate serves mainly to provide the accused with legal as-
sistance. Committal proceedings arc dealt with mainly through a "prel-
iminary enquiry" rather than the ordinary "preliminary investigation", 
according to s.l of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 
197H. The preliminary enquiry gives a less searching examination than 
the preliminary investigation. If the accused complains of his treatment 
in custody, a prc-trial investigation is carried out into the complaint on 
hehalf of the Director of Puhlic Prosecution, but the defence has no ac-
cess to this investigation. other than hcing asked to make a statement to 
the investigating police officer ( Bennett Report, paras 289-292 and 
]59-362 ). 
(c) At the trial, statements ohtained hy "oppressive" methods are admtssi-
hie, so long as their methods did not amount to torture. inhuman or de-
grading treatment; the courts also as a rule exclude statements in cases 
in which there was evidence of physical ill-treatment. 
In ordinary law. involuntary statements must he excluded from evid-
ence (principle (c) prefaced to the Judges' Rules). This includes state-
ments ohtaincd hy "oppression", which was defined in R ~· Prager 
( 1971) 5o Cr.App.Rep.151.161 as "something which tends to sap. 
and has sapped. that free will which must exist hefore a confession is 
voluntary" (from R v Prrestly, 1965, 51 Cr.App.Rep.l) and as "qucs-
tiomng which by its nature, duration or other attendant circumstances 
(including the fact of custody) excites hope (such as the hope of re-
lease) or fears or so excites the mind of the subject that his will crumhles 
when otherwise he would have stayed silent" (from a speech by Lord 
MacOermott in a speech to the Hentham Cluh in 1968 ). 
In the" Oiplock" courts, statements must be excluded only if it has heen 
shown that they were obtained as a result of torture, inhuman or de-
grading treatment (s.8 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provi-
sions) Act 1978 ). According to Bennett J. "it is nevertheless clear that 
any statement which may have been obtained by the use of physical vi-
olence or ill-treatment would not be admitted" (Ben nett Report, para. 
84 ). Otherwise, there is no clear or consistent practice, but it is clear 
that "forceful", "decisive" and "persistent" questioning is not as such 
ground for exclusion, even when it falls within the definition of "op-
pression" cited above and even though it may clearly affect the reliabil-
ity of the confession (see R v Corey and others ( 1977) 6 December 
1973, unreported; R v McCormick and Others (1977) N.l.4; R v 
McGrath (1980) N.l.91; Diplock Report, paras 88-90). 
(f) According to s.7 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 
1978, trialin the "Diplock" courts is without jury. The single judge has 
taken over the functions of the jury as tribunal of fact and "weighs" the 
evidence in a legal framework which is much less strict than in ordinary 
trials. 
The ordinary law sets a strict framework for the weighing of evidence 
by the jury, and the judge ensures strict adherence to the framework: he 
rules on the admissibility of evidence; is the umpire over the manner in 
which prosecution and defence present their case; sums up the evid-
ence; and instructs the jury on the law as regards onus and standard of 
proof etc. 
In the "Oiplock" courts the changes in the rules on the admissibility of 
confession, together with the fact that the judge is both umpire over the 
proceedings and tribunal of fact, have substantially relaxed the legal 
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framework for the "weighing" of the evidence, and have thereby re-
duced safeguards against subjective factors influencing the findings of 
fact. Such subjective factors need not take the form of bias on the part 
of the judge. but may include "case-hardening". the negative effect of 
constant involvement in the administration of justice on the detach-
ment and objcct1vit y of judges. 
(g) In most cases the evidence against the accused consists wholly or main-
ly of a confession submitted by the prosecution as having been made by 
the accused during police interrogation. 
Ben nett J. was informed by the Director of Public Prosecutions that in 
the first six months of 197H in 75-HO% of cases for scheduled offences 
the prosecution case depended wholly or mainly on the confession of 
the accused (Rennet/ Report. para .10 ). This included both written and 
alleged verbal confessions. 
(h) In such cases, the "weighing" of the evidence is in fact subsumed under 
the judge's ruling on the admissibility of the confession: confessions, 
once admitted as evidence. are not in practice tested further on their re-
liability. 
Matters which might affect the reliability of a confession (threats, pro-
mises, oppression) are. in law, supposed to he fully investigated after 
the ruling on the admissibility. In fact. there is no subsequent inquiry 
specifically to deal with the reliability of confessions, once they arc ad-
mitted. No case has been brought to Amnesty International's attention 
where an accused was acquitted though his confession was ruled ad-
missible. If such cases exist, they arc extremely rare. 
( i) The scope of appellate review over .. Diplock" court cases is limited, at 
least as regards the crucial issues of the exercise of judicial discretion in 
ruling on the admissibility of a confession. and of the "weighing" of 
confessions by the judge acting as tribunal of fact. 
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There is virtually unlimited right of appeal (s. 7(6) of the Northern Ire-
land (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978). However, under normal 
procedure matters within the discretion of the trial judge do not afford 
grounds of appeal and appellate review over the "weighing" of the 
evidence by the tribunal of fact is very limited in scope. 
In practice, the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland has not always 
restricted hearings to issues which, on the basis of the law as normally 
applied, would afford grounds for appeal. On the other hand, Amnesty 
International has not found any decision by the Court of Appeal in 
Northern Ireland clearly extending the scope of that court's review be-
yond what was stated above. Whatever the precise extent of the Court 
of Appeal's supervision. the followmg i~ clear as regards thl· crucial is-
sue in the "Diplock" courts· the asst•ssmcnt of the reliability of a con-
fession by the single judge in the "Diplock" courts is not tested on ap-
peal. once it is accepted by the Court of Appeal that the trial judge was 
correct in his interpretation of the words: "torture. inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment". and that he had at least considered whether to exercise 
his discretion to exclude the confession. 
2. The Reliability of Confessions 
Having analysed the system. Amnesty International believes that, for the 
purpose of determininll the fairness of trials in the "I>iplock" courts, the 
sinJlle most important issue reJlards the reliability of confessions obtained 
durinJl interroJlation. In this respect. Amnesty International has established 
the following: 
the police rules on interrogation allow for methods of Interrogation 
which can seriously affect their reliability: 
the prc-trial investigation carried out on behalf of the Director of Pu-
blic Prosecutions is not aimed at ensuring that only primajaciereliabk 
confessions arc tendered in evidence; 
the tests applied by the judges in the .. Diplock .. courts in rulmg on the 
admissibility of confessions do not as a rule extend beyond ensunng 
that confessions were not obtained as a result of physical ill-treatment: 
although these tests leave out many aspects of interrogation which can 
seriously affect the reliability of confessions, the courts in practice sub-
sume their "weighing" of the reliability of a confession under their rul-
mg on its admissibility. 
The .. Diplock" courts convict in the vast majority of cases in which a confes-
sion (allegedly) made by the accused in the course of police interrogation is 
the only evidence of his guilt. as long as there was no evidence that physical 
ill-treatment (or worse) was used to obtain that confession. It is surprising. in 
view of the evidentiary problems arising out of the private nature of intern>-
gation (described in the Ben nett Report, paragraphs .140- .14H ), that the 
courts so often hold that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt 
that no such treatment occurred. Even if that is left aside, there must be seri-
ous doubt about any assumption that confessions obtained as a result of 
"forceful". "decisive" and "persistent" interrogation arc reliable even if 
there was no physical ill-treatment. 
.1. The Royal Commission on Cnminal Procedure 
• 
The issue of the reliability of confessions obtained as a result of interrogation 
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-ha> heen dealt with tn the context of the revtew of English cnmmal proce-
dure \:arried out hy the Royal ( 'omtnt\\ton on ( 'nmmal Procedure. Exten-
\tve re~car\:h wa' earned out on hehalf of the ( 'ommisston m to the psycho-
logical aspects of interrogation (Royal ( 'ommission on ( 'riminal Procedure, 
Research Studies Nos. I and 2: l'o/ice /nterrogatwn. The Psychologtcal Ap-
proach: A case >tudv of current pracltce. London, HMS( J, I WW ). Thts re-
\t'an:h rat\cs -.eriou\ douhts ahout the rehahility of confessions ohtaincd a' a 
result of interrogatton. in particular if the display of authority hy the interro-
gator ts comhtned with such factors as isolatton and/ •>r fatigue which tmpair 
a suspect's "dcctsion-making performance" (sec pp. 42-43 of the study). 
The researchers concluded that such tmpairmcnt an>cs 
"wh~re mterrogatton takes place after mtdnight: where the .,w.p~ct ha>. lost mon: 
than five hours sleep: or when the mtcrrogation nmllnucs for more than one hour 
without a hreak" (p. 42 llf the >.~udy). 
The authority of the interrogator can make a suspect "obedient" in that it 
"pr~dtspos~s the sw.pecl to gtve up the responsihility of making lhl' dectsion for 
himself in favour of acqUtescmg to the demands of his Interrogator ... 
In the situation where the interrogator has formed a view of the possihle guilt of 
the suspect, the risk of mdirt:ctly conv~ying important m formation about the crime 
and the part played hy the suspect will be greater. If m such a case the suspect is both 
innocent and fully ohcdicnt, then the nsk of a false confession will also be high" (p 
43 of the study). 
The researchers argue from the psychological literature that 
"in principle, false confessions can be elicited by the application to an innocent su-
spect of techniques which may also be successful in obtaining true confessions from 
the guilty, but th~ state of knowledge is not sufficient to assist in detecting false con-
fessions when they have heen obtained (assuming that there is no oth~r evid~ncc 
which casts doubt on their reliability)" (pp. 25-26 of the study). 
This study carried out on hehalf of the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Procedure with particular reference to English nmms of criminal procedure 
(though drawing on and confirming international psychological research) 
must cast serious douht on interrogation and "Diplock" court-practice in 
Northern Ireland. Many of the features of interrogation identified as affect-
ing the reliability of confessions are almost institutional parts of interroga-
tion in Northern Ireland, for example, isolation, fatigue and the strong dis-
play of authority implicit in "forceful", "persistent" and "decisive" ques-
tioning. The finding that the same pressures which may cause guilty suspects 
to confess may as well compel innocent suspects to make a false confession 
goes strongly against propositions made by Lord Diplock and at least impli-
citly accepted hy Bennett J. that it is acceptable in the circumstances in Nor-
thern Ireland to put strong psychological pressure on suspects to confess and 
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to rclv on such confesstons to convtct. even without corrohoration . 
• 
The Commission considered the rules for the questioning of suspects with 
the henefit oft he results of thts study into the psyehologtcal cffl·cts of interro-
gation. The ( 'ommission developed a framework for questiomng linked with 
the rcliahility of confessions and drew up rules for questioning atmed at en-
suring. as far as possihlc. that confesstons ohtatned hy the police arc rcliahlc. 
Confessions ohtained in hreach of these rules would require corroboration 
(Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Report, paragraphs 4. 109 -
4. I 14 and 4. 131 -4.133 ). The nature,length and conditions of Interrogation 
m Northern Ireland arc such as to fall far short of the rules envisaged hy the 
Royal Commission on ( 'riminal Procedure as necessary to ensure. as far as 
possihle, that confessions ohtained hy the police are rcliahle. By the stand-
ards of the ( 'ommission (set on the hasis of extensive research into the psy-
chological effects of interrogation). convtctions hased solely on confessions 
ohtaincd as a result of" forceful". "decisive" and "persistent" interrogation 
arc not sound: under the Commission's proposals such confession would re-
quire corrohoration. 
Changes in "technical" aspects of a criminal justice system aside, the most 
fundamental requirement for all such systems must he that convictions are 
sound, in that they arc hased on reliahle evidence, properly tested. The Eng-
lish system of criminal justice contains safeguards. first to ensure that the na-
ture,lenght and conditions of questioning are not such as to he likely to affect 
the reliahility of a confession. and second to test the "voluntariness" of a 
statement before allowing it to come hefore the trihunal of fact. These safe-
guards arc not mere "technical" and outdated aspects of the system, as Lord 
Diplock suggested (Dip/ock Report, paragraphs 59 and 73 ff.). The Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure has re-affirmed that it is a fundamental 
requtrement of the English system that it comprises rules for questioning 
aimed at ensuring the reliahility of confessions prior to their heing brought 
hefore the trihunal of fact. This fundamental requirement for the attainment 
of soundness, reliability and fairness of convictions has heen abrogated in 
the "Diplock" system of criminal justice in Northern Ireland. 
4. International not ms 
Amnesty International is aware that, in times of emergency "threatening the 
life of the nation", the international human rights treaties allow for deroga-
tion hy state-parties from some (not all) oftheir international obligations, in-
cluding the obligation to afford everyone a fair trial in the determination of 
any criminal charge against him. Such derogations must he "to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" (International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, article 4; European Convention on Human 
Rights, arttcle 15; somewhat differently, American Convention on Human 
Rights, article 27). This allows states in certain circumstances to introduce 
administrative detention without trial (internment) as the authorities did in 
Northern Ireland between 1971 and 1975. However, the United Kingdom 
Government (although it has declared that an emergency continues to exist 
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111 Northern Ireland) ha-. alway-. mamtamed that tho-.e convu:ted 111 the 
"Diplock" courts have heen found guilty of cnmes m fair proceedin~s. ln-
del·d. Lord Diplock, in recommending the settmg up of thl' courts. stressed 
that the changes he recommended tell wtthm the mmmlllm requiremenh of 
article n of the f .. uropean ('on t·entlon on Human Rights. whtch lays down re· 
quirements for a fair trial ( Dtplock Report, paragraphs 12-14 ). 
The proceedings linked with trials in the" Diplock" courts may therefore 
he JUd!-(cd by mintmum mtcrnational standards for a fatr tnal. 
The most tmportant questions regarding adherence to mternattonal 
norms, for the purpose of Amnesty International's assessment, relate to the 
fn.:edom from sclf-incrimmatHJn and to the presumpttnn of mnocencc. The 
princtplc that someone who is the suhjeet of a cnmmal mvesttgat1on shall 
have the right not to he coerced tnto t:onfessmg •~ not statl·d exphcttly 111 all 
human nghts treaties; the Fumpean Convention on Human R1~ht\, for m-
stance. does not wntain such a provision. The pnnc1ple ts contamed 111 the 
/nternatwna/ ( ovenant on ( 'it·i/and Politiml Rtght.\, to whtch the l :ntted 
Kingdom ts party. ( Arttt:le 1-l( 3 )(g) oft hl' Covenant provtdes that in the de-
termination of any criminal charge against htm, everyone shall ht· entitled: 
The principle is also explicitly stated in article X( 2)(g) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the most recent of the human nghts treattes. 
which further develops the print:iplc by adding, in article X( 3 ): 
"A confc;,sion of )(Uilt hy the accused '>hall he valid onlv 1f it j;, made Without coer-
Cilln of anv km d." 
-
The princtplc that no-one shall he convtcted on the hasts of a confession 
obtained under duress is also explicitly stated in such documents as the ( Un-
ited Nations) Draft Principles on Freedom from A rl>itrary Arrest and De ten-
tion (articles 24 and 25) and the (United Nations) Draft Bodv of PrincipleJ 
fiJr the Prosecution of AI/ Persons under Anv Form of Detentwn or lmprt-
.wnment ( arttt:les 15 and 23 ). 
Even though not always explicitly stated, the right not to he coerced mto 
making a confession and the right not to he convicted on the hasis of a con-
fession obtained under duress can he said to he implicit in the right to a fair 
trial, pronounced hy all international human rights instruments. The first 
right can he said to flow from the presumption of innocence: to require a su-
spect to talk subverts the principle that it is the duty of the prosecution to 
prove the guilt of the accused- which is not only the "golden thread" running 
through English criminal justice (Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 
Report, paragraph 4.35, quoting Lord Sankey), but also a general principle 
of criminal law, and an internationally recognized norm for a fair trial. recog-
nized equally in accusatorial and in developed inquisitonal systems of crimi-
nal justice. Furthermore, the equally fundamental (and equally widely re-
cognized) principle that the guilt of the accused must be established beyond 
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rcasonahk doubt tmpllcs a prohthttton to convict on the ha-.1-. '1f unreliahk 
evtdencc. such as confessions ohtaml·d under Jure-. ... In the worth of the 
Royal Commission on Crimmal Procedure: 
"lt "not only that t•xtremc mean-. of attempt In~ to .:xtort conk'>,ion,, tor exam-
ple the rack and thumhscrew .. are ahhorrelll to any CIVIIIIt.'d -.oe~ety. hut that thev 
and other less awful. thou)(h not nece'>sarilv le'' potent. mean' of applvmg prc\'>urc 
to an accU'>l'd pt~rson to '>l>t'ak do not nen·"anly prodtH:t' 'Pt't'l'h nr the truth." 
( R( '( P Report. para~raph 4. 1h ). 
The explicit inclusion in such recent mternatlonal treaties and documents 
as thl' A mertcun Com·entwn on Human Rights. the Draft l'nnciples on 
Freedom from A rl>itrary Arrest and Detention and the Draft Body of l'rinci-
. . 
pies for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Impri-
sonment of the principk that confessions obtained under duress shall not 
form the basis of a conviction underlines the ar~ument that that principk is 
an essential clement in attainin~ fairness in cnmmal proceedings. 
The institutionalized use in Northern Ireland of strong psychological 
pressure on suspects in order to induce them to confess appears to he in 
hreach of at least article 14( 3 )(g) oft he International ( 'ovenant on ( 'il'iland 
Political Rights. Convictions based solely on contested cnnkssions obtained 
under such duress furthermore raise douhts ahout the adherence hy the" Di-
plock" courts to the presumption of innocence in all cases. These aspects of 
the "Diplock" courts system therefore raise questions about the extent to 
which trials in the "Diplock" courts accord with imermttional norms for a 
fair trial, contained in such international instruments as the Unirersal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, the International C ·o vena m on Ci vi/ and Political 
Rights and the f.'umpean Convention on Human Rights. 
London, December I9X2. 
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APPENDIX 11 
AI INIH-:X: H 'H-IS/Ill /K-1 
NORTHERN IRELAND: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CON· 
CFRNS RF<iARDIN(i THE CRIMINAL .JUSTICF SYSTFM 
In August I YHJ Amnesty International suhmitted material documenting its 
concerns ahout the so-called .. Diplock Courts" in Northern Ireland to Sir 
( ieorgc Baker. the English JUdge who 1s conducting an inquiry into the 
workings of the .. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act" of I 97H. 
Amnesty International suhmittcd a detailed analysis of the legislation 
along with a summary of its conct•rns which it had suhmitted to the Secretary 
of Stall' for Northern Ireland in Decemher lliH2. 
In Its suhmission, Amnesty International expressed concern that the pro-
ceedings in the" Dip lock courts" might not conform to international stand·· 
ards for fair trial. 
These courts were named after the JUdge who recommended in a I Y72 in-
quiry that "terrorist" offences committed in Northern Ireland should he 
tried hy senior judges sitting alone with no jury. None of those tried in this 
way haw heen adopted hy Amnesty International as prisoners of consci-
ence. 
Furthermore, allegations that confesswns were ohtained as a result of 
phys1cal ill-tn:atmcnt had virtually stopped since Amnesty International's 
I Y7H report on that suhjcct and the suhscqucnt confi1mation of the organi-
zation's findings hy a government-appointed committee of inquiry. 
However, Amnesty International expressed concern ahout various issues 
connected with the fact that throughout the history of these courts, the great 
majority of those convicted had heen convicted solely on the hasis of confcs-
• 
sums. 
The police and army have wide powers to arrest people and detain them 
on suspicion for up to seven days. During the first two days people who have 
hecn arrested arc held incommunicado without access to lawyers or rela-
tives. The laws and police regulations pe1mit the use of strong psychological 
pressure on suspects to induce them to confess. Even confessions obtained 
in this way may be admitted into evidence by the Oiplock courts, although 
they would be excluded as "oppressive" by established standards in other 
courts in the United Kingdom. 
By comparison with trials in ordinary courts in the United Kingdom, the 
fact that there is no jury, hut only a judge, reduces the safeguards against 
such confessions being given too much weight. 
These factors lead to the risk that people may be convicted and sentenced 
to imprisonment on the sole basis of confessions which, having been oh-
I 13 
tamul h\ ••pprl''>'>l\l' llll'thods. an· not rl'ltahk 
Appeal to htghn court-. dol'S not o\l'H'Oilll' thts ddtctenn stnce thl· ap· 
pt·alcourts constdvt mor,· thL· trtalrourts' ;tppltcatton olthl· !<m than thc11 
a"c"mcnt ••I th,· c·\ tdcncc 
I nth -.uhllli'>'>~Oilto Str ( il·mgc Bakn. Amnesty lnternatHmal also r;used 
the Cl'>c' of Mtchad ( ·ulbcrt. whtch 11 hcltcn:-. tllustratl'' th umcnn' 
Mtc:hacl ( 'ulbcrt. a soctal worker from Belfast. was arrc'>ll'd Ill ! li7X and 
ctmvtctc·d 111 111711 of murdcnng a P••ltn:man and member'>htp of the ln-.h 
Republican Army. After hts arrest he \I. a'> tnterr .. gated tor long pcrtod-. hut 
not phv'>lcall\ tll-trc·aied. lk was alleged to have madl' a verbal (un'>tgncd) 
c:onfc,,ton. and thl'> W<l'> the omly t:vtdcncc produn·d agatnst hitn. lie dcntul 
ha\tng made: ,uch a confc'>'>lon and mamtatnnlthat at thl' ttme of the alleged 
conk''>lon he wa-. c..:ompktcly dtsoncntatcd ao, a n:~ult of c:ontmuous mterro-
gatwn. lack of -.lecp and being made to '>land for long penod., dunng mtcrro-
gatwn. (The poliCl' tkntcd that he had been forced f(l -,tand.) 
At hi'> tnal by a -.pcctal court o,omo: month'> lall'r m ( ktobo:r l47ll, thl· only 
"'uc .,.,a., the adrmssthtltty of hts alleged verbal confcs.,ton. 
The c..:ourt held that the confcs~ton was admi,,tblc, c..:onvtc..:ted hm1 of mur-
der and mcmhc"hrp of the lmh Republll'an Army. and ~cntcnced htm to life 
rmpn'( liHlll'llt. 
Amnesty lnternatumal. hdit•vmg the c<l'>t' to ratsc' fundamentalt~sw:s of 
' prinoplc, -.o:nt an observer to his appeal heanng 111 January llJX2. Hts appeal 
was turned down. 
On J October llJX] Amnc-.ty lnternattonal wrote agam to the t:nitcd 
Kmgdom Government expressing concern about the recent practice in Nor-
thern Ireland of bnngmg prosecution~ solely or mainly on the basis of testi-
mony of former accomplice~ of the at:cu~ed. 
Dunng the past year about ]00 people had been c:harged wrth or tned for 
cnmes involvmg politically motivated violence on thl~ basis of testimony by 
20 individuals who were themselves implicated in such offences. 
These former accomplices arc known as "supergrasses". a term derived 
from "grass", a slang expression m the UK for tnformer 
The defendants have included alleged members of both Republican and 
Loyalist paramilitary organizations. 
In its letter, Amnesty International asked the Secretary of State for Nor-
thern Ireland to ensure that this subject he included m the terms of reference 
of the inquiry into the operation of emergency legislation in Northern Ire-
land. Amnesty International sent a copy of its letter to the judge conducing 
that inquiry, Sir George Baker. 
The orgamzatlon said that it was agatnst neither international standards 
nor the United Kingdom's laws for the testimony of accomplices to he ad-
mitted in evidence in criminal trials. 
However, Amnesty International said. a number of features of prosecu-
tion practice m "supergrass cases" had emerged which, taken together, 
raised doubr- about the quality of proof m such c..:ases. These factors were: 
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Many def<:ndants were convicted solely on the has is of the uncorroborat-
ed tt'stlmony of former accomplices. 
Although in English law the normal rules of evidence ruled out testtmony 
oht ;uned hy .. hopt· of advantage ... held out hy a person m aut honty ... in some 
"-.upergnN ... cases testimony had been admitted in evidence which was gtv-
en hy people who had themselves been offered immunity from prosecution 
for serious crimes. 
···· S< •me such witnesses had been m custody for long pcrtmb- well over a yt·-
ar- before the trial. so that the police had ample opportunity to influence the 
testimony unduly. 
Whneas in normal trials Judges were required to warn JUries of the dang-
t·rs of convicting ddl~ndants on the sole basis of such evidence, in the "Di-
plock courts" in Northern Ireland there were no JUries- and so JUdges had to 
"warn" only themselves. 
On 21 November I YIU the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland repli-
ed to AmneMy International's letter of]() Octo her. He referred Amnesty In-
ternational to a recent statement by the Attorney (lem~raltn Parliament out-
linmg the critena and safeguards employed hy the authorities in cases like 
those descriht~d hy Amnesty International. The Secretary of State also n:-
ferred to the safeguard offered hy the right of appeal against sentence to the 
higher courts. He told Amnesty International that witnesses, in custody or 
und~:r police protection. were not subjected to police pressure and that their 
right to access to relatives. friends or lawyers were respected. 
The inquiry hy Sir Cieorge Baker was still in progress as of mid-Fehruary 
19H4. 
The attached document (Appendix here included Appendix 1-SIM) was 
part of the material submitted hy Amnesty International to Sir George 
Baker in August llJlO. 
17 February l9H4 
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This issue in the series SIM Specials contains an extensive analysis of the law 
pertaining to the Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland. 
lt is available from SIM at Hfl. 20.- plus postage. 
SIM, Nieuwcgracht 94 
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